


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SOVIET UNION MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Examines Issue of Military Cadres (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates)	1
Restructuring Raises Demands on Commanders, by V. Lobov	1
New Rubric on Duty, Responsibility	5
Officers Urged To Set Tone, by V. Abryshkin	6
Naval Academy Cadre Education Discussed, V. Ponikarovskiy Interview	7
Irresponsibility in Cadre Selection Scored, by N. Shlyaga	12
Selection of Air Regiment Commanders, by V. Bulankin	16
Commander's Persistence Changes Detachment, by V. Borodin	19
Need for New Petty Officer Policy, by A. Pushkin	22
The Formation of New Pilot Command Cadres, by V. Kudryavtsev	25
Proper Upbringing of Young Officers, by N. Mulyar	29
Innovative Submarine Leadership Praised, by P. Ishchenko	32
Warrant Officer's Career Frustrations, by A. Samoylov	35
Strictness Toward Junior Officers, by Yu. Shilin	37
Col Gen Popkov on Improving Predraft Training (M. Popkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 May 87)	42
Col Gen Arkhipov on Restructuring in Moscow MD (V. Arkhipov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 May 87)	49

Major General Vasilevskiy on Unifying Minorities in Collectives (N. Vasilevskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 May 87)	54
Debate on Impact of Military Service on Higher Education (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, various dates)	58
Round Table Criticizes Draft, by M. V. Volkenshteyn, et al. Col Gen Gareyev Responds, by M. Gareyev	58 60
DRA Veteran Returns To Active Life Despite Wound (P. Chernenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Apr 87)	68
Editorial Calls for 'Intensification of Openness, Criticism' (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 May 87)	70
WARSAW PACT	
Briefs	
Ivanov Port Call in GDR	73
ARMED FORCES	
Session of Collegium of Main Military Procuracy (A. Varfolomeyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Apr 87)	74
Legal Notice: Changes in Pre-Draft Training (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Apr 87)	75
Briefs	
Combat Training Conference	76
GROUND FORCES	
Lt Gen Gredasov on Weakness in Tactical Intelligence Support (F. Gredasov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 4 Jun 87)	77
Tactical Cooperation With Artillery in Combined Arms Battle (V. Mikhalkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jun 87)	82
AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES	
Maintenance Teams Train as Missile Launch Crews (V. Amirov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 May 87)	87
NAVAL FORCES	
Briefs	
Port Call at Tripoli	89
SPECIAL TROOPS	
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Raid: Labor Safety in Construction (Yu. Yegorov, et al.; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 May 87)	90

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Acceleration: Automation at Tank Repair Enterprise (B. Zotov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 28 Apr 87)	92
Change To Contract Method Detailed (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Apr 87)	95
Overcoming Bureaucratism in R&D Work (Ye. Zhuravlev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 May 87)	96
Planning for Reliability, Safety of Complex Systems (I. Ryabinin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 May 87)	99
Briefs	
Military-Scientific Agencies' Conference	103
Defense Enterprises Shift Work Increase	103

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Defines U.S., NATO Doctrines (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jun 87)	104
Review of NATO Laser Training Simulators (G. Gladkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 May 87)	106
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Examines Western Minesweepers (A. Kolpakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Apr 87)	109
Review of 3 Books on Japanese 'Militarism' (Ye. Aleksandrov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 18, Sep 86)	113
Briefs	
Chernavin, Yazov at Reception	118

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EXAMINES ISSUE OF MILITARY CADRES

Restructuring Raises Demands on Commanders

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Lobov: "It Begins with the Commander"]

[Text] Increase the responsibility of commanders, political workers, all officers, and army and navy party organizations for maintaining at a high level military discipline, ideological and moral indoctrination of the troops, and their military and political training... That is how mandatory for the military man is the requirement of the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum resolution.

The instructions of the plenum are addressed to each leader, including the sole commander. They make it incumbent upon him to be a model of ideological staunchness, unwavering observance of party and state discipline, competence, adherence to his word, honesty and probity, integrity, modesty, and irreconcilability toward any deviations from the norms of socialist morality. They provide the professional and moral standard that is necessary in order to conduct restructuring successfully. The time of allowances and concessions, the time of tapping someone on the shoulder in the selection and placement of cadres, including military, is irreversibly receding into the past.

Among those commanders in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District who are actively and creatively involved in the process of renewal, and are giving all of their strength to the common cause, I would first like to name Lt Col N. Petruk. Recently he was promoted and left for a new duty station. But I know that from time to time he will call the regiment that he commanded. And I also know how earnestly he will react to the first steps of his successor. And it is not difficult to understand him. He gave too much effort and spiritual fire to the regiment, which, until Nikolay Nikolayevich arrived was not distinguished by successes. Today it is the first regiment, known throughout the district.

What is it that Lt Col Petruk has? First of all it is his efficiency, his selflessness in his work, the ability to unite people and to mobilize them with the help of the party and komsomol organizations, to achieve the planned

goals. Petruk is one of those who could be called an "old soldier." I recognize that there was a time when I considered him excessively reserved and dry. Yes, in the sight of senior officers he did not smile excessively. On the other hand he becomes entirely different when he goes down to the trench of a dug-in company or appears at the firing positions of the artillerymen; in short, in those places where the outcome of the training battle is decided. Once on a mountain firing range I happened to see him along with a gun crew, wet to the skin, trying to pull out a vehicle that was stuck in the mud. It seems that Petruk had just arrived, but there was already a shovel in his hand and he was energetically helping the artillerymen. What was the lieutenant to do who until this had been standing to the side. He also threw off his raincape and set to work.

I never saw Lt Col Petruk at a party meeting or party committee session. But I heard from others. When he spoke he did not spare others either, including his deputies. He gave no quarter, did not forgive the slightest negligence or lack of execution, and even less excused indifference toward people. And today it is said justifiably that by his stern demands upon himself and his strengthening of high exactingness in the party organization, Petruk set the tone of restructuring in the regiment. The unit successfully completed the past training year, and began the current year well.

Perhaps I was distracted by this discussion of Lt Col Petruk. But I wanted to emphasize the main thing in the style of his work -- its thrust toward high end results; the priority of deeds over words.

And when, at the January CPSU Central Committee plenum, it was stated that the main thing today is to act, to act, and again to act -- actively, boldly and creatively -- I could not help but remember Lt Col Petruk. It is precisely such people as he and persons like him, such as aviator Lt Col Yu. Shamarin, tanker Maj V. Maleta, and artilleryman Gds Capt A. Vorotnikov, who are the leaders and organizers of restructuring. And they grow through accomplishing deeds and intense work, under the tireless influence of the demandingness and concern of senior supervisors and political organs.

Once I observed the work of a blacksmith. It is a spellbinding scene. He grabs the forging from the fire, begins to beat it on one side and then the other, measuring with his sharp eye where and how to modify it so that the necessary item is obtained. Sometimes the blacksmith would look and see that the forging was not right, that neither a horseshoe, nor a shackle would be obtained from it. He did not stand on ceremony with such a "good," but immediately removed it from the anvil to be smelted further. He knew that if the conscience gets crooked, harm will be brought to the work.

Human character, figuratively speaking, also passes through a forging process, only in another forge, that of life. For example, we want to have a good commander. And here good starting material is very important. And what frequently happens in real life? How do the higher military schools that prepare command cadres select the new commanders? We agree that frequently such criteria as a high mark in the recommendation and in the exams, and the vividness of the reference frequently play the main role. It seems as though we grope our way toward the selection of the future officer.

Take, for example, the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni MSU I. S. Konev. It is a new school. It is just a little more than 16 years old, but this school already has its own traditions, and authority, which many of its graduates have brought to it. However, the successes must not interfere with asking the question directly about defects in the selection of students. They exist and there are many of them. Already in the first year it is at times apparent that as a result of the imperfect selection system many students were not up to the work at hand. No Petruk will be obtained from them; they will not be able to become the equal of V. Litvintsev, P. Koptyukh, or our other best commanders. They do not have the mettle or the character.

It has long been recognized that the acceptance of new students into the school requires a scientific approach and a painstaking selection of the most deserving. But little is being done in this regard. The same person who issues the applications is the one who approves them. Just as long as the entrance exams were passed. It must be otherwise. In my view, primarily those who pass through the school of service, who were chosen in the workplace by authorized representatives of higher military educational institutions, who were singled out from the mass of their contemporaries for their ideological and political qualities, organizational abilities and moral and physical tempering should enter the school.

Analysis confirms that more reliable officers are obtained from those who entered the school, not from the civilian classrooms, but from the army, after being through the "university" of the worker.

Here I anticipate objections: What about age? Will we succeed in developing an army commander? We will. And the maturation, if it can be so expressed, of the students would have, I believe, only a positive effect on the quality of army cadres. There would be fewer errors in admission. I believe that the times and the increased demands upon service insistently dictate the need for restructuring in this matter.

Today we can also no longer brush aside this problem, which can clearly be seen in studying officer cadres. Whereas, in the postwar years there were not enough duty positions to assure the advancement of all militarily capable commanders and political workers ("competition" for advancement was so high among them), today frequently another picture takes shape. There are vacant positions for promotion and it is necessary to promote young officers who are not entirely deserving (there is no other choice). He is trusted to grow into the position, as it is already customary to say. Many justify the trust placed in them, but there are also many who do not rise above the mediocre, and at times even simply do not stretch themselves. Undoubtedly, the work suffers from this.

This is why it is so important to take up seriously the upbringing and preparation of a reserve for promotion, and to raise the responsibility of each supervisor, in the spirit of the instructions of the January plenum, for the preparation of his replacement. And it is important to deal strictly with those who do not give a chance to promising officers.

Again I recall Lt Col Petruk. He received a promotion and there was no problem with seeking a replacement for him..."Here, you select." He offered as candidates his deputy and chief of staff. "Both are deserving, and both were tested repeatedly in practice. I will vouch for them as for myself."

I believe that restructuring must also concern certain other views that do not correspond with the spirit of the times on the selection and placement of cadres. How does it frequently happen? There are officers in a regiment deserving of promotion. They are seen and known in the collective. But, someone is promoted from the unit, and they send to fill the vacant position a newly promoted officer from another unit, who, moreover, as it later becomes clear, does not handle the job. Is it necessary to say how negatively this affects the morale of the officer collective, and how badly it damages the authority of the regimental commander?

Of course, it would be incorrect to pose the question as one of the impermissibility of promoting a man from the outside. Here, like everywhere, it is necessary to proceed from the specific situation, but preference should nonetheless be given to people who have demonstrated themselves in the given unit, large unit or military district. One cannot help but consider that an assignment to a duty, so to speak, from long range, is also a suitable loophole for all manner of protectionists. As a commander, try to find out for what reasons one or another officer, who came from afar, has been assigned to your regiment.

This problem is also a very close one for the military district commander. He wants to entrust the regiment to a tested, reliable, hardworking officer, and frequently obtains an entirely unknown man for the vacant position. Hasn't the time come at least to have a test period in such cases for regimental commanders and higher ranking officers. If he does not do the job, he is not designated. So far one must be patient and become annoyed: A man fails to pull his weight, but it is a very difficult matter to replace him.

Here I believe it is necessary to make changes. It was emphasized at the plenum that a person who is not capable of changing for the better the situation in the area entrusted to him does not have the right to occupy a position of leadership. One must not look on with indifference as an untalented man, who is incapable of more, messes up the work and at times demoralizes the military collective with his actions and conduct. You see, everything begins with the commander.

Passivity in work and moral rust also thrive under certain conditions. Precisely these conditions arose in the "N" Tank Regt, not without the "strivings" of its commander, Maj V. Finkin. The year before last a serious failure at the final inspection, it would seem, had to teach all of the officers a great deal. The weakness in the individual training of a number of platoon, company and battalion commanders was obvious. The officers of corps headquarters also did not demonstrate good examples. But, a considerable period of time has already passed, and the situation is not changing for the better. The same shortcomings exist, and based on them, as before, the level of officer training is low.

The district military soviet was forced to pose sharply the question of the state of affairs in the regiment to the division commander. This time the division commander himself, his deputies, and the division staff were also subjected to strict criticism. They were criticized for the poor level of effectiveness of commander's training in the regiment, and for the fact that instead of training, here notorious "coaching" flourishes, which does not give stable results.

It goes without saying that it is difficult to teach something to a person if he himself does not want to learn. How can one not agree with the division commander, who with complete justification blamed Maj V. Finkin for this. But it is also necessary to see something else in this. The division commander and staff are incapably and superficially training the regimental commanders.

As the party requires, no one must remain outside criticism, including even the commander, or a supervisor of any rank. And it is indubitable that had, in this case, the division commander, political department and primary party organization been more demanding, this development of events could have been prevented. A similar conclusion also follows from analyzing the process of the downward slide of officers F. Volkovnitskiy, V. Klusov and M. Berilyuk.

The commander implements the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government. Today this means most of all, persistently, energetically, and picking up the pace of work, to carry out restructuring.

New Rubric on Duty, Responsibility

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 87 p 1

[Unsigned article: "Military Cadres: Duty and Responsibility"]

[Text] Duty and responsibility... These concepts, which are close in meaning and always stand together, are today taking on special importance for every Soviet man. To constantly increase responsibility for the work assigned, strengthen discipline and create an environment of mutual demandingness -- this was one of the lessons which the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum gave to cadres.

The words about duty and responsibility, heard repeatedly at the plenum, are all the more close and understandable to us, military people. "The Central Committee," emphasized M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, in his report, "is counting firmly on army cadres, and the Soviet Officer Corps in solving the task of strengthening the defense capability of the state, and is sure that under today's complex international conditions, communists and all army and navy cadres will act with highest responsibility, and increase and improve the skill and combat readiness of all the armed forces and branches of arms."

"Military cadres: duty and responsibility." This will be the name of the rubric which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is beginning today with an article by Col Gen V. Lobov, entitled "It Begins with the Commander" (published on page 2). In

materials under this rubric the newspaper will discuss how restructuring is going in the work of military cadres, in the spirit of the requirements of the 27th Party Congress and the January CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Officers Urged To Set Tone

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by Gds Lt Col V. Abryshkin, commander, "N" Tank Regt, Central Group of Forces: "A Time of Actions"]

[Text] The very first discussions in the regiment about the materials of the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee plenum indicate that the men responded to its resolution with profound interest and approval. Naturally, we military people received the task of increasing and improving the skill and combat readiness of all armed services and branches of arms, assigned by the party, with a special feeling of responsibility. After all, this is our vital task. We understand that accomplishing this task will depend on how creatively and purposefully each soldier will work in his particular place.

Reading carefully the lines of the report, "On Restructuring and Party Cadre Policy," one collates his own actions with the requirements that are today placed upon the leader. Just the same, are we operating, like the party demands, actively, boldly, creatively and competently?

There are, of course, examples of such work in the regiment. One can take even the recent tactical exercise. The subunits had to operate under difficult conditions. First, the situation in the exercise itself, which we attempted to make as close as possible to the conditions of real combat, demanded considerable intensity from the personnel. Second, the snowfalls and hard freezes, unprecedented for these parts, also seriously complicated the life and military work of the subunits in the field. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases the tasks assigned to them were accomplished at a high level of quality. And, most often, this was observed where commanders involved their subordinates through their own personal example in the struggle against difficulties, and, most of all, were themselves at a high level of performance.

However, I would not speak about this phenomenon, which is in general typical for the army, if I had not been confronted with facts of another type. I recall in one subunit I met a young officer who fearlessly, and very approximately drew the situation on the map, and did not develop the required combat documents. His subordinates, as it became clear later, also acquired less at the exercise than they could have.

There is nothing surprising about this. Subordinates very keenly catch such nuances in the behavior of their commander. I told the officer about this. He seemed to understand. In any case, I never again saw him so indifferent. But should a regiment commander have to speak about this with an officer in an exercise? Do we not have other, more important tasks, associated with improving the military training of the men, which require seeking and striving, initiative and youthful enthusiasm? Why is it necessary to waste

time on such reminders to an officer about the need to solve all questions thoroughly in a training battle, to not allow himself indulgences and concessions, and to be an example for his subordinates?

I think that in the immediate future we will continue this discussion at a meeting of the regiment's officers. All of us together will strictly call to account those who do not hold an officer's honor so dear. We will also acquaint people with the experience of those from whom they can learn. And we have many such officers. For example, the authority of Gds Sr Lt V. Sevostyanov, who has earned two Orders of the Red Star, is high. In the company that he commands there is not yet anyone equal to him in tactics and military bearing. His subordinates are also strong in this. Other names could also be mentioned. More than 80 percent of the officers in the regiment are first and second class specialists. This is our accomplishment, our work and our honor.

But today, the very thought that what has been achieved is the boundary, the summit, is harmful and incompatible with the spirit of the times and with reality. Immeasurably more is to be done than has been done. And here communists and officers have the decisive word. Today it is necessary to pose questions sharply and with principle, not only in the plane of the professional growth of officers, but also in the moral plane. Even the highest level of training and skill on the part of the officer, as is known, does not guarantee against failures in service, if he has low moral qualities. Not so long ago the communists from one of the battalions held a strict, insistent discussion with Gds Sr Lt S. Budkov. The officer was hitting the bottle, and as a result had to leave his position as company commander. Harsh? Yes, but in our day the question cannot be posed otherwise. The responsibility which the party has placed on the Soviet Officer Corps is too high.

Naval Academy Cadre Education Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 87 p 2

[Interview of Adm V. Ponikarovskiy: "Academy -- to the Navy"]

[Text] The Naval Orders of Lenin, the October Revolution and Ushakov Academy imeni MSU A. A. Grechko is 160 years old. Being one of the oldest higher military educational institutions in the country, the academy has made an important contribution to the training of highly skilled commanders and engineer cadres in our country's fleet, and in the working out of important scientific problems. The present concerns of the academy are inseparably linked with the problems that the Navy, the armed forces and the country are experiencing. Adm V. Ponikarovskiy, chief of the Naval Academy imeni MSU A. A. Grechko, discusses this in a talk with Capt 1st Rank S. Bystrov, editor of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA naval military training department.

Question. Comrade admiral, as it was emphasized at the CPSU Central Committee January plenum, today, under the conditions of restructuring, one of the most

important tasks is that of improving cadre policy. What problems of this sort is the academy having?

Answer. If we speak about cadre policy within the framework of the academy, first of all it is necessary to pay attention to the problem of the selection of candidates for training. It has existed for a long time and requires an effective solution if we wish to achieve real progressive advances.

Today a relatively small percentage of naval officers has the opportunity to obtain an education in our academy. This means that the selection of candidates must be all the more painstaking, balanced and well-grounded. All understand this; however, the existing system still has imperfections. Most of all, the present age qualification for command personnel taking part in full time training is too rigid and frequently does not enable us to compile a sufficiently thorough impression about the command qualities of an officer and his real future capabilities. In practice, in order to "succeed" in the academy, today an officer who will become commander of a first category ship, must "race" right through all the levels of shipboard service, not staying more than an average of two years in each. And, by the moment he enters the academy he must command a ship for no less than one and a half or two years. Therefore, an officer who is dreaming about the academy (and this is natural) is continuously thinking, almost from his years as a lieutenant, about how he can leap out of this "rut of future prospects." This does not always correspond to the interests of the service.

This programmed haste also creates difficulties in the fleets. The best, most promising commanders, who are capable of doing much to assimilate new equipment and increase the combat readiness of the ships and the development of tactic, are essentially not given the time to reach their full output on the commander's bridge. That is why senior officers in local areas attempt in every way possible to hold on to such commanders, even after they are included in the list of candidates confirmed in the fleet. And the replacements who appear are not of equal value.

Question. No doubt it is not an accident that many of the best known ship commanders in the Navy were not able to make use of the opportunity to receive an academic education in residence?

Answer. Precisely. I will name several examples. Rear Adm V. Naumov, who was awarded this rank during his term as commander of a nuclear missile submarine; Capt 1st Rank A. Olkhovikov, commander of a nuclear powered vessel, who earned the title Hero of the Soviet Union for mastery of a new warship; Capt 1st Rank A. Kovalchuk, the first commander of the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov; and Capt 1st Rank G. Yasnitskiy, commander of the aircraft carrying cruiser Kiev, all studied here on a non-resident basis.

Question. But, perhaps non-resident training is the most acceptable solution to special cases?

Answer. Unfortunately, too many such special cases arise. As a result, many more worthy candidates for non-resident training in the Navy come up than the academy can receive.

Question. What measures are being taken to solve the contradiction that has arisen nevertheless?

Answer. So far these have been half measures. In some cases, by decision of the VMF [Navy] commander-in-chief, officers are allowed to enter the academy for resident training who have "stepped over" the age requirement. We have also sought, with the assistance of the VMF cadre directorate and the commander-in-chief, to send directly to study officers whom the fleets have attempted to hold onto. Apropos of this, for officers in engineering specialties the age limits have been expanded without any apparent need. You see, it is known that, let us say, an officer has the opportunity to reach the level of commander of an electromechanical department more quickly than his colleague can become a ship commander. And situations also occur when mechanical engineers are recommended for the academy who are already rather senior in age, without adequately ensuring their subsequent prospects.

Question. That is, after the completion of the academy, difficulties arise with the appointment of officers in accordance with their education?

Answer. For those who have completed the command and aviation faculties there are virtually no problems. All graduates are named to positions that require academic education, and non-resident students are most often named to such positions while they are still in training. But a large percentage of officers in engineering specialties are distributed, due to a lack of vacancies in the fleets where they are most needed, to the central directorates, scientific research institutes and military delivery and official acceptance offices. In this regard, in the NII [scientific research institutes] they are very often placed in positions of junior scientific associates.

Question. That is, the requirement of the January CPSU Central Committee plenum concerning the need to improve fundamentally the work of preparing a reliable reserve of cadres for promotion encourages us to seek more resolutely a way out of this situation? I have in mind also the training of officers of engineer specialties. Perhaps, with respect to the latter, there is reason to speak about a certain "over-production"?

Answer. Undoubtedly we have something to work on here. The academy command group, political department and party organization understand this well. We have introduced their proposals on this score, and they were supported by the VMF command. But, I think that without the support, say, of the main cadre directorate, not everything can be solved. Our previous appeals to this level, unfortunately, were not always understood. As for the "over-production" of graduates in engineering specialties, there is none. Here it is more appropriate to speak about using them more effectively. In the same NII one observes inadequate manning by specialists with academic education. It is not always justified, in our view, to place people there without the necessary education.

Question. Let us again refer to the materials of the plenum, and to the unified system of continuous education which must be created in the country.

In your view, what is the state of affairs with respect to this in the Navy? Especially with respect to command personnel?

Answer. All the way up to the Naval Academy this system, I can say, was established and is satisfying the requirements of the Navy. Officers who show themselves well in the command path, as a rule, receive training at VMF Higher Specialized Officer Classes. After a few years many of them become our instructors. But then the matter becomes somewhat more complicated. The percentage of students at the General Staff Academy is not great. However, virtually all officers and admirals in the command elements of units and forces require regular, systematic renewal of their knowledge (besides independent study). I experienced this myself. In 1963 I completed the Naval Academy. And only now for the first time am I taking further training within academic walls, in the higher academic courses of the General Staff Academy. Such courses have also been created in our academy. In the course of a definite time period, according to a condensed and differentiated program, officers obtain the necessary modernization and expansion of their professional and socio-political knowledge. Unfortunately, the process of manning these courses suffers from the same shortcomings as does the selection for the academy.

Question. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the time spent in training officers within academic walls is very costly. After all, cadres are diverted from active activity in the fleet. In connection with this, how is the question of the intensification of training being decided?

Answer. The academy is most seriously involved with this problem at this time. We have thoroughly analyzed the content of training and disclosed serious shortcomings.

First of all, our training process was not fully comprehensive. Each faculty posed and decided its own tasks. The efforts of the teachers seemed to be split into a number of directions and questions. This did not correspond to reality in the Navy, where officers are constantly required to solve comprehensive tasks, implementing their knowledge of different disciplines in organic coordination. It is precisely in this way that we now intend to conduct training. Here is one example. Previously students had to solve several dozen specialized tasks, proposed by different faculties. Now the number of these tasks has been shortened eight times over. Up to a hundred hours of training time are allotted for some of them and they are conducted by the collectives of many faculties.

We also did not always take into account another reality of the Navy -- the universality of requirements upon specialists. Let us say that now in many forces there are ships with different power plants. Narrow specialization of the mechanical engineer in the training process, of course, does not correspond to the requirements of their future service. The academy graduate was forced to complete his schooling while functioning in his duty position.

Finally, we increased the demands upon professors and instructors. They must teach not that which they know, but that which the Navy requires. This means that it is necessary to expand and improve their knowledge. Once I observed

one of the students in an exam. He filled up the entire blackboard with the most complicated mathematical computations relating to the three groups of the theory of firing errors. His answer was above reproach and made the instructor happy. I asked the student one additional question: "On which group can you, as a specialist on a flagship, exert influence to reduce firing errors?" And I did not receive an answer.

Question. Is it not true that today it is impossible to intensify training without the most active use of technical means, without computerization of this process?

Answer. Undoubtedly. This is a very complex question, and of most importance is that no delay be permitted in its solution. We are carrying out a fundamental redesign of the training laboratory base. It can be said that we are creating it over again. We have designed and ordered it, and are assembling it.

Not a single graduation thesis here can be accomplished without the extensive use of computers. And I am not talking about ordinary computers, but about engineering computers. This is not easily done. Not all students have sufficient training. And, you see, there is no time in the academy to master the techniques of the use of computers. Our main goal is applied questions in the use of computers.

But we are rapidly eliminating our flaws, and if students arrive here in the future with inadequate "computer education," this will take the form of a serious problem. Therefore, we are now vitally interested in solving this problem within the walls of the naval schools.

Question. Comrade admiral, the Naval Academy had long been considered the center of VUZ science in the VMF. How well does this aspect of the activity of the academy correspond today to the needs of the Navy? What reserves are seen and being used here?

Answer. The scientific capability of the academy is great. More than 85 percent of the professors and instructors are doctors and candidates of sciences. But, this is the formal side of the matter.

What is important, as it is said, is the real practical outcome. And it is enough to say that many of the operational-tactical manuals (of the command profile) which are being used in the fleets have been developed with the active participation of the academy. Many promising efforts are also being conducted in the engineer profile. But, thus far here we have better contact with industrial design buros and NII, than with fleet NII. Although, we can also substantially assist the latter.

Just the same, the thus far low level of implementation of our development in practice should be acknowledged. The obsolete method of work of some scholars "for the bookshelf" has its effect. We need not merely scholars, but scholar-organizers. The existing system for introducing theoretical developments into practice does not ensure the necessary effectiveness. It is necessary to count more on the personal enthusiasm of the scholars. For example, such

officers as rear admirals F. Matveychuk, Ye. Mnev, L. Ventsyulis, V. Byrin, and some others can be named. But it is better when enthusiasm is buttressed by progressive organization.

Unfortunately, shortages in ship-board officer practitioners involved in scientific developments are also being experienced. Without this "reciprocal" scientific stream our VUZ science loses. I cannot, for example, recall the last time an officer from the fleet defended a thesis here and returned again to his force. And the Navy needs commanders and engineers who are capable of thoroughly and scientifically comprehending reality. Here, as in everything else, unused reserves are seen for the still more organic fusion of the academy with the fleet. After all, it is all the more true now, during restructuring, that the main purpose of the Naval Academy is to serve the practical tasks of the Navy.

Irresponsibility in Cadre Selection Scored

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen N. Shlyaga, Military Soviet member and chief, Political Directorate, Central Group of Forces: "Promotion"]

[Text] The principled and innovative formulation of questions of cadre policy made at the January CPSU Plenum brought great satisfaction to every Soviet man.

Today, when a revolutionary upheaval in all spheres of social life is taking place, the role of the knowledgeable leader, who has a feel for that which is new and high ideological-political and moral qualities, is immeasurably increasing. All of this also relates fully to our army activity. Practice constantly confirms that the level of combat readiness, military discipline, order and self-discipline is higher in those collectives where commanders and political workers have party fervor toward the task at hand. And of course, there are many such people.

But it is necessary to look truth in the eye. There are also a sufficient number of those who are distinguished by passivity and inactivity, as well as moral unscrupulousness. And if we wish to truly raise the quality of our cadre work, we simply cannot avoid the question of the responsibility of those who are entrusted to decide the question of promoting officers to higher positions. This especially concerns those who make the initial decision. Often errors committed there are difficult to notice immediately, and they then lead to great losses.

In this plane, for example, the fate of Maj I. Fedorenko is highly instructive. He commanded an artillery battalion for a little more than a year. He demonstrated himself incapable of working in this position. Possessing poor commander's and organizational qualities, he began to make up for such a substantial deficiency by "arbitrary" methods of leadership -- coarseness, dressing down subordinates, and threats. It was necessary to name a new battalion commander.

But how did the promotion of Maj Fedorenko come about? It became clear that Lt Col B. Babanov, the former regiment commander (now he is in another position), having received an order from higher headquarters to propose a candidate for battalion commander, did not trouble himself with doubts. With a light heart he named Fedorenko, in order to get rid of an officer toward whom there were many grudges. And he represented him in the very best light.

Unfortunately, no one hastened to requite Lt Col Babanov as he deserved for such an approach to solving cadre questions. But in another similar case irresponsibility was assessed according to its worth.

Not so long ago Maj Gen V. Malashkevich and Col Yu. Kuznetsov were strictly reprimanded at a session of the military soviet of the group of forces. They had permitted a clear defect in cadre work. According to their persistent recommendation Lt Col V. Volkov was named to the position of regiment commander.

It turned out that Volkov's superiors had studied their subordinate in a most superficial way. During the course of his activity in his new position it became clear that he has poor organizational abilities and is unable to construct correct relations with officers. He began to misuse his duty position. Matters went so far that the question arose about the advisability of his further retention in his position. Now he has been removed from it.

The officer did not withstand testing, if one can so speak, by the traditional requirements upon a leader. Today, they have immeasurably increased. The January CPSU Committee Plenum added to them with a most important postulate: A decisive criterion in the assessment of cadres is their attitude toward restructuring. This means that demands upon the whole spectrum of qualities have increased. I would like particularly to single out the loyalty of the individual to our ideological principles and his firm moral convictions. I would name these qualities decisive in all assignments and transfers -- the times themselves have moved them to the forefront. A leader cannot be without them. Have we always taken this into account? Because some assignments do not justify themselves, it is necessary to say no, not always.

We say correctly that any omissions associated with superficial knowledge of people can have no justification. But there is even less justification for deliberately forcing through to a higher rung of service those who are undeserving.

Not so long ago Lt Col V. Novikov was expelled from the party and removed from his duties. The officer, who sullied himself with money-grubbing and immoral conduct, could no longer remain in the ranks of the party or in his high position. He rose in position because he was able to be obsequious. He found those to whom servility was to their liking. And even at the moment that the time had come to call Novikov's conduct and deeds by their names, defenders turned up and found ways through someone or another of saying a word on his behalf. However, the intercession did not help. It was necessary, as the saying goes, to answer in full severity.

No doubt I would not be wrong if I said that one of the reasons for unjustified and erroneous assignments is that at present no one bears full accountability for this; not commanders, not political workers, who support an unworthy candidate, and not the workers in cadre organs. At best they are scolded a bit when such a "promotee" fouls up in his new position. The time has come to raise the "plank" of demandingness.

And the primary reliance, of course, must be placed on increasing consciousness and intensifying the feeling of responsibility of each of us.

Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of communist leaders have a proper attitude toward solving such important questions. I will speak about Lt Col V. Petrov. He has an enviable ability to see good inclinations in a subordinate. He even demonstrated this with respect to Capt Yu. Zavarzin, a battery commander. He held himself modestly and did not exaggerate his merits. Petrov saw in him traits of a purposeful man who was giving himself fully to his service. He spoke with him often, gave advice, and assigned tasks, the solving of which each time was a test of another aspect of the officer.

It would seem that Zavarzin was already in the public eye; he received an Order of the Red Star for the successful assimilation of new equipment.

"Yes, he had a good record," Viktor Vasilyevich told me later. "But I still wanted to pull him up in a few things."

That is the approach! The time came and Zavarzin became regiment chief of PVO [Air Defense], and then went to a military academy. And Petrov pays such attention to everyone. It is not for nothing that his work with officers is called a good "school of cadres."

As we see, much depends precisely on those communist leaders who, figuratively speaking, are first to select one or another candidate. Here we need redoubled circumspection, true Bolshevik principles, and a painstaking accounting for all factors which in a particular situation could grow into negative phenomena.

It is good if such officers as Lt Col Petrov are involved in solving such an important problem. And what if it is those such as Babanov? How do we raise a barrier to even the slightest attempts to distort Leninist principles of cadre selection and placement?

The analysis of errors always shows almost the same thing. Namely, that the question of promotion was decided privately, within a narrow circle of people, or even individually. Now the good rule of taking into account the opinion of the party organization in examination of a candidature is being affirmed more and more.

It would seem that everything is clear. Party members are pledged to give an accurate and objective reference to an officer communist. But, even here frequently formalism takes place. Let us return to the story of Maj Fedorenko. The regiment party committee, then headed by Maj V. Nikolaychuk, maintained the full right (more accurately, this was the duty of the party committee!) to note the shortcomings and state what was positive. I am sure that the considered opinion of the party committee would have forced the workers at the cadre organ to look attentively at the proposed candidature. In fact, the party activists merely mechanically "rubber stamped" the already prepared decision.

Later I spoke with some of these comrades.

"But what could we do? They gestured helplessly. You see, the question was already coordinated with the higher command.

I must again mention party principles. If we do not raise the level of principles, and do not sharpen our irreconcilability toward shortcomings in the activity and conduct of communists, talk about restructuring in our affairs will remain just talk.

Not only our principles, but real life as well, disagree with the opinion that party organs are constrained in their influence on cadre decisions. Everything is determined by the party maturity of people. If the feeling of party mindedness is lessened problems arise. But for us only one conclusion can be drawn. It is necessary to conduct the indoctrination of communists more persistently, both that of leaders, and, as it is customary to speak, that of rank and file party organization members.

The resolution of the January CPSU Central Committee plenum directly instructs us to ensure that primary party organizations fully execute their prescribed duty of participating actively in the conduct of party cadre policies. This also means that those leaders who act thoughtlessly, without the necessary sense of responsibility, should be brought to party accountability more strictly than has occurred in the past.

There is no doubt that our cause will only gain if party organizations become more actively involved in the formation of a moral atmosphere which makes it possible to discuss more fully and frankly urgent problems of the life of the collectives. We must raise the role of party and officers meetings and party references to a new level. All of this will also have a favorable effect on the solving of cadre questions, and make it possible to avoid secrecy, subjectivism and a superficial approach.

Selection of Air Regiment Commanders

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Bulankin, VVS commander, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "A Criterion of Maturity"]

[Text] At the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum it was noted that the party is not reducing its efforts for a moment in further improving the defense capability of the country, and is assigning military cadres a special role in solving this vitally important task. The plenum underscored the need to continue to increase the responsibility of commanders, political workers, all officers, and army and navy party organizations for maintaining military discipline at a high level, and for the ideological and moral indoctrination of soldiers and their military and political training.

Our correspondent, Col V. Kaprov, talks with Lt Gen Avn V. Bulankin, VVS [Air Forces] commander, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District, on ways to fulfill these urgent instructions, and on work with cadres.

Question. Which of the cadre issues, in your opinion, is today most pressing?

Answer. Attitude toward restructuring, real deeds in its implementation, moral make-up and competence, a high level of professionalism, and adherence to everything advanced and progressive -- this is the decisive criterion for the assessment of cadres. It is from precisely these requirements that we proceed in the assignment of an officer to one or another duty position.

Relatively recently, for example, Lt Col G. Chernov was named to the position of commander of an air regiment. He rapidly assimilated the increased number of difficult duties and demonstrated the ability to solve the many problems which dynamic aviation practice poses. Being a determined, demanding and concerned commander, he earned personal authority, which had a favorable impact on the increase in combat capability of the unit and the strengthening of military discipline. The unit which Lt Col Chernov commands is among the best in competition.

Discussing this leading officer, I catch myself thinking that it is precisely those questions associated with the selection of regiment commanders, and indoctrination work with them, that concern me most of all, since an air regiment commander is a key figure in solving the tasks posed to our party. From an officer occupying this position are demanded full output and constant intensity of physical and moral forces, since flights are conducted almost every other day. He must be a good organizer and be able to plan this process precisely, in which not only aircraft but also specialized vehicles, motor transport, communications, range personnel and other coordinated subunits are involved.

Moreover, the commander is the first pilot of the regiment. He must himself fly a great deal and pay attention to his personal preparation for the flights. We add to this participation in political indoctrination work, concern about the living standards of the soldiers, inspection of the guard and obligatory contacts with local party and soviet organs. It is necessary to look very attentively at candidates for this position, study their inclinations and habits, and weigh a great deal. And even with this approach, when the decision on an assignment to the position is carefully weighed, and when party organizations participate actively in the selection process, errors, unfortunately, are not entirely eliminated.

Question. And, in your view, what can be done about this?

Answer. Unit commanders and officers of cadre organs must think constantly about creating a reserve for promotions, and watch over attentively not only the experienced pilots, but also the graduates of military aviation schools who arrive in the units. The fact is that the chain of duty positions from a rank and file pilot to regiment commander is very long. And in each position an officer must serve a definite, and rather lengthy period, in order to master the duties and gain experience for more responsible work. It is also necessary to have in mind the time of study in a military academy and the opportunity to receive first class qualifications in a timely manner... Once you break this chain at some stage for some reason, even a capable organizer and master of combat employment can no longer become a regiment commander.

Moreover, it seems to me that the time has come to reexamine the list of duty positions from which aviators have the right to attend a military academy. I vote with two hands for allowing future flight [zveno] commanders to study there. They will return to their regiments with an age "reserve," pass through the required rungs of duty positions before the eyes of the commands of the large unit and military district VVS, and we will tangibly expand the capabilities for maneuvering cadres and selecting candidates, I would stress, for the most crucial position, that of regiment commander.

Question. You mean that the problem of selecting air regiment commanders is the main thing that concerns you?

Answer. As I already emphasized, with all of its importance, other cadre issues are also of concern. Without solving them we will not be able to achieve a marked acceleration in military training. Thus, here and there we have a lack of on-board technicians. We are seeking internal reserves and are preparing them ourselves. All the more so in that lieutenants are striving to fly. Why not, say, in the Vasilkov Military Aviation Technical School imeni 50th Anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol of the Ukraine, create several groups to which youths medically suitable for flight work would be enrolled. Then, immediately after completion of school they could be named as on-board technicians. This would provide a significant savings of training time and material resources.

A shortcoming at this time is the capability to select candidates for command positions in rear aviation subunits. Graduates of higher educational

institutions of the corresponding type arrive here in ones and twos. At times inadequately competent officers, who display personal lack of discipline and carelessness and are unable to conduct indoctrination work, are promoted in this field.

Of course, we struggle against such instances. Lt Col A. Chernak, who, as commander of a separate airfield support battalion, displayed moral bankruptcy and abuse of his duty position, has just been expelled from the ranks of the CPSU and discharged into the reserves. He took refuge from criticism for his shortcomings by making reference to the poor training of his deputies and prejudice, and did not take the necessary steps to eliminate these shortcomings. When, as the times demand, criticism of his omissions became stricter, complaints from the battalion commander rained down upon the most varied headquarters. Study of the circumstances under which Chernak was promoted to his command position showed that some of his superiors and officers in the cadre organ demonstrated a lack of principles in his selection.

In rear services air subunits restructuring is also still very sluggish because their structure has become obsolete, has lagged behind the demands of the times, since it remains the same as it was back during the days of piston-engine aircraft. It seems to me that this is precisely a case when one can speak about stagnation and inertness.

Question. In the mail received by the editors letters which say that people who demonstrate initiative and creative inquiry are not always supported are not all that uncommon.

Answer. I agree, such instances do exist. However, it is the duty of every commander to investigate thoroughly the essence of the creative inquiry and support the innovator, if the inquiry is aimed at benefit for the common cause. I recall that several years ago Lt Col S. Chernilovskiy, commander of a motorized rifle subunit, attempted to set up precise coordination with aviation. He caused many troubles then! In return, he found common language with a similarly troubled aviation commander, Ya. Skalko, who, having received a well deserved promotion, is now serving in the Far East. The experience obtained in those exercises is being used in military training even today. Pilots visit motorized rifle personnel, and study their weapons and combined arms tactics. This work has been especially well organized, taking present demands into account, in the air regiment where Maj A. Shirokikh commands one of the squadrons. Now, as a rule, officers who have been selected by the secretaries of subunit party organizations, passed through a good school of indoctrination work with people, and recommended themselves as honest and principled communists, men of their word, are assigned to the position of squadron commander. And it is no accident that from this regiment many officers are promoted and leave for other units.

In conclusion, I would like to add the following. Yes, we must all improve our work, since restructuring depends on everyone. In the selection of cadres we must say a decisive "no" to people who are inert, indifferent, incompetent, or who have stopped growing. Those who are not equal to the burden, who find stagnation and routine to their liking, and who do not draw the appropriate

conclusions from criticism, must be removed from the leader's chair. One's attitude toward restructuring is determined by specific deeds, the specific contribution made to improving combat readiness and strengthening discipline. Therefore, all of us aviators in the Far East must act, and act again; i.e., toil at full capacity in the name of improving combat readiness.

Commander's Persistence Changes Detachment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Reserve Capt V. Borodin: "Learn From Biryukov"]

[Text] When, two years ago Maj N. Biryukov was offered the assignment of commanding a military construction detachment that had an unenviable reputation, many warned him: "Refuse, you have little chance of success, your predecessors were not weaker than you, but... such conditions there are there."

And, as a matter of fact, the situation with respect to discipline, as we say, left much to be desired: unauthorized absences, drinking bouts, slipshod work, etc., etc.

I also had occasion to visit there. I recalled the dilapidated walls of the company facilities, an untended area, and behind it rocks, a swamp covered with hummocks turned into a dump...

And now two years later people talk quite differently about the "traditionally" backward subunit. When talk turns to the organization of service and regulatory order, one hears: "Learn from Biryukov." People talk about sports work and, again: "See how Biryukov's detachment does it."

That is, the collective which one once recalled with a distressed helpless gesture was now brought up as an example. Such amazing changes.

When I arrived at the detachment I did not recognize even the territory itself where it was located. In place of the swampy waste, at the former dump is an attractive sports center. The company facilities look like the same ones but it is as if they are not the same. It was especially amazing that everywhere young pine trees are growing. How did they succeed in making them take root; as a rule they die after transplanting. But here... and another detail. Very recently a deep snowfall occurred, and all the roads are swept. When could they have found time? Yes, it is apparent, Biryukov had to work thoroughly with people in order to overcome the psychology of indifference and fatalism. No doubt this was not easy to do. Stresses and nervous tension must have exhausted the commander.

However, Maj Biryukov does not look at all like a "worried," utterly exhausted man. He looks smart and cheerful. And he speaks with humor. It is immediately apparent that the officer carries out his difficult service not

merely conscientiously, but willingly and even, I would say, happily. I was interested in what thoughts Biryukov had, coming to the detachment?

"Frankly speaking, at first I was somewhat dumbfounded." There was an ardent gleam in Biryukov's eyes. "And indeed, the conditions, the situation, the detachment were all grave. And then pride touched me. What is this "uncorrectable" situation? And what are these "conditions"?"

When Biryukov began to study the situation, his first conclusion was clear: There was total neglect in everything. It had become a habit. First of all, in the organization of service and in regulatory order. Although, formally everything was in its place. Take the daily duty detail. The guard mount was on time, the duty officer and orderly were in place. And, at the same time many were in slovenly uniforms and knew their duties poorly. The incoming company duty officer did not consider it necessary to report to the company commander about taking over the watch. "Thus he will also not consider it necessary to fulfill his duties," concluded the major. "For a start we will polish up preparations of the daily duty detail in accordance with regulations. It is what determines the course of events in the detachment, especially in the evenings, after retreat."

The next day the new commander inspected personally and ordered the arriving duty detail dismissed. He demanded that the personnel study their duties by heart and bring their uniforms to an appropriate appearance. He invited the company commanders and first sergeants to a second guard mount. It was necessary that everyone see what now would be demanded of them. They became certain of this a day later, when the subordinates of Sr Lt Yu. Zaytsev appeared at the guard mount poorly prepared.

"You saw how an arriving duty detail must be?" Biryukov said calmly but firmly. "And Sr Lt Zaytsev did not demonstrate consistency. For that I declare a reprimand. This is for the first instance."

Another time the detail arriving from the company commanded by Capt A. Sukhanov, by contrast, turned out to be exemplary in its preparation. For this gratitude was expressed to the captain. And to Sr Warrant Officer N. Kravtsov, company first sergeant, as well.

Then the detachment commander watched unremittingly to see that the detachment did not merely know its duties thoroughly, but also fulfilled them scrupulously. Here he was irreconcilable. No, Maj Biryukov did not reprimand the company duty officer when he noticed unswept roads or poorly made beds. He commented to the company commander. And only to him. And also to the detachment duty officer.

Study of merely one trait from the practice of Maj Biryukov may even seem petty. In general, it is ordinary. But there should be "secrets," and something unusual. But here? Simply persistent and purposeful observance of the Internal Service Regulation. Can it be that Biryukov's predecessors did not know these requirements? They knew them. But they did not display such unwavering persistence. That is the whole "secret."

Biryukov also carried out his policy in other aspects of service with the same consistency and tirelessness. He began with the daily schedule, for which he initially held a special exercise. Not instruction, not a discussion, but namely an exercise. Why did Biryukov rely on practical exercises? Because they provide visibility, specificity and practical skills.

A consistent policy of strengthening the authority of sergeants and arousing the activeness of the junior commanders was the next step in strengthening discipline and self-discipline. And again, not through spontaneity. What does the regulation require? A pass to the city only with the concurrence of the junior commander. Leave as an incentive? Only if the junior commander will so petition.

"There is an instruction which quite clearly defines the authority, role and place of junior commanders in the subunit," states Biryukov. "I have in mind the participation of junior commanders in disciplinary practice. Some are a little afraid of "impressive" figures. But in my opinion there is nothing to be afraid of in an increase in punishments. In my opinion five reprimands given by the sergeant are better than one punishment given by the company commander. But, in addition, we watch the disciplinary practice of sergeants, give advice, and teach them to be psychologists and pedagogs.

We discussed the sports complex.

"The sports complex was a chief assistant for me," Biryukov said animatedly. "This is the situation. Although our people engage in physical labor, it is in some respects repetitious. Sports is a shifting of energy, it is excitement, and this is attractive. If they are involved in sports there will be fewer moralizing discussions! Is this not so?!"

I will not describe the equipment in the complex. The detachment political worker mobilized the komsomol aktiv. And the personnel, believing in the reality of the changes, willingly responded. Many volunteers appeared. The overall work of creating their own sports base sharply improved peoples' frames of mind and drew them closer together. And here is the result. Last summer the detachment soccer team was first among the fleet construction detachments. And recently a team of wrestlers came in first in the fleet construction directorate.

There is no need to speak about how the sports complex favorably affected discipline. This is obvious. And the fact that good health and resilient muscles are important for a young fellow is also not necessary to say.

Yes, the commander exacted initiative and persistence. Through his irreconcilability he was able to reshape the formerly slovenly tenor of life and service. But why the pine trees?

"You are referring to the planting of trees?" Asked Nikolay Nikolayevich. "You see, for his term of service the detachment is the home of the military construction worker. So? Let this home be a little bit more cozy. It is true that fir trees do not like to be replanted. But here Private Oleg Kochetkov, from the Urals, told us a secret. When you are digging it out it

is necessary to mark the branch pointed toward the sun. In order then to plant it in the same way. And water it well. You see, not a single pine tree has dried up."

I thought: It is as if even the trees sensed concern with their hearts and responded.

Yes, at one time this detachment was called difficult. Then, it became customary to consider it so because the conditions were said to be more difficult. But an energetic, thoughtful, strong-willed commander came, demonstrated character, persistence and bent the circumstances to himself. It turns out that even this is possible. If one is irreconcilable toward shortcomings.

Need for New Petty Officer Policy

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Feb 87 p 2

[Article by Rear Adm A. Pushkin, candidate of naval sciences: "The Petty Officer Rank"]

[Text] On the submarine preparations for a voyage were being carried out. Petty Officer Second Class A. Volkov, commander of a helmsmen-signaler section, received an instruction from the watch officer to take up several meters of anchor chain, as is called for in such cases. He was busy with other matters, however, and forgot. As a result, the weighing anchor of the submarine was delayed.

Blame for the delay was placed entirely on the watch officer. He did not monitor the execution of his instructions. In the review of the incident the petty officer was not mentioned.

Here, needless to say, we are not talking about the choice of punishment for a section commander who does not carry out his assignment. Although the carelessness of the sailor could not remain unpunished. What is noteworthy is that the question of the responsibility of mandatory service petty officers on the ship was in general not posed seriously, a fact which was confirmed again in this specific example.

Let us return to it. In the rather action-filled environment of the watch officer there was no opportunity to monitor; i.e., to personally assure himself that his instruction was fulfilled, or even to remind the petty officer about it a second time. And he did not see the need to do this: The petty officer, as he was supposed to, reported the fulfillment of the order, but, it turned out, before he fulfilled it. That is, the section commander demonstrated clear irresponsibility. And everyone understood this. But, understanding it, they nevertheless truly considered the officer to be the only guilty party. The argument: What is required of the petty officer? One can hold an officer responsible, and in an extreme case a warrant officer.

And this psychology is not exceptional.

Those who are a bit older recall that the figure of a petty officer on a ship seemed much weightier than it is today. He held up virtually all internal order in the section, the initial training and indoctrination of the sailors, the organization of service and a mass of other matters that no one could handle better than the petty officer. I myself commanded ships for a long time and was deeply convinced that without firm petty officers the crew could not meet the demands placed upon it.

The greater independence of the petty officers of those years, by comparison with today's, can to a certain extent be explained by the fact that previously people served longer in the navy and arrived already with some working experience, at a more mature age. These are important factors, but one must not fail to note that today more literate, professionally better trained replacements come to the navy, who are capable of rapidly finding their place in the military collective, and of displaying more complete professional and social activeness. But, today's navy and army youth require more attention, and this relates most of all to the selection, training and indoctrination of junior commanders. For on this largely depends the situation in the subunits, and in the crew as a whole.

Probably the increase in the petty officer ranks observed in recent years on modern ships is associated with this. That is, the number of junior commanders is being increased. Is this good or bad? First, what most strikes one is that among those who wear the petty officer shoulderboards one encounters many who are not essentially junior commanders. That is, they were such, but then, for a number of reasons they were removed from their duties and their rank remained. One is also confronted with such a paradoxical situation: A senior seaman is in charge of a section, and there is a second or first class petty officer subordinate to him. An oversight? Not entirely. In the eyes of some officers, the epaulets on the shoulderboards no longer correspond to the actual role of the seaman in the subunit and crew. Does this not thus reinforce the low authority of this rank?

And those petty officers who, although they are listed in commander's positions, nevertheless have no subordinates or only one or two, should rather conditionally be called junior commanders.

It happens that petty officer ranks are awarded to some soldiers without any justification: for example, in order to encourage and somehow distinguish a good specialist, a komsomol activist, film mechanic, ship's cook, etc. All the documents are formulated as stipulated. And essentially line petty officers appear who, as in the above named instances, erase the impression that the sailors have about true junior commanders. A young sailor, who was taught in his first months of service in a training subunit to see a commander in every petty officer, suddenly learns onboard ship that this is far from the case, that in the presence of some "junior commanders" it is permissible not to think about subordination, but in general to conduct one's self in a familiar way -- not every petty officer will straighten one's uniform or call one to order.

At times there are also hasty assignments, not called forth by practice, to the positions of junior commanders, and clearly premature awarding of petty

officer ranks. Then it is necessary later to correct the errors that have been made. But, practice shows, that perturbations of this sort lead to nothing good, and only lower the prestige of petty officers.

It is enough to speak with any ship commander, and he will name all of these already tiresome, but nonetheless existing flaws in the selection and placement of petty officers. Some make active attempts to solve individual aspects of this problem. For example, the command of the nuclear powered cruiser Kirov proposed that the table of organization of petty officers who do not meet the interests of the work be reduced.

Commanders also are trying to raise the quality of selection of candidates for petty officer. Here, in general there are no difficulties. Subunit commanders can rather accurately single out such candidates (the best of the best), but under the mandatory condition that everyone whom they send for study must be returned back to the crew.

In the submarine unit where officers E. Rybakov and V. Fomichev are serving, petty officers are trained for a total of a month, without removing them from the crew. Naturally, "cadre spoilage" here is reduced to a minimum. The role and prestige of petty officers in this leading unit are high.

But this natural, seemingly logical selection to petty officer duties is violated if ship commanders and subunit commanders do not have the firm conviction that after schooling the best people will again end up in their crews. Here they send for schooling not the best. No administrative or organizational measures have yet been able to replace a missing lever of self-interest.

A thoroughly thought out "junior" cadre policy today, I am convinced, is a very pressing question for the navy. For true acceleration is impossible without the total self output of all elements in the chain of military collectives of the ships. And nothing compensates for the weakening and decline of the petty officer element.

A ship needs petty officers who demonstrate initiative. That is, petty officers who fulfill their duties energetically and actively. But, unfortunately, at times this is not only not expected from petty officers, and these qualities are not merely not inculcated, but they are considered unnecessary. Officers, primarily young officers, do not have an entirely clear impression of how to use the capability of petty officers in practice, and in what it should be expressed. Yes, they know the regulations, but, lacking adequate experience, and not obtaining assistance from their seniors, they attempt to "get along without petty officers," for this, in their view, is easier. But, it is not natural.

Here is one example. On a submarine a "man overboard" exercise was being worked out. Circling time after time, the ship approached the article thrown overboard. However, the submariners still could not reach it.

"We are wasting much time," stated the ship commander. "In cold water the victim will not await our assistance."

One of the petty officers from the mooring crew suddenly offered: "Someone must tie the end of the casting line around his waist and jump into the water." The subunit commander located nearby attempted to rein in his "upstart" subordinate. But the ship commander seized upon the good thought. And the exercise was conducted differently. With the report, "Man overboard," the petty officer quickly put on light diving gear and a line was tied around him. And when the ship approached the "victim," the sailor jumped overboard, quickly reached him, and then just as quickly was returned to the boat with the help of the line.

Subsequently, ships began to develop extensively this method of life saving in northern waters. And, it was based on the initiative of a petty officer. To the credit of the commander, he not only assessed it verbally, but also reacted quickly. It was a very convincing lesson. It went beyond the individual instance. Businesslike respect for the petty officer convinced the whole crew of the benefit of bold, decisive and active actions. And, how the authority of the petty officer in the crew soared. Sailors remember such instances for years. And I am sure that the petty officer grew in their eyes.

Objections could be raised: This is an incident, an episode. But, you see, naval service consists of incidents and episodes. And if they, through the force of will and wisdom of commanders, turn out and work for the benefit of the indoctrination of subordinates, all the more so of junior commanders, we can already begin talking about this as schooling.

Yes, today, I believe that we are becoming quite convinced that in working with petty officers and sergeants much must be made up for and restored from that which was successfully employed previously, and that new approaches must also be sought. In other words... restructuring is necessary.

When a commander is described as being junior, this merely emphasizes that he stands closest of all to the soldier, the sailor, but in no way that his responsibility is belittled. Today the words of M. V. Frunze that "the junior command personnel formed the basis on which all discipline, military cohesion and military training in the unit are formed" retain their currency.

The Formation of New Pilot Command Cadres

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Col V. Kudryavtsev, commander, "N" Air Regiment: "With Whom Are We to Fly into Combat"]

[Text] An event took place in the regiment. For the first time the lieutenants who recently graduated from military schools flew independently in what was for them a new type of fighter-bomber.

"Our relief," stated one of the regiment veterans. "What sort will it be?"

"It will be as we bring it up," answered one of the squadron commanders.

The answer was correct. And it reminded me of my own formation in my first combat regiment following graduation. We arrived, four lieutenants who had graduated from higher military flight school, at the unit full of hopes and aspirations to master supersonic aircraft. Col V. Matveyev, the regiment commander (today serving in another position), sensed our fervor and structured the training so that each day was like a holiday for us. In classes and at the airfield we competed with one another for the right to be first to fly in a combat aircraft. We knew it would be granted to the one who best prepared for the flights on the ground. The flight commanders gave willingly of their time to us, gave generously of their knowledge, but also demanded corresponding output from us. By their attitude toward the work they were already indoctrinating responsibility in their subordinates. They reminded us: "Tomorrow you will be commander; study this today."

A little more than two years later the regiment commanders, in a ceremonial environment, awarded us certificates of military pilots first class. His words etched in my memory for my whole life:

"From now on, comrade officers, the young pilots have entered the combat nucleus of the regiment. One can fly into combat with each of them..."

It was pleasant to recognize that you were a part of the core of the regiment, that your comrades and commanders had trust in you. By this time we already know that candidates for promotion were recommended from the officers who constituted the military nucleus of the regiment, and that they were given the most difficult assignments in tactical exercises.

We were not allowed to rest on our achievements. Whereas, previously we knew basically one mission -- to devote all our efforts toward improving our personal flying and tactical schooling-- now we began to be given responsibility for the training of young pilots. When one of us flight commanders committed a methodological error in training his subordinates, accountability was strict, but fair. I would say benevolent. Neither the squadron commanders, nor even less the regimental command hastened to draw organizational conclusions, but attempted to teach all the pilots from the mistakes committed by one. At the foundation of the methodological work of the commanders was first of all openness: Not a single error was avoided in silence.

Today, recalling my years as a lieutenant, I see more clearly the work that senior officers spent on our formation. I strive to use their experience in preparing a worthy relief. And there is a reserve for the training of command cadres in the regiment. Annually young officers with good flying and commander's gifts come to us from the military schools.

Thus, last fall lieutenants I. Ushakov, Yu. Zakharov, and A. Kartavenko arrived in the regiment. The commanders developed an individual schedule of flight training for each of them. Simultaneously they began to study their psychological and physiological qualities and attempted to test each of them with some assignments in social work. The young officers felt the enhanced attention being paid to them and understood that they were not of indifference to their senior comrades, and that the regiment was their military family.

And here are the first results. These officers began independent flights on combat aircraft of a type new to them a month earlier than their predecessors.

Lieutenants are our most extensive reserve for promotion. The more thought that goes into forming this very first layer of reserve, the more reliable, and the more stable and higher will be the results of the regiment tomorrow as a whole.

In bringing up command cadres from young officers we cannot consider something primary and something secondary. Here everything is interrelated. For example, concern about the growth of a lieutenant is not only the duty of his flight commander. This work is carried out comprehensively in the regiment; i.e., squadron commanders, their deputies, staff officers and the regimental command are also involved.

We begin to select candidates for the position of flight commander long before a lieutenant becomes a senior pilot. Bit by bit squadron commanders accumulate information about them, in order to have a clear impression of each candidate. Not only the professional skill of the pilot, but also his abilities as a teacher, indoctrinator and organizer are taken into account. The deputy regiment commander for flight training watches the quality of the work being conducted with candidates for promotion, and monitors the activity of those responsible for their training, and the inculcating of commander's skills in them.

We strive to take into account their prospects as we plan the flight training of candidates for the position of flight commander. For example, we plan for them elements of instructor's training in advance, and involve them in methodological training together with flight commanders. Immediately before their new assignment we carry out a kind of test among the candidates. Through this test competitiveness, openness and objectivity are achieved. And most important, errors in the selection are reduced to a minimum. An example of this, Sr Lt M. Skripko, worthily made his way through all the enumerated steps of growth and was deservedly assigned as a flight commander. Today his subordinates, lieutenants I. Ushakov, Yu. Zakharov and A. Kartavenko are leaders in military training.

In the lives of military pilots there are days which become landmarks in their service. These include the successful passing of exams for higher class qualifications; a certain number of hours spent in the air; authorization to accomplish more complex exercises in military training; command of flights. The latter, as a rule, are a duty of deputy squadron commanders and above. For Maj Pavel Korchagin the day he was authorized to exercise independent command of flight became a true holiday. Yes, and not only for him. His coworkers and we officers in the regiment command, who proposed his candidature for the higher position, rejoiced in Korchagin's success.

The professional growth and formation of Maj Korchagin as a commander took place before my eyes. In his day, after having become a flight commander, the officer led the subunit to an excellent rating. In Korchagin's flying qualities we had no doubt; it was important to test his ability to lead people and to establish contact with them, and to confirm his commander's authority.

The officer proved his right to command. Then we offered him the position of squadron chief of staff.

It is true that for a leading flight commander this promotion was unique. He moved into the category of deputy squadron commanders, but at the same time in the air was changing in status from a leader to one who was led. We watched to see how Korchagin would react to this. As one of the strongest pilots in the regiment, we wondered whether his pride would come into play. I will say straight out, Korchagin's military activeness in the air did not decline, and on the ground he acquired the experience of working with documents and showed himself to be an intelligent supervisor in solving questions of troop service.

And also we saw that his comrades and coworkers went to Korchagin for advice. His opinion on methods and techniques for waging aerial battles and attacks on ground targets remained authoritative. It became clear that a future subunit commander was gaining maturity.

Immediately following the assignment of Maj Korchagin to the position of deputy squadron commander we outlined a plan for his training period in the duties of squadron commander. There should always be such a reserve in a regiment. According to an individual plan we began to teach Korchagin to command flights. In my view, the flight command post (SKP) is the quickest and most accurate device for determining whether a commander is capable of leading, seeing the situation, displaying creativity and initiative, making bold decisions, and taking responsibility on himself.

Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in avoiding omissions in our work with cadres, although every such error finds openness and serves as a lesson for commanders. One day, in carrying out an operational employment flight, Sr Lt S. Okutin committed a prerequisite for a flying accident. In the critique it became clear that Capt V. Belozerov, the flight commander, was also at fault. He did not monitor sufficiently the readiness of his subordinate. His methodological error was pointed out to the officer, and in response we heard:

"I did not ask for this position. You yourself assigned me."

This was a fair reproach first of all to myself, the regiment commander, who was not able to assess in a timely manner how well my subordinates possessed such qualities as responsibility for matters assigned to him. The question arose: How are we to find a way out of this situation? Of course, it would be simplest to release the officer from his position. But would this be correct? Would we be acting in accordance with the interests of the state by releasing an officer from more difficult duties, having just assigned him to the position? After having investigated the situation, can we, or, rather, will we be able to assist the young commander in his formation, give him the opportunity to grow stronger and display his ability in deeds? Let him come to believe in his own powers and gain the trust of the commanders. After all, if a difficult moment for the homeland arises, we will have to fly into battle along with him. And, as a regiment commander, I am far from indifferent about who will fly next to me, wing to wing, and in what frame of mind.

Proper Upbringing of Young Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Mulyar, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "It is Easiest to Punish"]

[Text] The vehicle stopped after the long and jolting road that led from the station to the location of the unit.

"We have arrived, comrade lieutenant," the driver opened the door of the cab and helped me take my things. "Here is where we will be serving..."

Lt N. Kucherenko stepped onto the scorching ground and looked about. All around were hills, faded from the sun, and nearby were several wooden huts. "What luck!" Nikolay thought to himself. "And they said it was beautiful in the Transcaucasus..."

A senior lieutenant came out of a hut to meet him:

"We have long been expecting you. You are, I see, suffering? It's not necessary. These parts are good and the city is not far. We will talk about this. But now let us get acquainted. I am Senior Lieutenant Kolchin, your company commander. Let's go, the regiment commander is waiting..."

It was dinner time and, after the lieutenant reported in to him, the regiment commander invited the young officer to the mess hall. At the table a conversation started up in a free and easy environment. Having asked where he grew up, how his schooling took place, what the lieutenant likes to read, and what problems trouble him, the regiment commander also talked about himself, about his days as a young lieutenant. Unnoticeably the conversation shifted to the topic of everyday life, and the lieutenant colonel stated:

"Initially you will live in a hotel. A room is already prepared for you; you can summon your family to live here. As soon as possible we will give you a separate apartment."

Then his service began. The regiment commander and headquarters officers did not allow the new lieutenant to slip from their field of vision. He constantly felt their attention and support. And not only in his work. When it was necessary the regiment commander, for example, helped the lieutenant get work for his wife.

Seeing such concern and attention, Lt Kucherenko, the young deputy company commander for technical matters, also strove to do well. In a short period of time he brought the equipment to an exemplary condition and mastered his duties. The first commendations appeared in the officer's service record. One of them was for outstanding maintenance and able operation of equipment under winter conditions.

"A good shift is developing," said the regiment commander, talking about Lt Kucherenko and the other young officers. "Hard working fellows; strivers. Short on experience? That will come with time. Everyone was like that. Ourselves included. The main thing is to instill in the young officer a taste for his service, and make each understand that he is needed and counted on. It is necessary to trust him. And it is absolutely necessary to look after him. And then to be demanding..."

Truly noted. People grow quickly where they are truly cared about, both on the official, and the everyday living planes. No matter how overloaded he is with work, the commander of this regiment always makes the time to talk with a young officer, visit him at an exercise, look into the dormitory and the sports complex. When he makes any decisions the commander attempts first to consult with his subordinates and listen to their opinions. He also teaches his deputies and the battalion commanders to act in this way. The opinion has already long been confirmed in the regiment that a chief who does not consult with his subordinates will never achieve success in their indoctrination. Feeling respect toward themselves, the lieutenants also strive and have a conscientious and creative attitude toward their assigned work.

Take, for example, lieutenants A. Kalyuzhnov and V. Goryainov. They arrived in the regiment together with Kucherenko. In a year they mastered their duties well and achieved a great deal in working with people. The platoons that they command are acknowledged to be the best in the regiment.

Unfortunately, this is not found in every unit. Frequently the opposite occurs. A lieutenant arrived, began his duties and, as the saying goes, began to limp on both legs. What doesn't get started well doesn't get on well.

In one of the regiments I became acquainted with Lt L. Rassokhin. In a year of service he received six reprimands and was convicted by the comrades' court of honor for junior officers.

"When I arrived in the subunit," stated Rassokhin, "I was confronted with many things for the first time. I had not had practice in working with people, and was unable to make contact with my subordinates. I began to be reproached by Capt A. Burzakovski, the company commander. Then the reprimands..."

Unfortunately, neither the battalion commander, nor the other commanders and supervisors took an interest in how things were going with the young officer, and did not look into the essence of his relations with his company commander. All of the work that was done with the lieutenant amounted solely to placing disciplinary punishments on him. Is it only with respect to Rassokhin, and only by Capt A. Burzakovski that this style of work in this regiment has been "mastered?" No. Maj V. Shestakov, regiment chief of staff, uses punishment as his main means of influencing his subordinates. He has the greatest number of punishments levied on officers. And the chief of staff often imposes them without delving into the details and causes of various errors by the young officers, and without thinking about the fact that sometimes a lieutenant requires assistance and advice from a senior, and not punishment.

"I do not exceed the authority granted to me by regulations." That is how Maj Shestakov reacted to the question about whether his approach to indoctrination work with officers was not one sided.

No one even placed in doubt the authority to levy punishment given to the commander or supervisor. We were talking about something else. We were talking about the fact that it is necessary to punish intelligently, resorting to it as an extreme measure, and not the only one. Demandingness is far from just punishment. Demandingness also must presume trust, assistance, monitoring and many other things that indoctrinate, teach and inspire a person, and increase his responsibility for the assigned task.

And what had the regiment staff and Maj Shestakov personally done to help the lieutenants master their duties, weapons and equipment more quickly? Little. Analyzing the reasons for the failures of lieutenants Rassokhin, Balayev and other young officers, who so far have been awarded only reprimands, one comes to the conclusion that their failures are not accidental. In many respects they are predetermined by the style of work of their commanders and supervisors, and the whole tenor of life in the unit.

Take, for example, commander's training of officers. The regiment staff is poor in introducing into the training process active forms of training -- tactical exercises and brief exercises, group training exercises on the ground -- and does not concern itself as it must with the methodological training of officers. So the lieutenants have to, so to speak, stew in their own juices.

Or take the matters of the study and introduction of leading experience. Many leading officers who have been through the severe school in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] are serving in the regiment. These include Sr Lt Kh. Gasanov, Capt V. Dergachev and others, who have been awarded orders and medals. Is their experience not of interest to lieutenants? But, no one has taken pains to make this the property of the young officers.

Questions of living conditions are also being solved poorly here. The garrison has a shortage of living quarters. Some young officers have to live in the barracks. But, how do they live there, how do they pass their free time, what do they read, what diversions do they have? The senior officers and party committee are little involved in these matters. The lieutenants are left to their own devices. Over the course of a year questions of the formation of the young officers in the regiment were not once discussed. Here they are even unable to say which of the lieutenants is successfully mastering his duties and leading in competition, and who is lagging behind.

Young officers. Young command and political cadres. They, along with the experienced commanders and political workers, who have been through the school of life, are to raise and improve the skill and combat readiness of subunits and units of all services and branches of arms. This means that attention paid to them, especially early in their careers, must correspond to the level of demands placed upon them. After all, it is not for nothing that the saying goes: How goes the solo, also goes the song.

Innovative Submarine Leadership Praised

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Capt Lt P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Boldness in the Search"]

[Text] The time was approaching for the surfacing stipulated by the assigned mission, and the situation above the conning tower of the nuclear powered submarine remained rather complex. But, then the commander received a report about the temporary "clarification" of the situation. Sure that there was enough time for the maneuver, Capt 2d Rank L. Katukhin commanded:

"Surface to... meters!" From the frothy white surface of the sea first appeared the protective ridge of the conning tower, and then the submarine showed all of itself to the light. The captain 2d rank first flew up the spar ladder to the conning bridge. The situation almost excluded the possibility for conducting the planned measures. To dive meant to lose time. And this equated to not fulfilling the order.

Having climbed down to the central control compartment, the commander consulted with his senior assistant and the other specialists. The decision proposed by the commander was just as promising as it was risky. But there was no other way out.

The submarine remained on the surface, having taken all measures to observe secrecy. And while his subordinates carried out the anticipated amount of work the thoughts of Capt 2d Rank Katukhin were occupied with one thing -- how to reduce to a minimum the risk of detection by the "enemy."

In the recommendation written by the large unit commander on Capt 2d Rank Katukhin is the following line: "Capable of justified and calculated risk." When he was still far from the position of submarine commander he observed carefully the conduct and difficult situations of those officers in whose positions he wanted to find himself in the future. The examples of captains 1st rank A. Shevchenko and R. Chebotarevskiy, who at different times successfully commanded ships where Katukhin served, convinced him that without boldness and decisiveness it was impossible to achieve a high result in the fulfillment of missions at sea. And, in order to "master" these qualities, it was necessary to know much, be able to do much, and to be a highly skilled professional. All of his service was subordinated to one thing: to achieve maximum perfection in the work to which he devoted his life.

As an assistant submarine commander, Capt Lt Katukhin already received authorization to exercise independent command of the vessel. For his successes in military training he was awarded the rank of captain 3d rank early. In the position of senior assistant he earned the Order of the Red Star. From this position he entered the academy, which he completed with distinction. And for two years already he has confidently commanded an outstanding submarine. During this time Capt 2d Rank Katukhin accomplished dozens of difficult military training missions. Very often victory in

difficult duels was his only because he operated boldly and not according to stereotype. It is true that he was not always immediately able to prove the correctness of his non-standard, sometimes risky decisions. The submarine had to negotiate the search zone of "enemy" anti-submarine warfare ships. Moving to break through this zone, Capt 2d Rank Katukhin fired a torpedo against those that approached too close. Probably this would have been enough to negotiate the search zone successfully, but he decided also to test a firing idea that he had long been nurturing.

Experience indicated that such firing of torpedoes had insufficient results if the time and nature of movement of the torpedoes were not taken into account. Capt 2d Rank Katukhin even decided to test his conclusion. And, although his submarine had received an outstanding rating (it turned out that the gap that the first torpedo made in the formation of "enemy" ships was enough for the breakthrough), the exercise leader did not praise Katukhin at the critique.

Analyzing the reasons for his failure, the captain 2d rank came to the conclusion that the nervous actions of an operator, Capt Lt M. Zaporov, and the lack of control over his work by the senior assistant, were at fault for everything. As this meant that his calculations were correct, the risk was nevertheless justified within the bounds of what was permissible. And, when soon afterward the submarine went to sea to carry out a firing against a detachment of "enemy" warships, Katukhin again employed his method. This time he was successful, since the watch officer, Capt Lt Zaporov, and other leading members of the ship's combat crew worked irreproachably.

Today boldness of a special sort is required of the commander-innovator. Boldness is required to begin something new and progressive in literally all spheres of his activity -- not only in tactics. And, as there is "for" there is undoubtedly also "against;" against obsolete forms and methods of daily work, and obsolescent approaches to the organization of socialist competition and indoctrination work.

An inspector from the political department, having seen the screen on the course of socialist competition hanging in the corridor of the submarine, did not conceal his indignation:

"Why are the marks not being displayed? And what are these little pluses?"

"Then, in front of many commanders, I had to defend the system of summing up competition that we were using," tells Capt 2d Rank Katukhin. "It lacks the customary evaluations according to a four grade scale. But it is precisely this that makes it possible to eliminate leveling and non-objectivity when summing up the results.

Until recently on the submarine everything was "as among people;" i.e., an outstanding evaluation was given out to a participant in competition virtually for elementary fulfillment of regulatory duties. The evaluation was reduced only in the event of some violations. According to the new system complete fulfillment by the serviceman of all his regulatory and other duties was taken as a reference point. If something was done above that which was required, say, a rationalization proposal was submitted, or a related specialty was

mastered, positive marks were counted. If some mistakes were made, or violations, penalty marks were given. The overall total is presented instead of an evaluation daily on the screen of competition. If an individual simply fulfilled the established norm a "plus" mark is placed in his square.

"Before it was possible to lead in competition without working too hard," Capt 3d Rank V. Pyzh, deputy commander for political affairs, supported his commander. "Now that is impossible. Even if an individual has nothing but pluses on the competition screen, he will not be a victor. Our system of summing up the results makes it possible to assess thoroughly the work of each."

Many discussions in the large unit, and various understandings -- from unconditional acceptance to just as decisive rejection -- resulted from the indoctrination measure taken by Capt 2d Rank Katukhin in implementation of the principle he professed: "The family of the serviceman must work to improve the combat readiness of the ship." Essentially it is as follows. At the end of the training period the family of every sailor, petty officer, warrant officer and officer receives a letter signed by the ship commander, political worker and the secretaries of the party and komsomol organizations. It reports the results with which the son or husband completed military training and what contribution he made to the work of the crew. The indoctrination importance of such letters is extremely great. They force those who are not especially fervent in their work to increase their responsibility, and they encourage the leaders in competition to work still better.

The "biography" introduced by Capt 2d Rank Katukhin of the system, as he calls it, of guaranteed crew rest, turned out to be most difficult. It is no secret that the problem of rest for the crew of a ship is far from easy. And to solve it always at a level of high quality would mean to improve the combat readiness of the ship. However, the first steps taken by Katukhin in this direction not only were not supported, but they cost him a reprimand. Leonid Fedorovich recalls to this day the profound amazement reflected on the face of the staff officer inspecting the training of the ship's combat crew, when to the question: Where was radiometrician Warrant Officer Yu. Vetokhin? he was answered: On leave. And at the most varied levels Katukhin had to prove that even on a warship an officer or warrant officer not only can, but even should be granted leave on a work day if he stood a detail, or carried out another service on a free day or holiday. And he did prove it. But it was not limited to this. Whereas, previously it was a rare evening that an officer or warrant officer was able to spend at home, in the company of his family, now the picture has changed fundamentally.

Here is an interesting fact. With the introduction in the crew of the system of guaranteed rest the indices of all parameters of the ship's military training activity sharply increased.

As I was told in the unit, Katukhin's innovations in the majority of instances are supported by the command and the political department. However, here is an amazing thing. They are not acknowledged on neighboring ships, where, unfortunately so far there is more talk than action about commander's independence, professional boldness and initiative.

For a second Capt 2d Rank Katukhin removed the microphone of the ship's loudspeaker from his lips. He wanted to command that the ship dive in order to avoid the ever growing danger of detection. But he forced himself to think rationally, precisely, not yielding to emotions. And no one -- from the newest sailor to the old hand senior assistant -- had any doubt of their success. They trusted: The commander had considered everything, calculated everything. And that is how it was.

Warrant Officer's Career Frustrations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Warrant Officer A. Samoylov: "I Want to Serve to the Maximum"]

[Text] To reveal the capabilities of people to the maximum, not only a differentiated, but also an individual approach to solving cadre issues is required.

Dear Editors!

I am commander of a torpedo recovery boat. I have been in the navy since 1976. While I was mastering the finer points of commander's science and gaining experience at sea, I was satisfied with my service, and most likely, the command was satisfied with me, if one judges by incentive awards. In time I became a master of military affairs. I began to think about subsequent service. I completed the institute of water transport engineers by correspondence, and received a diploma as an engineer-vessel operator. From that time the feeling of satisfaction left me. On the one hand, I have an apartment, a family with three children and even have obtained an Moskvich. On the other hand, the feeling does not leave me that I can be of much more benefit to the navy and more fully utilize my ten years of naval experience, and the knowledge I have obtained as an engineer. But, as the saying goes, nothing is shining for me. As I was a warrant officer 10 years ago, and so I will remain until I receive my pension. Theoretically, of course, I can even become an officer. But think about it yourself: First, a 30 year old lieutenant is obviously lacking in prospects, and second, I am a "pure" surface ship sailor, and I serve in a unit of submarines, where there are no officer's duties for my specialty. I can, of course, continue serving until I receive my pension, and then go to shore. There I will always find work according to my education. But, I love the navy and would like to realize all of my capabilities here; i.e., serve to the maximum.

There are those to whom my example may seem atypical. There are not so many of us warrant officers [much many] with higher education. But I am speaking about something else. It would be valuable for our cause if every serviceman could give himself completely to his service. To disclose the capabilities to the maximum, not only a differentiated, but an individual approach in solving cadre matters is needed. A man who knows his business and gives of himself fully should have sufficient prospects for growth. For warrant officers these are obviously lacking. But, within the framework of this institution an effective system of incentives can be created. Why not, for example, do this.

Award graduates of corresponding training institutions the military rank of junior warrant officer (one star on his shoulder-board) for his first five years of service. Subsequently, provided he has favorable recommendations and a petition from his commander, promote him to warrant officer. After service of more than 10 years award the rank of senior warrant officer. Practice making reductions in rank for disciplinary infractions. Allow the awarding of early warrant officer rank for those who have received outstanding recommendations and supervise not only sailors, but also warrant officers.

It seems to me that it would be appropriate to practice more boldly assigning warrant officers to officers' duties. The specific nature of service as a warrant officer is such that he, as a rule, serves for years in one specialty, and achieves a high degree of professionalism. And officers are often not kept long in their initial duty positions. Due to this, as a matter of practice, they lose a great deal. In the recent past the duty of ship commander on large torpedo recovery vessels corresponded to the rank of senior lieutenant. And primarily lieutenants were assigned to them. This led to numerous preconditions for accidents. After all, the ability to command a ship takes years to master. For civilian sailors, in order to rise to the bridge of even the smallest little boat it is necessary to acquire definite sailing qualifications. But with us yesterday's student, who has a few moorings of a little motor launch under his belt, goes up to the bridge and begins to "command." In the end, the command was forced to assign experienced warrant officers to the torpedo recovery boats. And soon the officer's position was reduced, and not even a senior warrant officer, but simply a warrant officer was made commander. You will agree, that there is a certain paradox in the fact that a commander, even of a small ship, is a warrant officer, and the petty officer of some subunit on shore is a senior warrant officer. Of course, he also has many concerns, but, in my opinion, they cannot compare with the responsibility that lies on the shoulders of the commander of a boat or ship.

And here is one more paradox. My schoolmate is working as senior assistant commander on a tugboat. And he "has served" already to the rank of reserve-captain lieutenant, although our education is identical. Apparently, if I were in the reserve I would already have become a captain-lieutenant. This, of course, is not the point, but such incidents greatly undermine the authority of our service.

I think there is reason for more extensive and active selection of officer cadres from among warrant officers. After all, a warrant officer is, as a rule, a man who has long linked his life with the navy, is entirely knowledgeable and has learned to overcome the difficulties of naval service. And if such a sailor decides to become an officer, most often he will be a good officer. While those, who have intermediate technical education, do not even dream about the rank of junior lieutenant, which, in my opinion, has overall been undeservedly forgotten in the navy.

Strictness Toward Junior Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Avn Yu. Shilin: "Without Making Allowances for Youth"]

[Text] Not so long ago the subordinates of Col A. Zhitkov distinguished themselves in accomplishing a military training mission. They acted competently, boldly and resourcefully. This was largely due to the fact that their commander trained them well for this. He is a commander for whom an honest, conscientious attitude toward service is most characteristic. Many times I have noted that once Col Zhitkov goes to work he will accomplish it conscientiously.

Last year, when officer recommendations were being made, I became interested in how Zhitkov was as a lieutenant. And in his first official recommendation I read: "Hard working. Has excellent marks in military and political training... disciplined, responsive, conscientious." This is his quality -- conscientiousness is also noted in subsequent efficiency reports and recommendations.

Already, two years after military school he was assigned as a company commander. It was a difficult company. It was such that, when Sr Lt Zhitkov stated his intention to turn it into a leading company, many who knew this company doubted the feasibility of his intention. He did not back off. After a year the subunit became one of the best in the unit.

Soon Zhitkov was named a battalion commander. The whole time that he commanded it the battalion was distinguished by cohesiveness and high indices in service and training. The commander himself was always placed as an example to others... In short, from the very outset and throughout all of his service officer Zhitkov displayed mature independence and responsibility, and behind this, I am sure, the highest demandingness toward himself.

I recall my own years as a lieutenant. Our group of graduates of the military aviation school for pilots arrived at the unit. We were confronted with the fact that the summer training program there differed significantly from that at our school. And, although experienced officers helped us, it was difficult. But we did not give up. Each of us knew what the entry into service of young officers meant to the regiment. We also understood another thing. It was a matter of prestige and honor for each to master quickly the complicated types of flight training. The first who achieved success was Lt Ye. Maksimov, a strong-willed officer, who did not allow himself any slack. Even later he remained for us an example of demandingness toward oneself, and his service, therefore, took shape. Today he is a general and occupies a high position. And those who began his service badly back then continued, so to speak, serving in a slipshod manner. There was, for example, a Lt I. Savchenko with us. He was weak willed, lazy, and covered up everything with references to the difficult circumstances. Therefore, he was discharged into the reserves, although he could have continued to serve.

Life, nevertheless, assures us that not every young officer is able to ask of himself and give himself a principled assessment. Here it is very important which senior officer ends up next to him, and in what collective he finds himself. In the unit commanded by Col Zhitkov this is thoroughly taken into account. It is a notable trait. Every time on the eve of the arrival of military school graduates, the commander gathers the officers in order to consult with them about the distribution of the lieutenants among the subunits, providing them living quarters, and to discuss other questions. At one such meeting someone asked Col Zhitkov what thoughts he himself had upon meeting with the new graduates.

"I think about their unstained officer's honor," he answered seriously, and his meaning, expressed in the context of the discussion, had to be understood in this way. All officers in the unit are responsible for how the service of yesterday's students will go, and what reputation they will merit.

As a matter of fact, the graduates are just beginning their service as officers and, just as there is not yet a single speck on the lieutenant's new overcoat, so his reputation is also clean. A service record has not even yet been established for him. And if it is established, in what column will the first annotation appear? In "commendations" or in "punishments?" In the unit we are discussing they strive to ensure that the first mark is a commendation. Last year Lt A. Plyushch arrived in one of the subunits. He was assigned as chief of an RLC [radar station]. Capt V. Smychek, the company commander, stated in this regard:

"I have no one but you to be responsible for the station and crew. To maintain combat readiness is a matter of your professional honor." And Plyushch was held responsible for the slightest omission. At the same time he was trusted. For example, he used a method he had developed for training the crew. The level of crew training and condition of the station was best disclosed during a surprise tactical exercise. Surpassing the norms, the subordinates of Lt Plyushch closed down the station, marched to the range and there fulfilled the mission he had assigned in an excellent manner. Then the lieutenant received his first commendation, which inspired him still more. He served conscientiously and with initiative.

The majority of the other young officers in the unit are serving just as successfully. Lieutenants A. Gorbulev, O. Zabodin and A. Irs, for example, mastered their duties in minimum time periods and passed tests for authorization to carry out independent combat watch. Perhaps some sort of special lieutenants are selected to go here? No. It is simply that here they are worked with more thoughtfully than in other collectives.

The demandingness of their seniors to a great extent mobilizes the young officers to successful service. And the commander, Col Zhitkov, most of all gives the example of such demandingness. He never leaves the "point" without looking into the work and life of each lieutenant. He holds them accountable for negligence, praises them for their successes and gives advice when they make errors. And frequently he reminds them to be more demanding toward themselves, not overlook small things, undertake more self-testing and self-analysis. His deputies and the subunit commanders also act in this way.

Military service takes shape entirely differently if a young officer ends up in another environment. In an inspection of one air defense missile battalion the inspector gave the command to switch on the station. It was revealed that, due to the fact that Lt I. Demen poorly implemented regulations, the parameters of one system in the station did not meet the norm. Another person would have turned red with shame, but he observed with amazing calm as the inspector revealed shortcomings.

"And does not the condition of the equipment offend you?" The inspector could not keep from asking. But here the subunit commander came forward and defended the lieutenant: "He is young, inexperienced."

It occurred to me, how much longer will the commander cover up for the shortcomings of a subordinate officer and be rebuked on his account? Is it not time to begin to hold the lieutenant accountable? After all, it is clear that spinelessness and connivance are merely harmful to him. It is a pity, but this phenomenon is also characteristic of some of our other military collectives. And senior officers are largely at fault for this.

Attending several assemblies, seminars and meetings devoted to working with young officers, one at times notices that the organizers of these and other measures turn them, figuratively speaking, into a one-way game. The balls fly mainly to the direct commanders and supervisors of the young officers. The spirit of their lasting "guilt" before lieutenants soars directly over those seated in the hall, and the sharing of experience turns into self-flagellation, which has become popular here and there. Nor is it any better in practice.

Lt Col V. Zemtsov, an artillery battalion commander, reprimanded Lt A. Kruglov for unconscientious fulfillment of an assignment. Kruglov caught up with the others in his service, but soon again committed an unconscientious act. It was not an error, but namely an unconscientious act, for which Lt Col Zemtsov punished him still more strictly. Thereby he brought upon himself the unkindness of an officer from higher headquarters who visited the battalion one day.

"The lieutenant has been given two punishments in his short period of duty?" The latter expressed surprise, and began to reproach the commander for improper work with the young officer.

One wonders why an officer who does not know well either the lieutenant, or his commander (who is, by the way, a very sensitive and demanding indoctrinator) decided off the top of his head that the punishment of the lieutenant was an obvious mistake. It is because we still have the tendency to assess the state of affairs by the number of punishments. If there are no punishments this means that everything is well with respect to discipline; if there are, it means things are bad. But, you see, restructuring demands here as well a new approach to assessing the state of affairs. More trust be shown to unit and subunit commanders. After all, it is clear to them how to have an effect on their subordinates. In this case the best affirmation is the fact that, after his second punishment Lt Kruglov began to serve industriously.

Experience teaches that demandingness in general, and especially with respect to the honor, worth and professional pride of young officers, helps to inculcate activeness and independence in them, and facilitates their rapid formation. This has always been especially valuable, and is even more so today, when each officer must look at himself more strictly and be more productive in his work. And, on the other hand, the desire to shift the blame of young officers to their seniors, and all manner of condescending pats on the back, saying, he is young and is still catching up, engenders dependent frames of mind in lieutenants and slows their growth.

The same experience, and elementary logic as well, counsel that it is necessary to combine demandingness with concern about the training and indoctrination of young officers. I recall Lt I. Starchenkov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Military-Political PVO [air defense] School imeni Yu. V. Andropov. He went to his unit with the frame of mind of ardently getting down to work. He went to his "point" and... requested a new assignment. Lt Col V. Valikov went hurriedly to the subunit. He found out that the lieutenant's disappointment was not from a lack of conscientiousness, but from the fact that his impressions received at school did not coincide with his real service in the combat subunit. In particular, it turned out to be more difficult to organize lessons in practice than it was said to be in his lectures. Lt Col Valikov shamed the lieutenant for his flare up of faint-heartedness, reminded him about his duty and about the calling of a political worker, and advised him how to solve that which seemed insoluble to the young officer. Subsequently they had more meetings. And I learned that Lt Starchenkov came to be thoroughly at home at the "point," and is fulfilling his duties with initiative. That is what the timely support of a senior officer means! However, not all commanders are able to render this assistance capably and with tact.

There are still commanders and supervisors who do not know well the young officers subordinate to them, and therefore they take the lack of experience and unintentional errors of lieutenants frequently as negligence. This leads to unjustified accusations and punishments. They forget that basically lieutenants are conscientious people. Many are proud of their age-old masculine profession, which is so honorable and necessary to the homeland, and are filled with the desire to serve as their duty commands. And here it is important sensitively and thoughtfully to support and develop all the best that is in them.

Let us look at some other aspects of our work. For example, do we often appeal to the concepts of honor, conscience, duty and responsibility in officers' meetings? And in general do we use this form of indoctrination? Not conferences at which only dry instructions are given, but namely officers' meetings, where each could openly express his opinions, including those which concern moral qualities, and the overall spiritual world of the officer. Lieutenants need tactful and fair demandingness. It is necessary not to take over for them, but to trust them. With an even-tempered, demanding and attentive attitude, it is necessary to convince them that independence is impossible without personal responsibility.

9069

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COL GEN POPKOV ON IMPROVING PREDRAFT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Col Gen M. Popkov, military council member, chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Troops: "A Common Concern, a State Concern"]

[Text] A special atmosphere reigns these days in the country's commissariats--the spring call-up is under way. Registration notices are being sent to tomorrow's tankmen, motorized riflemen and border guards in accordance with an order from the USSR minister of defense.

These are the conscripts of spring 1987. Concurrently those who had donned the uniform earlier have the responsibility of implementing decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress--making their contribution to strengthening the fighting potential of our armed forces. Naturally, no one of us can remain indifferent to the question as to how well today's army and navy replacements have been prepared. I repeat, no one, because every communist, every Soviet citizen, as the CPSU Program states, is obligated to do everything he must to maintain the country's defense capabilities at the needed level.

Thinking about this, I return again and again to the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree concerned with improving preparation of young people for military service. As we know, the decree, which was adopted a little less than a year ago, foresees an integrated approach to problems associated with improving preparation of young people for military service, and a mutual coordinated effort by all upon whom solution of these problems depends. And wherever this approach has become a reality, the measures planned by the party and government are being implemented more energetically, with greater effectiveness.

We can cite the experience accumulated in Belorussia for example. The republic's Communist Party Central Committee is coordinating all of the multifaceted work of military-patriotic and international education of young people, and of their preparation for service in the army and navy, while a working group of the Central Committee headed by one of the secretaries is directly responsible for organizing this work. Traveling often to the rayons and oblasts for its meetings, the working group systematically examines problems concerned with predraft training, listens to reports from the leaders of party and Komsomol organizations, enterprises and training institutions,

analyzes shortcomings and mistakes, and determines specific steps for correcting them. It has become a rule for secretaries, buro members, division directors of the republic Communist Party Central Committee and the oblast committees, military council members and the directing command and political staff of the Belorussian Military District to actively participate in organizing and conducting mass youth functions, and to work on the problems concerned with preparing young people for military service in the production collectives, training institutions, draft districts and DOSAAF training centers.

Military-patriotic and mass defense work is well coordinated in Leningrad. It has become especially active in connection with preparations for the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The oblast and city war and labor veteran organizations and the garrison officers and political workers are actively participating in it--and not just on holidays at that. Those who have recently concluded their service and who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan are also helping the adolescents along. Diverse forms of influence upon young people are being utilized in the City of Lenin. They include Komsomol-Pioneer posts beside the Flame of Perpetual Glory, Podvig [Heroism] clubs for preconscripents, and farewell parties in labor collectives for persons about to join the army. The citizens of Leningrad maintain close ties with the units and ships in which their compatriots serve.

There also are many other places where progressive experience can be found in the efforts to improve preparation of young people for military service, to improve military-patriotic education of the public and to strengthen spiritual ties between the army and people. But at the same time there are also many shortcomings in this work. In particular we would like to see local organizations intensify this work in every possible way, enrich it with new content and display more concern for those who are returning to their homes after fulfilling their military duty. It is important to help them in job placement, and to surround all reserve soldiers with attention--especially those who had experienced service in Afghanistan. As was noted at the 22d Komsomol Congress, they have proven themselves to be real internationalists and patriots. Many soldiers have been awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union title and thousands of soldiers were honored with decorations from the motherland in the last 5 years for bravery and heroism displayed in the performance of international duty.

However, if we wish to realistically evaluate what has been done to fulfill the goals defined in the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree, we would have to note that in a number of places this effort is being restructured extremely slowly. Its content does not always correspond to the new realities, to today's requirements on conscript training. Many measures foreseen by the decree are planned out in a hurry, they are ill-conceived, they fail to address all of the urgent problems, a system for monitoring fulfillment of the plans has not been organized everywhere, and strict responsibility for end results is not being maintained. As was stated in the report of the Komsomol Central Committee to the 22d Komsomol Congress, in recent years military-patriotic work has gradually lost some of its incisive nature, becoming superficial and often downright boring. Unfortunately this trend was not detected in time in many places. And even today we would have

to say frankly that tangible changes in the matter of raising the quality of preparation of replacements for the armed forces are few.

Of course though, when we in the military talk about all of this, we must be self-critical. A kolkhoz chairman or plant director wizened by experience finds the time to check in on the school his organization sponsors, to meet with upperclassmen, to ask about their plans and to try to encourage their interest in his occupation. But how many unit and formation commanders and political workers, staff officers and political organ officers, not to mention commanders and chiefs of higher rank, can boast that they have checked in on a school on a routine day, talked intimately with the children about their problems, or answered their difficult questions? The image of the Soviet officer--the commander and political worker--has an enormous attractive force upon those who are embarking upon adulthood. But his image must be supplemented by the fabric of living communication, and not only during holiday celebrations.

We can find many other forms of spiritual influence by army and navy representatives upon the young simply by approaching the effort creatively, patriotically. The search in this direction is still going on. But we know enough now to be able to say categorically that the possibilities we have available to us can be utilized effectively only if party and Soviet organs and social organizations maintain close interaction with military councils, political organs and military commissariats.

We already have positive experience in such interaction. For example an inspection of basic military and physical training provided to conscripts in Moscow, carried out just prior to the fall draft last year by the Moscow City Military Commissariat jointly with the capital's party and Soviet organs, made it possible to reveal a number of serious shortcomings. The city party committee and the executive committee of the Moscow City Soviet adopted the appropriate measures. As a result around 10 percent of the military instructors were replaced by more-qualified specialists just in the course of preparations for their recertification.

Discussing an integrated approach to military-patriotic and international education, it seems to me we cannot fail to mention the special role played by the press, radio and television, which are also called upon to awaken the interest of the young in the armed forces, a desire to enter military school and to acquire the profession of a defender of the motherland, and to work for military valor and glory. The mass media could do a great deal to instill a feeling of pride in military service in the young people, so that they would perceive the action itself of being drafted into the ranks of the motherland's defenders both as a display of great trust in them and as recognition of their preparedness to honorably fulfill their military duty. But unfortunately far from everything the mass media do in this area satisfies the high requirements. In particular, articles about soldiers are often penned by journalists with little understanding and little interest owing to their weak knowledge of life in the army and navy. This is especially true of rayon, city and youth newspapers.

But there is a solution to this problem. As an example the Political Directorate of the Leningrad Military District took steps to supply local editors and the Komsomol committees of major enterprises and training institutions with the information they need on the work being done by conscripts from the oblasts and rayons in which the district deploys its forces. This makes it possible to demonstrate the beauty and enormous significance of military labor more persuasively.

I have already discussed the need for making more effective use of the schools of general education to provide military-patriotic education to the young, to interest them in specific military specialists and to prepare them for service. But unfortunately we must admit that those who join the ranks after graduating from school must be not only educated but often even reeducated when they get to the army and navy.

Experience tells us that problems left unattended and ignored in school grow in their proportions and invariably make themselves known in the future. Take for example the following fact. We say with understandable pride that our military collectives are multinational. This is intrinsically natural. The Soviet Army has always been an army of internationalists, it has always embodied the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the USSR. But are some of us not hypnotized by this principle, including those of us involved in military-patriotic and mass defense work, are we always attentive enough to problems associated with service of young people in multinational military collectives? Should we not be prodded toward serious concern by the fact that many representatives of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan and the Transcaucasus have difficulty today in speaking Russian--the language of international communication? After all, this circumstance cannot but have a negative effect on our efforts, and particularly on the kind of work done by the young people and on the time it takes for them to master their combat specialties and equipment.

Every year we proclaim that many conscripts have a weak knowledge of Russian, but we never go beyond that, especially in a number of regions of the Uzbek and Turkmen SSR. This is of course not an easy problem to solve. Much depends here also on the military commissariats. Unfortunately some of them have assumed a passive position. They have documented the lack of progress, and they are now waiting for things to get better on their own. Military commissars and political organ chiefs--particularly comrades V. Kolesnik, M. Musayev and A. Rubeko, lack the resolve to pose these problems to the local party and soviet organs, and they are doing little to ensure that basic military training is provided in Russian, or to create Russian language study groups.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the military instructor is the central figure of basic military training provided to young people. There is one remarkable person that I must mention in this regard--Communist Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) Ivan Grigoryevich Popov, basic military training instructor at Secondary School No 21 in Tambov. Around 200 of his graduates have become military school cadets. One can imagine the charm that the teacher must have, and the high authority he must enjoy, to have so many students decide to follow in his footsteps.

I am convinced that the reserves for improving basic military training, as well as military-patriotic education in general, are often implemented slowly because many military instructors display inertia and formalism in their work. To activate the creative potential of this category of specialists means to accelerate the restructuring of military-patriotic work in the school.

It must be said that there is much work to do in this area as well. Most specialists of this profile are people with rich practical and living experience. But far from all possess a special pedagogical education. And there are difficulties in preparing a reserve or a qualified replacement. On one hand the possibilities of the corresponding faculties of the country's pedagogical institutions of higher education are limited. On the other hand some of their graduates either assume an altogether different career, or they do not stay very long in the positions to which they are initially assigned. As an example according to data available to the headquarters of the Central Asian Military District, every other graduate of the basic military training faculty is not working in his specialty within the district's territory just 2 years after completing his studies.

There are also many schools in which initial military training is either not conducted at all, or it is organized by specialists with low qualifications who do not bear officer ranks, and even ones who have never served in the army at all. In the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, for example, most workers among even the initial military training inspectors and instructors of rayon and oblast organs of peoples education have not experienced military service.

We also need to think seriously about how to raise the prestige of the military instructor, and about the ways to improve the work done by military commissariats to select young people, especially from rural rayons, for training in the corresponding institutions of higher education. And there are many problems in this area.

Nor can we ignore the serious shortcomings in the presently existing programs of physical education of secondary school, vocational-technical school and university students. These programs still do not have an applied orientation; they are directed more at fighting hypodynamia than at preparing young people for military service. This sort of "gymnasium" physical education provides little benefit. The task is to more actively encourage young people to participate in sports, and to upgrade the quality of mass sports work in DOSAAF organizations. It would be no less important to inflict the strictest punishment upon those military instructors who provide false figures on the numbers of ranked sportsmen and GTO ["Ready for Labor and Defense of the Soviet Union"] badgeholders. The military commissariats and physical education organizations of Odessa, Samarkand and Tashkent oblasts have been criticized for this a number of times. But tangible changes have not yet occurred.

As was emphasized in Comrade M. S. Gorbachev's speech to the 22d Komsomol Congress, we communists and our socialist structure are interested in active youth, in politically mature youth participating in the solution of all of today's problems. And this means that in our work we must account for the

fact that some young people achieve civic maturity later, that some young people have a parasitic disposition, and that others are unable to subordinate their personal interests to those of the society. Unfortunately we do not always adequately consider a certain demographic feature of our country when we organize educational work--growth of the number of people among conscripts brought up in so-called "broken" families, people who turn to drink and who remain unemployed.

These and other problems were subjected to self-critical discussion recently at a meeting of active party and soviet workers of Kazakhstan. Planning their future work, the participants of the meeting emphasized that party leaders are called upon to take charge of and unite the efforts directed at improving patriotic and international education of the young. It must always be remembered, however, that this must be a general effort, one in which everyone participates. In particular we are counting on more-active assistance from the Komsomol in preparing young people for service.

Special mention should be made of the role of military commissariats and their political organs. We naturally require that they display greater energy, persistence and responsibility in solving today's urgent problems. But analysis of their work shows that these are precisely the qualities which many organs of the local military administration lack. Force of habit, inertia routine and, in some places, irresponsibility prevent certain instructors from rising to the level of the requirements imposed on them by the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, or from evaluating their activities and their subordinates on the basis of the end results.

Each year the results of the work of military commissariats concerned with preparing young people for service in the army and navy are summarized in accordance with requirements of the USSR minister of defense. It was not long ago that this was done. This time the military council of the ground troops took a stricter approach to evaluating the indicators submitted by the military districts. What did they find? An inspection failed to confirm the indicators stated in documents sent from the districts by the military commissariats. This was true even of all the military commissariats that had been represented as being the best in the region. In particular numerous cases of falsification of records and deception were revealed in the military commissariats of Khmel'nitskiy, Rostov and Lvov oblasts and Altay Kray.

The appropriate officials suffered personal punishment for these deficiencies. It stands to reason that we will continue to steadfastly follow the line of making the leaders of military commissariats more responsible and strictly answerable to the party. The political directorate of the ground troops is also making the appropriate conclusions for itself in regard to raising efficiency, concreteness and exactingness in the work done within the districts, and in regard to providing assistance to the political organs and party organizations of the military commissariats. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy turned our attention to this need as well. The political departments of the military commissariats are obligated to decisively improve the concrete leadership they provide to primary party organizations, and to make a monthly personal evaluation of the progress made by communists in fulfilling their official responsibilities.

The military commissariats also have many problems of their own. As an example it is not at all unusual for executive committees to adopt and then fail to fulfill decisions to build conscript training centers and shooting galleries and to create sports and health camps from one year to the next, and for military commissariats to accept this state of affairs as something unavoidable. Interaction between military commissariats and therapeutic institutions in the territory, rayon, city or oblast is still poorly organized in a number of places. The occupational selection specialists of the military commissariats are still essentially not participating in the organization of health improvement and preventive measures. The range of their responsibilities has not been clearly defined, and there is no system for training them. Restructuring of the activities of the military commissariats of the Kirghiz and Turkmen SSR, the Dagestan ASSR and Odessa and Chelyabinsk oblasts is still proceeding too slowly in these and other directions. And yet the military councils and political directorates of the corresponding districts have not made the appropriate demands of them yet.

We have everything we need in order to intensify military-patriotic education of the Soviet people and to prepare young people for military service. consequently what we need now is action. More-aggressive, purposeful and coordinated action. We need a real contribution to this work of state importance, one that is in the spirit of the requirements of restructuring.

11004

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COL GEN ARKHIPOV ON RESTRUCTURING IN MOSCOW MD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 87 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Arkhipov, troop commander, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "The Will to Act"]

[Text] 1. What Has Been Done in Your Collective, in Your Area of Work? Tell Us What Is Most Important

I believe that one of the most important aspects of our climb to the next rung is development and reinforcement of a feeling of party pride in every communist. This might seem paradoxical to some. If a person is a communist, they might think, wouldn't he naturally be this way? Unfortunately the feeling does not always come naturally. We have had many examples--and ones can be found today as well--where the convictions of some go no deeper than the tip of their tongue, where the words are lofty but the deeds do not live up to them.

Or take the problem of one-man command. It would seem that this most important principle of military leadership, one which presupposes unity of power and responsibility and which determines the structure of subordination and decision making and execution, has been assimilated well by all. But it is no secret that some people--they may be of any age and position--simply forget that we exercise one-man command on a party basis. And because they forget, we observe cases of misdirected willfulness, haughtiness and caddiness, cases of conceit and deception, of the prevalence of personal interests over public interest.

And so, replying to the first question, I would like to emphasize that when we embarked upon the restructuring program, we made it our first objective to confirm a spirit of high adherence to party principles at the district's executive level, in its formations and units, and among all communist officers, to instill a keen sense of responsibility for membership to the party, and for implementation of its policy. This today is the main line of personnel indoctrination.

Many noticeable things have already been done. The criteria by which leaders are evaluated are changing. The one-sided approach in which the individual was sometimes judged only on the basis of outwardly vigorous administrative

zeal, is fading into the past. Today it is important to study each person from inside, to know the depth of his convictions, and to learn whether or not his moral tenets are firm and his political temper is strong. In recent times we have been promoting namely people with a harmonious combination of qualities--business-like, politically mature and morally reliable. The payoff from this is tangible.

To a great degree it is owing to positive changes in personnel work that I, the district troop commander, can now say that the combat and mobilizational readiness of the formations and units and the field, aerial and fire skills of the personnel have risen somewhat, and that organization and discipline have improved to some degree. I am referring to the changes in the psychology, in the thinking of the people, to promotion of new leaders. Our task now is to reinforce, to deepen this process in accordance with the requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

I understand that the questions addressed to me by the editor's office are posed directly to me--they are addressed to the individual who is personally responsible. Were I to begin creating the appearance that I personally have no restructuring to accomplish, that I as the leader have a perfect understanding of everything and that I am experiencing no difficulties, this would be untruth and conceit unworthy of a communist. And he who replies in such a spirit sincerely is sincerely blind. It is now time for everyone to surmount the inertia of the old psychology, the old approaches.

Let me dwell at least on this one issue. In their relationship to lower levels of authority, it has been customary for higher levels of authority to put most of their effort into revealing shortcomings and exacting punishment for them. Moreover, oftentimes they did not delve into the problems; it seemed to some that all you had to do was chew someone out, and things would get done. This was taken to be an entire psychology and even a unique sort of philosophy of distribution of roles. You are always on trial, and we are always the judges. And so the regiment commander "harassed" the battery commanders, the division commander harassed the regiment commanders and so on. All of this frayed nerves, but any changes were minor.

We need to move our way of thinking, our style of work and our attitude toward people to another plane, to a higher orbit. We are trying to do this successively and persistently. And to do it successively means to begin with ourselves.

Take as an example the work of the district's military council. As we know, it examines and passes on the most important problems of troop training. Well, it so happens that some change has already made itself known: Problems concerned with the social sphere--it had formerly been relegated to the background, with the spiritual life of people, and with the moral atmosphere in the military collectives have now been elevated to the level of the "greatest" problems. In other words, no more are there any minor problems. Everything that has to do with combat readiness is a concern to the people. This is yet another trait of the new way of thinking.

To go on, problems are analyzed today significantly more substantially, using the most effective methods of analysis. Naturally this approach is, in and of itself, an abrupt contrast to the style of reprimands and badgering. The main thing is to help executives see their shortcomings more keenly, to correct them, and to organize themselves and their subordinates better. Concurrently this approach makes it possible for the military council to obtain the deepest and most complete information.

Let me briefly describe the last meeting of the military council. It was conducted away from the usual meeting place. Members of the military council and a large group of generals and officers representing the district headquarters and its directorates visited a certain garrison. They worked there for over a week. They studied the organization of combat and political training, the training material base and personal conditions, they talked with people in party and Komsomol organizations, they talked to the families of officers and warrant officers, they spoke with people requesting assistance in personal problems, they participated in question-and-answer evenings, and so on. They revealed numerous problems and reserves to which the local command had not devoted any attention. We all arrived at a broad understanding of the state of affairs from many of its aspects. We saw the ways to solve the problems of combat training more effectively, to improve the organization of the entire life of the camp, and consequently to increase the influence of all factors on combat readiness and on tightening military discipline. We did a great deal of work with commanders and political workers. We explained and suggested many things, but we also dished out sharp criticism to some people.

The military council arrived at a quite specific decision. In the time subsequent to the meeting we sent proposals and instructions to different levels of authority in order to help them surmount elements of stagnation.

Let me return to the question I touched upon earlier. I believe that adherence to party principles in one-man command--as we define it today at the new level of our development--presupposes active introduction of a number of important criteria into the psychology of personnel. First of all the communist leader is himself an active champion of party policy, an example of businesslike self-sacrifice, exactingness, adherence to principles, political maturity, moral faultlessness and socially correct and effective work methods to other communists. And he is an example to everyone simply as a personality. Second, he must not put himself in a special position in the party organization, as some people try to do. He is a member of that party organization, and he must act in a spirit of party comradeship. He must spread this spirit in the most active manner. And third, he must competently direct the energy of communists toward solving the fundamental problems of the military collective without sinking to bureaucratic practices.

Once when I returned from a visit to the troops I shared my observations and thoughts with the secretary of the party organization of the directorate to which I am assigned, Lieutenant Colonel B. Poliyenko. One of the things I told Boris Markovich was that I was not very happy with the relationship between a certain division's commander and the secretary of its administration's party organization. The division commander was operating as if he himself had been elected secretary. And the person who had in fact been

elected behaved as if he were the commander's own "private" secretary. Something had to be done.

The other replied that such problems were within the competency of the district's political organs and political directorate.

"Why don't we do something as well?"

"How?" he asked.

"Through our own example."

I must frankly admit that some members of our party organization, and I myself among them, were treated as communists with "special status." And I must admit that some of our leaders also felt themselves to be this way--in a special position.

"Let's change this," I said to Boris Markovich.

And now there is nothing surprising in that critical remarks could be addressed toward anyone, including me. As an example the agenda of a recent party meeting had this item: "Communist V. Arkhipov's report on his fulfillment of decisions of the party organization." I was asked many questions, sometimes extremely unpleasant ones. In particular they recalled the trip I took to the garrison where we conducted that military council meeting.

"At that time you discovered 145 apartments that were temporarily unoccupied," the speaker asked. "A decision was made to offer them to persons in dire need of housing. Was that decision fulfilled?"

Unfortunately this problem had not been solved completely. But I was thankful for the question because it encouraged me to improve my monitoring of the work and caused me to be more persistent in fulfilling the adopted decision.

In a word, this made it possible for the garrison to relieve to some degree the acuteness of the housing problem. We are now studying the problem in other garrisons from this standpoint as well. Incidentally, many garrisons possess what are referred to as garrison hotels and as vacation homes for "VIPs." We are now taking stock of such housing and offering it to others who really need it. Other problems of the same ilk include the use of company transportation for personal purposes, and other abuses of official position. A leader's modesty is not just something nice to say from a podium--it is a principle and an indicator of adherence to party principles.

The personality of the communist leader must be integral, it must be cast from one chunk of steel, so to speak. It is no accident that we often tell officers promoted to higher positions not to compromise themselves.

2. What Is Keeping You from Seeing the Problems and the Ways of Solving Them?

Of the things that are keeping us from seeing the problems, I would like to dwell on one, though of course there are many other things as well. Let me talk about paperwork. Some people think incorrectly that the quantity of paper is the only indicator of importance.

It is extremely important to reduce the flow of paperwork. Unnecessary paperwork overwhelms, and it robs us of time and effort. We analyzed the situation. We found that a third of the documents in the "In" and "Out" files were unnecessary. For example the armament directorate always sent out the same "volume" twice a year on converting equipment for the new season of operation. The numerous pages of instructions said everything the regulations did. It would have been enough to simply send a short telegram indicating when the work was to be done.

As another example, the district's housing operations directorate writes lengthy instructions at the onset of winter: This has to be tested, that has to be checked, transoms need to be closed and so on. Other directorates do the same thing. When young replenishments come in, for example, they tell us how to receive them, how to arrange quarters for them, and how to organize party-political work. When it comes to procuring vegetables, we get the same mass of details, which the corresponding workers of the units and formations should know by heart anyway. We have now put a halt to such "activity" in these directions, and we are reaping nothing but benefits.

But let me repeat that the essence of the problem lies not just in the quantity of paper. Most importantly, by ridding ourselves of our tendency to put everything down on paper, we will thus form a new psychology, a new way of thinking, a new work style. As soon as we stop sending out some directives, confusion arises at the local level: They phone us and ask us why instructions have not been sent. It had become a habit. Because instructions relieve people of responsibility for creative, independent solution of problems, for solution of problems in their entirety. Directives can always become an excuse for not doing something: We were not told to do such-and-such by the directives. Life is also easier for higher levels of authority, since they could limit their activities to nothing more than handing out directives: We told them what to do, but they won't do it.

And what if we were to do away with the practice of requesting numerous items of information from lower levels? This would mean that we would have to get the information from down below ourselves, we would have to talk with people, rather than satisfying ourselves with dispatches and reports, we would have to delve into their lives. Persuasive evidence that this is true can be found in the military council meeting I referred to earlier.

Thus the problem of ridding ourselves of a bureaucratic style and an obsession with paperwork is one of fundamentally changing our psychology, our consciousness, and affirming completely new approaches to both work and people. Unfortunately we have only taken the first few steps in this.

It is the will of the times that we make these changes in this area, as well as in everything else. And this means that we must make a greater effort to exercise that invariable quality of a communist which we refer to as the will to act.

MAJOR GENERAL VASILEVSKIY ON UNIFYING MINORITIES IN COLLECTIVES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 1987 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Avn N. Vasilevskiy, military soviet member, chief of the Political Department, VVS [Air Forces] of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "The Commander Made Us Friends"]

[Text] In the Transcaucasus no one could contemplate what surprises the elements would bring. Avalanches swept aside everything in their path, people perished, settlements were cut off from the outside world... In these anxious days soldiers from the Transcaucasus Military District were among the first to come to the aid of the local residents. How much courage and fraternal participation in the destinies of the people they displayed! But we will not describe the numerous episodes of clashes with the raging elements. I would like merely to emphasize that in the minutes of testing, many many times our great feeling of internationalism and the strong friendship of the peoples of the USSR fully manifested themselves. People of many nationalities live in the Transcaucasus. The soldiers from the units and subunits which hastened to their aid in a difficult moment represent all the republics in the country.

The fact that the inviolable friendship of the peoples, and respect for national culture and national worth of all the nations were confirmed in the consciousness of the Soviet people was stated at the 27th CPSU Congress. The Congress also indicated that our achievements must not create an impression that the national processes are without problems. The main point is to see their continuously arising aspects and facets, and to seek and provide in a timely manner reliable answers to the questions that life poses. How are we solving these tasks?

One day I happen to see this episode. In the subunit commanded by Capt V. Batyrev there was a break between lessons. The soldiers gathered in discussion. They gathered, but somehow not together. The Uzbeks had their discussion, and the Ukrainians theirs. At first glance this is nothing surprising. Fellow countrymen have something about which to talk. But, Capt Batyrev evaluated these discussions among the fellow countrymen in this way: If from the very outset of a soldier's service these microgroups arose only based on ethnic background, would not this interfere with the unity of the collective as a whole? "Obviously, it is necessary to recommend to the deputy for political affairs and the komsomol secretary that they pay attention to

this fact, and in the future work more actively to strengthen the friendship, mutual assistance and mutual support among all the aviators in the subunit," he decided.

The commander made a decision that was correct in principle. But, he did not consider one thing. Not only the political worker, but also he himself is obligated to work more actively on international indoctrination. Why, let us say, did he not pay attention before to the fact that some isolation of microgroups arose even from the fact that the beds of the fellow countrymen stood next to one another in the barracks, and that in the mess hall again the fellow countrymen sat at one table. And so forth.

Apropos of this, such instances can also be observed in certain other military collectives. It happens in roughly this way. Youths arrive in the subunit to serve from various places. Fellow countrymen, understandably, take up with one another more quickly, and the commander does not trouble himself as much as he should about the possibilities of a wider community of people on and off duty. Measures are, of course, carried out to strengthen friendships among soldiers of different nationalities, and the soldiers tell one another about their home kray, and they design a colorful stand about their friendship. But, just the same, even with such a "general inclusion," friendship that will remain forever, so that the memory of those with whom one served the homeland in the armed forces remains for one's entire life grows slowly among soldiers of different nationalities.

That is why I had to give Capt Batyrev simple, but very important advice. And it was of benefit to him. Let us say that later, not at all accidentally and without any artificial pressure, the bed of Sgt Geo Bokhua, a Georgian, turned out to be next to that of Pvt Igor Dergachev in the barracks. When the new replacements arrived in the subunit the captain said delicately, as if in jest: "Are you Ukrainians still chattering about your cherry orchards? And who then will tell you interesting things about Kutaisi?" And he himself watched to see that the new arrivees settled themselves in the barracks according to their combat crews, and not on the principle of national origin. Batyrev was also able to solve just as simply, taking into account the national composition of the subunit, the cadre question -- to choose candidates for junior commanders. And the soldiers of different nationalities, helping one another, began to accomplish the difficult details and difficult jobs. Their friendship grew stronger day after day at the firing range, in the classes and on flights. Dergachev and Bokhua now say with special warmth and pride: "Our commander made us friends."

There is much that namely the commander can do to unite a collective. And there are numerous instructive examples of this. Thus, Officer V. Naumov always takes into account in his work the national particularities of his subordinates. He has a tactful attitude toward the traditions and differences in life style of the service members of different nations. Once, he made a change even in the planned menu in the mess hall, taking into account that for new arrivees who came to serve from a remote mountain settlement one of the dishes could turn out to be unusual. And it is so important for a young man in military uniform to feel respect for himself and his national traditions from his first days of service! That is why Naumov also teaches his

subordinate officers to be sensitive to the special features of each national character, and to rely in this on their positive qualities.

It must be said that at times the language barrier becomes a serious obstacle to the commander in his work of internationalist indoctrination. Therefore, additional lessons, especially on special army vocabulary, are conducted for those soldiers whose knowledge of Russian is inadequate.

But let us refer again to a commander's experience. This time that of squadron commander Maj Ye. Rodionov. He personally initiates and organizes topical evening get-togethers devoted to the union republics. Of course, the party activists, majors V. Vasilyev, V. Mazurov, Capt P. Surovtsev, and the other aviators help him in this, but the commander's example itself is very important. Rodionov frequently talks with his subordinates, and not for the sake of obtaining information to fill out forms, but heart to heart and unobtrusively. By the way, this is part of the duty of every commander-indoctrinator. But, unfortunately, far from all commanders act in this manner. Some commanders still have an insufficient impression of what specific features there are in international indoctrination as a whole, and in the work of uniting specific military collectives. That is, their "explanatory" efforts are isolated from the specific problems of their subunits.

Let us say that captains N. Popov, V. Kuznetsov and L. Kochiyev, having fulfilled their international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, at one of the topical evening get-togethers told the regiment's soldiers how they helped the fraternal people combat the counterrevolution. But the example itself of the combat friendship of the pilots, two Russians and an Osset, would also have a notable influence on the combat cohesion of the aviators in the subunit, if special attention was paid to this fact at the get-together. But these wonderful manifestations of human qualities registered as ordinary even to the experienced officer-indoctrinator who held the topical evening get-together. And you see, his subordinates, especially the young ones, particularly need vivid examples of friendship, and manifestations of its wonderful moral ideals. These examples should always be in the public eye.

Only lack of initiative on the part of commanders can explain the fact that many opportunities for international indoctrination of subordinates are still not being fully used. Some commanders complain about a lack of time. As a rule, for them there is no time to conduct an excursion to a local museum, an enterprise, or a kolkhoz, or to organize a meeting of aviators of different nationalities with representatives of the local organs of Soviet government. Many other forms of indoctrination work, which reliably bring together people's hearts and souls, are also overlooked.

Such commanders, who themselves participate little in this exceptionally important indoctrination work, attempt to transfer all the blame for the shortcomings to the subunit's political workers and party aktiv. And we, they say, are not at all to blame here. Lt Col V. Smagin and Maj A. Zavalishin, for example, took this position.

I believe that military pilot Lt Col V. Loemaa, an experienced commander and competent indoctrinator, expressed himself very clearly in this regard. An Estonian by nationality, he pays constant attention to the question of inculcating friendship and military comradeship. The officer is deeply convinced that distinctions must not be made between commanders, political workers and staff officers with respect to the international indoctrination of the soldiers. The commander must be a model of personal participation in this work.

"Moreover, frequently we forget about the role of the junior commander in solving this matter," Lt Col Loemaa believes. "He is the one who, as first priority, must be given broader knowledge of military psychology, pedagogy, and the national particularities, traditions and culture of his subordinates.

It is hard not to agree with him, for we have many reserves for training junior commanders to participate fruitfully in international indoctrination.

And here is one more "commander's" problem. Let us look, for example, at the national composition of an "average" VVS air regiment in the okrug. As a rule, representatives of 12-18 USSR nations and nationalities serve in this regiment. And among pilot personnel, the majority of whom, as we know, are command personnel, are officers of from three to five nationalities. Why among the pilots are their more Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians and representatives of only a few other nationalities? The answer may be simple -- that the figures are proportional to the size of the population of the union republics. It would seem so, but not entirely. The fact is that military-patriotic work is still not being conducted as required everywhere, especially with respect to preparing and attracting young people to the special and, frankly speaking, difficult profession of military pilot. To some extent this also impacts on the national composition of aviation command cadres.

But the district VVS headquarters and political departments must also more decisively improve their methods in carrying out this work. Certain steps are already beginning to show. Links between our komsomol organizations and the local komsomol organizations in all the union republics in the Transcaucasus are being strengthened. A school for young aviators has been created in the garrison where Lt Col Loemaa is serving. Yes, and lads from Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani schools are simply being invited more often to the units to become acquainted with their remarkable aviation equipment. We frequently delegate our military pilots, majors Yu. Tsetsnadze and B. Dalidze, to go to meetings with pre-draft age youth in enterprises and local social organizations. They attract their countrymen by their personal examples.

It is still too early to speak about the results of all this work, but if we more boldly seek new approaches and display initiative, the results will undoubtedly come.

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DEBATE ON IMPACT OF MILITARY SERVICE ON HIGHER EDUCATION

Round Table Criticizes Draft

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 May 87 p 12

[Round table discussion by M. V. Volkenshteyn, biophysicist and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; L. N. Gumilev, doctor of historical sciences; Yu. P. Izyumov, first deputy chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; V. Ya. Lakshin, doctor of philological sciences; S. A. Makashin, doctor of philological sciences; V. M. Mezhuiev, doctor of philosophical sciences; R. V. Petrov, immunologist and academician; B. V. Raushenbakh, management problems specialist and academician; and V. L. Yanin, historian and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reported by O. Moroz and V. Radzishhevskiy under the rubric "Scientific Circles": "Round Table: Why Don't We Have Enough Properly Educated People?"; questions in first six paragraphs are introductory]

[Excerpts] What is your conception of the essence of an "educated person?" Is it different than in the past?

Is there a demand for highly educated persons now?

What is the current trend, in your view--toward increasing the number of such persons or toward reducing it? Don't you have the sense that there were more highly educated persons before than there are now?

Are there more of them among humanists or among those who are closer to the natural sciences and engineering?

Does the present system of education and training contribute to the preparation of highly educated persons? To what extent are book publishers and the mass media fulfilling this mission?

How do you evaluate the level of education of society as a whole? How should the situation be corrected, in your view?

Opening the round table discussion, Yu. Izyumov said that we now need more of the broadly educated persons who have always enriched society. Specialization unquestionably is needed in any work. Meanwhile, this word

itself is usually associated in our speech with the word "narrow." What can be done—such is the nature of specialization, obviously. The higher it is, the narrower it is. On the other hand, the higher that education is, the broader it is. Highly educated persons are necessary for every collective that wants to achieve important results on the world level. And perhaps our lag in many sectors is related to the fact that there are not enough truly educated persons. And this deficiency is being felt more and more acutely.

V. Yanin: What kind of person do you consider highly educated?

Yu. Izyumov: He should be an irreproachable specialist in his field, of course, have a good command of several languages, have a good knowledge of national and world history and literature, philosophy, and sociology, and be confidently oriented in other fields of science and culture...

M. Volkenshteyn: This is the maximum...

Yu. Izyumov: ...which is dictated by current requirements. We would like to have more such persons on our newspaper's editorial staff, but it is not at all simple to find them.

V. Mezhuiev: In my view, the effectiveness of secondary education is determined largely by the extent to which it orients students toward continuation of their education either in a higher educational institution or even by means of self-education. The school cannot guarantee everyone entry into a VUZ, but it should and it is obliged to prepare them for this, and not turn this role over to tutors. Otherwise, it seems to me, self-destruction of secondary education takes place.

The objectives of the secondary school cannot be confused with those of the PTU [vocational and technical school], either. We need workers in the trades, But are they really needed only for a country which wants to follow a path of scientific and technical and social progress? The number of persons with higher education—those who work with their heads, not just their hands—is increasing in all the developed countries. And it is not without purpose that they are already talking in Japan about introducing universal higher education. But how can it be otherwise under the conditions of computerization and robotization of production! But we have only arrived at the concept of "early specialization," which essentially means identification of the secondary school with the vocational school. What kind of vocation can be provided at the secondary school level in the 20th century? Neither Marx's nor Lenin's concept of introducing polytechnical education in secondary school and familiarizing students with productive labor had anything in common with the concept of early specialization. It has to be demonstrated particularly that not every kind of labor can be considered productive today, only the kind which is connected with the current level of knowledge. But our students' work and the knowledge they acquire in lessons often have nothing in common with each other. A person can be trained for work with the same success by forcing him to create fire by rubbing sticks together. And why is low-skilled work at a plant or in a shop considered productive labor, but intellectual work in any form is considered unproductive?

It is just as unreasonable to undermine the prestige of higher education by referring to the manpower shortage and the necessity for someone to engage in unskilled labor...

And the recently introduced practice of drafting first- and second-year students into military service is really quite incomprehensible. Service in the army is a constitutional obligation for every young person. But not at the cost of a normal education! Does our society really need soldiers more than young persons who have also acquired an education as physicists, biologists, engineers, and social scientists at the right time?.. Compulsory discontinuation of their education does not contribute to its success. Moreover, many do not return to institutions after the army--time has passed and new concerns and problems have emerged, and sometimes their interest in studies has been taken away as well.

B. Raushenbakh: Education really must not be interrupted. We have boys who come to study after school, and those who enter after the army. Those who have entered after the army perform excellently and are very well organized, but we will not acquire any Newtons among them. Obviously, an atrophy, a deadening, of creative aptitudes takes place.

As a result, there will not be anyone to engage in basic science in 10 years, and this is dangerous. For defense as well.

M. Volkenshteyn: After World War I, in which Germany suffered defeat, as we know, the science in this country increased to a much higher extent than in England and France. And because the Germans did not let their intellectuals and scientists go into the service. But the French and English did. As a result, an entire generation of talented young scientists was removed. An elementary factor which we are not thinking about. For this reason, I agree absolutely that it is foolish and shortsighted to draft students into the army.

Col Gen Gareyev Responds

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Jun 87 p 11

[Letter from Col Gen M. Gareyev, doctor of military sciences and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in response to a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA round table discussion, under the rubric "There Is Another Opinion": "Concerning Education Again"; first paragraph is editorial introduction; words in all capital letters printed in boldface]

[Text] This, our new discussion rubric, is intended for those cases when a statement in the newspaper encounters serious objection. This happened after publication of the verbatim account of the round table "Why Don't We Have Enough Properly Educated People?" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 13 May 1987). The editorial staff received a letter from one of leaders of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. We are publishing this letter.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA published material from the discussion by a group of scientists in the round table "Why Don't We Have Enough Properly Educated People?"

On the whole, there are good reasons for concern with this problem, both from the viewpoint of the interests of our society as a whole, as well as the country's defense. We share many of the views expressed, and enthusiastically support proposals with reference to an increase in the interest and prestige of the teaching profession, in particular.

Participants in the discussion spoke about various aspects of education, including the necessity for knowledge of the Bible.

At the same time, essentially nothing was said in the round table about ideology, patriotism, and civic responsibility. Only Yu. P. Izyumov and S. A. Makashin referred to matters related to the world outlook. But in Soviet society, education cannot be limited to the mastery of a sum of knowledge alone, no matter how extensive it is. Our education is not thought of without the formation of a Marxist-Leninist outlook, profound ideological principles and conviction, and without the organic combination of instruction with communist training.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree of 13 March 1987 "On measures to fundamentally improve the quality of training and use of specialists with higher education in the national economy" set the objective of "Providing for the training of personnel who combine thorough vocational competence and ideological conviction, high efficiency, and civic activity and who have been instilled with the spirit of communist morality, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. These are obligatory requirements for each person to put into practice at his place of work.

The other day, in responding to questions from the newspaper L'UNITA, M. S. Gorbachev said: "And the problems and conflicts in points of view should be resolved in the course of a democratic process by the participants in it themselves, and the communists among them are obligated to hold a position worthy of their knowledge." This is especially important when it relates to our ideological positions and overall state interests.

Perhaps all these are obvious conditions which are understood, and which participants in the discussion did not consider it necessary to dwell on? But the main point of many statements made in the course of the discussion compels us to doubt this. Obviously such a position is not coincidental.

In this connection, I would like to express my opinion on certain questions raised in the round table discussion.

FIRSTLY, a negative attitude toward service in the Armed Forces, and not only the drafting of students into the army, essentially shows through in the statements by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V. M. Mezhyuev, Academician B. V. Raushenbakh, and M. V. Volkenshteyn, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Participants in the discussion criticized Soviet laws which regulate the procedure for drafting young persons into the army in

utterly unacceptable terms. M. V. Volkenshteyn expressed his opinion most categorically by stating that it is "...foolish and shortsighted to draft students into the army."

Our democracy provides for broad discussion of draft laws, but when they have been adopted they must be carried out. The question of improvement in existing laws may be raised, of course, but then we need specific and sound proposals which take into account the interests of the state as a whole so that the appropriate competent organs can review them.

In preparing this article they attempted to explain to me that the discussion participants were speaking only about the inadvisability of interrupting students' studies in VUZes, but not against their service in the army in general. Let us assume that is so. But then what is the purpose of speaking about military service as something unworthy of an educated person, and its bad influence on education and the molding of personality? On one hand, it was admitted that "service in the army is the constitutional obligation of every young person." On the other hand, the contrived, rhetorical question was asked: who does our society need more, soldiers or young scientists? At the same time, service in the Soviet Armed Forces was spoken of in language that was current in prerevolutionary Russia, when the tsar's army was an instrument of oppression and repression of the workers ("forced separation from education," "drafting into the service," and other expressions). When it was stated in the discussion that some states "did not let their intellectuals and their scientists go into the service," but others did let them go, it was as if this referred to bourgeois countries, but the conclusions drawn were applied to our army.

It is impossible not to note in a careful reading of the text of the discussion that the entire tone of the views of certain participants implied that military service in our time is something alien and not very necessary for our society. All this cannot be disregarded because quite a few other articles with opinions such as this have been appearing lately in our press.

It is common knowledge that the CPSU Program and the Constitution of the USSR call for protection of the socialist Motherland, reinforcement of the country's defense, and the provision of state security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet state. Our party's decisions and Soviet laws obligate every communist and every Soviet person to do everything within his power to maintain the country's defense capability at the proper level. Protection of the socialist Motherland and service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honorable obligation and sacred duty of a citizen of the USSR.

All historical experience, and the experience of our country first of all, persuasively confirms the correctness of the Leninist conclusion that "any revolution is worth something then only if it is able to defend itself..." We need not go far for examples. If we had not been able to uphold the honor and independence of the country in the Great Patriotic War, when fascism openly proclaimed its objective to be the enslavement of the peoples and the destruction of all our national culture, it is not difficult to guess what the

fate of many generations of persons would be like, not to mention their education. Now, when victory was won at such a high price and we are all taking advantage of its fruits and the results of protecting the socialist Motherland, it is simply blasphemous to forget about all this.

But today, perhaps, all this is out of date? Possibly no military threat exists for our country and other socialist states in our time? But this is not the case, unfortunately. Objective reality and numerous facts of present-day life confirm the validity of the 27th CPSU Congress conclusions that although there is no fatal inevitability of war, a military threat originating with the imperialist states really exists at the same time. Their military preparations aimed against socialist countries are being stepped up more and more.

The extensive and persistent efforts undertaken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government to prevent war and reduce armaments are well known as well. But everything does not depend on us alone in this area, and while the military threat exists, the interests of providing for the security of our Motherland require reinforcement of the country's defense and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is unacceptable to rely on the "peacefulness" of imperialist states in protecting the socialist Motherland.

Based on this, scientists and cultural figures, not to mention the employees of higher education, have been called upon to instill in the youth and all Soviet people the correct attitude toward protection of the Motherland, without oversimplifying the complexity of the problem.

To V. M. Mezhuiev's question "Does our society really need soldiers more than young persons who have also acquired an education as physicists, biologists, engineers, and social scientists at the right time?" I can answer positively that under the conditions of existing reality, our society needs both highly educated scientists as well as soldiers, and they cannot be contrasted with each other. This truth should be indisputable for any citizen who is a patriot of his Motherland.

N. G. Chernyshevskiy said long ago: "The historical importance of every Russian is measured by his services to the motherland and his worth as a person is measured by the strength of his patriotism." For the Soviet person, a sense of duty to the Motherland and a sense of patriotism and internationalism is an integral feature of his education and moral character.

A person who is insufficiently competent also may be a patriot, of course (there are quite a few such examples in history), but for a highly educated person this involves profound ideological conviction and scientific comprehension of the essence of patriotism. Ideology, patriotism and internationalism may be manifested in different deeds. But these qualities make themselves felt most clearly when a person's attitude toward protection of the socialist Motherland is established in deed.

SECONDLY, it seems to be necessary to explain how matters actually stand with regard to the conscription of students into the Armed Forces. Universal military service is the law in our country. It reads: "All men who are

citizens of the USSR, regardless of birth, social and property status, racial and national origin, EDUCATION (the emphasis is mine--M.G.), language, religious affiliation, kind and nature of work or place of residence, are obliged to perform active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR." It is established in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law..."

There are now many hundreds of thousands of students in our country. Until recently, exemption from active service in the Armed Forces put students under unequal conditions compared with young persons drafted into the army and navy from production work or after completion of secondary school. The decision to call up first- and second-year students for active military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR when they reach draft age was adopted by the Soviet Government in accordance with numerous requests from Soviet people. This is one of the manifestations of social justice, when all young persons must carry out their sacred duty to the Motherland for established periods.

Experience has shown that the decision to draft students for military service is justified not only from the viewpoint of adherence to the law and social justice, but the interests of training scientific personnel as well. In past years, when exceptions were made for students with regard to military service, this sometimes led to a situation in which certain insufficiently mature young persons sought to get into VUZes at any price in order to avoid military service. I don't think that such students have grown up to be great scientists.

A number of additional steps have been taken recently to enable students who were drafted into the Armed Forces to continue their studies after the service. During the period that VUZ students are performing military service, they are not taken off an educational institution's rolls, but are on academic leave of absence.

Students who have returned to VUZes to continue their studies after completion of their military service and transfer to the reserves, regardless of their previous progress in school and their academic debts, are given a scholarship, and those who need them are provided with dormitory facilities. VUZ rectors have been charged with handling these matters promptly.

In addition, a number of other benefits have been established for the individuals named: they are not enlisted in student detachments and for agricultural work, an individual schedule may be established to pay off their academic debt, and if necessary they are provided with material assistance in the form of a monthly stipend.

With attentive consideration for this matter, the Newtons should not suffer. This is also our common concern. Other solutions also may be found, not only in carrying out the laws formally, but in essence as well, but this should be done by taking into account the interests of our society as a whole, without setting certain state objectives against others.

It must be stated that the overwhelming majority of students who are drafted into the Armed Forces regard the fulfillment of their constitutional obligations with understanding. They perform their military duty honestly and in a proper manner, and bring additional culture and knowledge into the ranks of the army and navy. Former students, as a rule, are a support for commanders and political workers in training and educating personnel.

The opinion that many do not return to an institution after the army is incorrect as well. In fact, more than 85 percent of the students return to their educational institutions after service in the Armed Forces and continue their studies successfully. Incidentally, the same procedure for enlisting students for service in the Armed Forces exists in Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Romania, and a number other socialist countries.

M. V. Volkenshteyn expressed the thought that "after World War I, in which Germany suffered defeat, as we know, the science in this country increased to a much higher extent than in England and France. Why? Because the Germans did not let their intellectuals and scientists go into the service. But the French and English did." I will not undertake to judge how correct this opinion is on the whole, inasmuch as there were many other historical circumstances and Germany was not advanced in all sectors of science.

But if we take the military aspect of the matter, M. V. Volkenshteyn's statement is not quite accurate. Germany (Prussia) introduced compulsory military service as far back as 1813-1815, and this system existed until 1919; in 1935 compulsory military service was reinstituted, but in practice it had begun to be implemented earlier. Consequently, Germany "did not let its intellectuals go into the army" for only 12 to 15 years over the period of 120 years. It is difficult to believe that this was enough for science to flourish. Universal military service was introduced in England only during the first and second world wars, and its army and navy were brought up to strength in the remaining prewar years by recruitment and they "did not give up their scientists for the service." According to M. V. Volkenshteyn's version, it was precisely in England that science should have been better developed.

THIRDLY, with all due respect for the esteemed academicians and scientists, it is impossible to agree with their assertion that only those boys who go to an institution right after completing school become Newtons, but "an atrophy, a deadening of creative aptitudes" takes place among those who have served in the army. One automatically has to wonder: if there are such harmful intellectual consequences for young persons who have served in the army for only 2 years, what will they be like for persons who spend practically their entire lives in military service? Such a disrespectful attitude toward their Armed Forces, where only those who are creatively incompetent are serving, according to statements by the round table participants, should remain on their conscience.

Historical experience shows that persons who are no less gifted than in any other field of science or practical activity are necessary to perform the military tasks that often determine a state's destiny. A. V. Suvorov was no less of a genius in the art of war than M. V. Lomonosov was in the field of

science. G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilyevskiy were highly educated persons in their field of activity, and their military work was needed by the people just as much as the work of important scientists. And they acquired their basic education after long military service, by starting from the most basic levels of it and taking part in two wars.

Obviously, no one calls into question the fact that great writers are highly educated persons, as a rule. It is common knowledge that L. N. Tolstoy was sent to the Caucasus, then to the Crimea, for several years (1851-1855) before he completed a full year at the University of Kazan, and he was in theaters of military action and took part in the defense of Sevastopol. Judging by his works, L. N. Tolstoy's creativity did not suffer from all this. Talented Soviet writers who have gone through the grim school of war--M. Alekseyev, V. Astafyev, G. Baklanov, Yu. Bondarev, V. Bykov, V. Karpov, K. Simonov, and many others--enjoy universal recognition. Some of them acquired their education right after the war. We all remember the eagerness and passion with which persons who entered civil

ilian and military educational institutions after the war went after scientific knowledge.

Many examples may be given of former servicemen who became distinguished Soviet scientists after being transferred to the reserves or by remaining in the Armed Forces. Among them could be named S. P. Korolev, G. I. Marchuk, A. M. Prokhorov, A. I. Berg, A. A. Blagonravov, G. S. Pospelov, V. A. Kirillin, G. A. Arbatov, I. A. Glebov, M. M. Dubinin, A. V. Fokin, I. L. Knunyanets, A. M. Samsonov, A. N. Tupolev, and many others.

And at present a large number of capable, and in a number of cases, really talented generals, admirals and officers are serving in the Armed Forces, and considerable creativity is being demonstrated by warrant officers, midshipmen, sergeants, soldiers and sailors. As far back as when our Armed Forces were first established, V. I. Lenin said that a modern army cannot be built without science. And it is impossible to perform the tasks of protecting the socialist Motherland successfully in a century of scientific and technical progress and more and more complicated weapons and military equipment without educated and technically competent persons. Military work is becoming more and more intellectual and contributes to the development of creative abilities among personnel.

Thus there are no serious grounds for conclusions that service by young persons, including students, in the Armed Forces has a negative effect on their creative abilities.

The experience of many years provides the basis for maintaining that military service molds many needed features and qualities in a young person, helps to educate Soviet boys, disciplines them, and provides worthy personnel for our educational institutions. Our Armed Forces are deservedly called a school of political, combat and moral training, a school of courage, diligence, collectivism, organization and discipline.

There are exceptions to this rule, of course. There are quite a few shortcomings in the army and navy which were sternly and justly pointed out by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee at the meeting on 30 May. Not all

young persons can be properly educated during their military service. A great deal depends on each one of them, on their attitude toward service, and on their military and patriotic training before being called up for military service.

Restructuring is now under way in the system of educating and training our fighting men, just as in the system of education and training in the country as a whole. Command and political personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy face a great deal to do in this field. And in this responsible work of reinforcing the country's defense we need the continuing support of all the Soviet people, including our esteemed scientists and leaders in culture, education and the arts.

8936

CSO: 1801/208

DRA VETERAN RETURNS TO ACTIVE LIFE DESPITE WOUND

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 p 1

[Article by Col P. Chernenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Courage"]

[Text] He knew for certain that he would return. And that in the same way as before the army, he would ride the kolkhoz fields on his tractor, leaving behind him furrows of raven-black earth. He knew and believed this. Both while he was serving in Afghanistan, and when he was lying in the hospital after being seriously wounded.

"Drive a tractor with one leg missing? Impossible!" His neighbors in the hospital ward objected.

"But I'll do it!" There was so much confidence in his voice that his detractors fell silent.

Private Petrashevich was nearing the end of his tour of duty as an infantry fighting vehicle gunner-operator. In a few days he was to be transferred to the reserves. And this was his last mission. The soldiers had been ordered to render assistance to Afghan soldiers in defeating a dushman band. The Soviet soldiers were ambushed while en route. Petrashevich's vehicle was hit by fire from a grenade thrower. Both of his legs were seriously wounded.

Under heavy dushman fire platoon commander Lieutenant V. Ivanov made his way to Petrashevich and dragged him out of the IFV.

Petr returned home an invalid, with the Order of the Red Star pinned to his chest. The question of the day was, how was he to live? He longed for his old job, on the tractor. "With one leg missing?" people asked in amazement once again.

"Yes, with one leg missing," Petr held to his own. And he knocked at every door.

With the help of the newspaper TRUD he was able to submit a request to Komsomol members of the Minsk Tractor Plant to design a manually controlled tractor for him.

The workers at the plant were sympathetic to the former soldier-internationalist's request. Komsomol members engineer-designers N. Zhukovskiy, A. Stasilevich and V. Novik and artist-designer S. Zemchenko literally never left the shop for several days, working on a manual control system for a tractor.

And then it was finished. Soon a sparkling blue tractor outwardly differing in no way from its fellows rolled off the plant's conveyer. The only difference that could be seen was an Order of the Red Star drawn in the upper corner of the cab wall.

I met Petr Petrashevich in the settlement of Naroch, Minsk Oblast. We met on a road leading from the fields to a dairy farm. He climbed down from the tractor cab and limped from the road over to the plowed field. And he stopped, gazing somewhere into the distance.

What was Petrashevich thinking? Probably that despite all difficulties he did return, as he had dreamed, to his beloved fields. He returned not as a spectator but as an actor. He is married, and he has two sons. Artur, the younger one, was born 3 months ago.

Petr Petrashevich displayed considerable courage in the performance of his international duty. And peaceful life required no less courage of him. He endured all trials, as is befitting of a Soviet soldier.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR 'INTENSIFICATION OF OPENNESS, CRITICISM'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 87 p 1

[Text] The actual experience of restructuring is especially dear to us today. It is a confirmation of the revolutionary transformations occurring in the country, and it shows us how specifically we can surmount the forces of inertia and inhibition, and implement new and progressive ideas. The desire to see action behind the words is deeply inherent to all today. Because otherwise the problems would never be solved; in other words changes called for by the restructuring effort would not occur. Speaking at the 22d Komsomol Congress, M. S. Gorbachev emphasized: "People will now judge the restructuring effort on the basis of how its ideas and plans are woven into the fabric of real deeds, and what changes they will bring to the daily life of millions."

To soldiers in the armed forces, the relationship between words and deeds is identified chiefly with faithfulness to the military oath, and honorable performance of one's sacred duty to the motherland. This is not only a legal but also a deeply moral rule of behavior of the military servicemen, one which is assimilated by each person back during preparation for military service, and one which is reinforced in its course. Therefore it would be natural for us to associate the image of the Soviet soldier with qualities such as responsibility, consistency, diligence and efficiency. Today, in a time when all of us are called upon to improve things in our service, in our work at our posts, to make specific improvements, it is especially important for the unity of words and deeds to always be the defining principle in everything in the attitude the man in shoulder boards expresses toward all aspects of army and navy life.

But is this the way things always are? To promise, and then not to do, to assume a responsibility, and then not to fulfill it, to say one thing, and to do something different.... Unfortunately these kind of things are not an exception in the army and navy milieu, even among commanders and political workers. This is found to be true in particular from letters to the editor, which often express the concern that while changes are coming about faster and the psychology of restructuring is gaining a firmer foothold, backsliding into the old way of thinking is still encountered. A discrepancy between words and deeds continues to appear in some people as a consequence of personal passivity, of a tendency to hide one's failure to satisfy the requirements of

the times behind proper phrases and loud slogans. This position is having a negative effect on the moral climate in the military collectives.

"I once overheard a conversation among young officers," writes Colonel G. Kashikov to the editor. "One of them said that no one could convince him that the restructuring has begun as long as chiefs appeal for display of principles, a party attitude and selflessness in work while they themselves continue to capitalize on their official position for personal gain.... I began thinking about how long it will take for these officers to persuade themselves that the restructuring which such chiefs talk about has in fact become an important aspect of their life position...."

Yes, changing the views of young officers is a problem in this case not so much of time as of the situation, which is undergoing improvement and which will improve with increasing emphasis. Yes, we still have areas of stagnation; yes, the old ways, the mechanisms of deceleration continue to operate in some places. All of this is keeping people from thinking in the new way, from acting in the new way, from working in the new way, from assimilating new approaches to solving new problems. Herein lies one of the difficulties and complexities of the restructuring effort. But we cannot wait for these difficulties and complexities to solve themselves. We need to display active initiative, we need to intensify glasnost and criticism--the moving forces of renewal. And commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations have to play the decisive role in developing these forces. A decisive transition from words to deeds in combat training, in tightening military discipline, in strengthening party-political work and in improving the social sphere depends most of all today on every serviceman and every subunit, unit, ship, staff and political organ maintaining an active relationship to restructuring.

The January CPSU Central Committee Plenum turned special attention to the need for decisively supporting resourceful, thoughtful, energetic people who can and want to march boldly forward, and who know how to capture success. The army and navy have always had an abundance of such people, such leaders. Today their influence on the state of affairs is especially tangible.

The missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov" recently returned from a long ocean voyage. It is a young ship, but everything its crew managed to do was done with high quality, it was done beyond the call of duty, with energy. Captain 1st Rank N. Patran, a senior inspector of the navy's political directorate, took part in this cruise. Highly experienced in ship service, he noted first of all the high authority enjoyed by the ship commander. This authority was based on the faith of the subordinates in the firmness of the commander's words. Every seaman aboard the cruiser, not to mention the warrant officers and officers, is deeply respectful of the regulations. Things are like this to a significant extent because this is the way the commander, Captain 2d Rank V. Veregin, relates to the regulations. In his first meeting with the crew he said that everything aboard the "Marshal Ustinov" will correspond strictly to the requirements of the regulations, and he saw to it that this was the way things were.

In terms of its design the cruiser is one of the most up-to-date ships. This is to the credit of its creators. In terms of its training, spirit and indoctrination the crew satisfies today's requirements--this in many ways is to the credit of the commander, who competently relies on the party organization. There is good reason why it is said that all of our successes begin with the concrete individual--first of all with the leader. And in the acceleration effort, in the restructuring effort his words and his moral example of energetic, persistent and consistent implementation of these words have enormous mobilizing significance.

It is especially evident today how growing exactingness toward one another, the growing force of glasnost and the increasingly stronger position of party principles are promoting accuracy and courage in evaluating personnel. Success comes to those who act, to those for whom practical work begins with thinking out and revealing the problems.

The concluded winter training period and the progress in fulfilling adopted socialist pledges eloquently reveal the true contribution of each person, of each subunit, unit and ship to our most important cause--strengthening the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces. We must examine our activities concretely, on the basis of their end results. Each one of us must fully reveal our possibilities in the general process of the occurring changes and in further growth of the combat readiness of our armed forces.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

BRIEFS

IVANOV PORT CALL IN GDR--A detachment of Soviet warships consisting of the missile cruiser "Groznyy" and the escort vessel "Svirepyy" sailing under the flag of Vice Admiral V. P. Ivanov, commander of the Twice-Awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet, called at the port of Rostok on an official friendly visit. The Soviet sailors were warmly greeted by Admiral V. Em [transliteration], GDR minister for national defense and commander of the Peoples Navy, by soldiers of the GDR National Peoples Army and by numerous residents of Rostok. Vice Admiral V. P. Ivanov met with city government representatives and garrison officers in a cordial atmosphere. Familiarization with the city and its points of interest is continuing. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 87 p 3] 11004

CSO: 1801/191

SESSION OF COLLEGIUM OF MAIN MILITARY PROCURACY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Col Justice A. Varfolomeyev: "Expanding Glasnost: In the Main Military Procuracy"]

[Text] A session of the Collegium of the Main Military Procuracy examined the problems of using the mass media for propaganda of Soviet legislation and expanding glasnost in the procurator's office in light of requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

A report was given by Major General of Justice A. Katusev, first deputy main military procurator. He noted that in this time of restructuring that is going on in the country and the armed forces, the role played by the mass media in developing the serviceman's profound understanding of law, his responsibility for strict compliance with Soviet laws and regulations and his intolerance of all violations of socialist legality is growing immeasurably.

Speeches were made at the session by Major General V. Khrobostov, deputy chief of the propaganda and agitation administration of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Major General F. Khalturin, first assistant editor-in-chief of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and by members of the Collegium of the Main Military Procuracy.

Representatives of the USSR Procuracy, the Directorate of Military Tribunals, the USSR Ministry of Justice, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, newspaper and journal editorial offices, Central Television and the Motion Picture Studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense and officers of the military procuracies participated in the collegium's proceedings.

The speeches noted the need for making wider use of the mass media and propaganda resources to strengthen military discipline, law and order and the principles of one-man command, and to prevent the unlawful manifestations, unsettled circumstances in the personal affairs of the troops, transgressions upon socialist property, falsification of reports, unearned income, drunkenness, bureaucratism and other negative phenomena encountered in some units.

Lieutenant General of Justice B. Popov, main military procurator, presented the session's concluding remarks.

ARMED FORCES

LEGAL NOTICE: CHANGES IN PRE-DRAFT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 87 p 4

[Text] Beginning in 1988 young men undergoing basic military training will be encouraged to attend field training courses.

The first stage, which is to last 14 days, is to be attended by students in their 9th-10th (11th) years in secondary general education schools (a week before the end of the work practical, during the summer vacation), in their first year of training at secondary vocational-technical schools (in July) and in their second year at secondary special educational institutions (in May-June depending on the training period). Field training courses of the second stage will be conducted for students in their 10th-11th (12th) years of school (in May at the expense of training time allocated for basic military training), in their second year of training at secondary vocational-technical schools (in July, during summer vacation), and in their third year at secondary special educational institutions (in April-July depending on the training period and the specialty). Young men who have undergone initial military training at training stations may also attend five-day courses.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

ARMED FORCES

BRIEF

COMBAT TRAINING CONFERENCE--A meeting of military journalists with representatives of armed services combat training directorates and departments was held in the offices of the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Lt Gen A. Rubinchik, director, Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces; Vice Adm V. Zub, first deputy chief of combat training of the Navy; Maj Gen Avn V. Shpak, honored military pilot of the USSR, VVS [Air Forces] deputy chief of combat training; and Col Ye. Bondarev, chief of one of the combat training departments of PVO Voysk [Troop Air Defense] took part in the meeting. During the meeting the results of the winter training period were analyzed, and the prospects for discussing in the paper the course of summer combat training in the Army and Navy were discussed. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 87 p 3] 9069

CSO: 1801/202

GROUND FORCES

LT GEN GREDASOV ON WEAKNESS IN TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen F. Gredasov: "It Begins with Intelligence"]

[Text] When talk turns to the subject of what impression our times are making in the style of work of commanders and staff, on their attitude toward the urgent problems of military training, I recall an episode that I witnessed recently at an exercise in one of the units.

"Has reconnaissance gone out?" the commander asked the chief of staff when the latter had concluded his report on the regrouping of forces and resources.

"It has." The chief of staff answered briefly, and with this the matter was seemingly exhausted.

But then an officer from division headquarters entered the conversation.

"Could you state in more detail where and for what purpose reconnaissance has gone out?" he asked the regiment chief of staff.

I will not get into details of the dialogue that then ensued between the representatives of the two headquarters. I will say simply that I was glad to observe this episode.

The question: "Where and for what purpose has reconnaissance gone out?" itself made me glad. It must be confessed that previously in such situations, if it was possible to hear such a question, it was extremely rare. Somehow everyone had become accustomed to the fact that in exercises, especially live fire exercises, where the evaluation of the subunit and unit were determined mainly by holes in targets, questions associated with the organization of reconnaissance went on the back burner. And the fact that reconnaissance had gone out was sufficient, both for the commander and, along with him, also frequently the inspecting officer.

And then suddenly this question was asked...

It was a routine episode. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it indicated a great deal. In particular, it indicated that more attention has begun to be

paid to tactical intelligence as one of the most important types of combat support. Needless to say, I am not making this judgment based on one instance. Working in units I witness many episodes that indicate the desire of commanders, political workers and staff officers not to overlook the slightest opportunity to improve intelligence training. I believe that now, when intensive summer training has begun in the Army and Navy, one of our tasks is precisely that of strengthening this tendency and facilitating its development in every way.

The battle begins with intelligence. This is known even to people not involved in military affairs. Why do we make reference to this truth again and again? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently has devoted a number of publications to questions of tactical intelligence training.

Modern combat, with its continuously developing nature, under the influence of changes in military affairs, requires from commanders and staffs at all levels special attention to questions associated with the organization of combat support, including, of course, intelligence. Naturally, the times are also placing their imprint on this work itself. The number of targets to be disclosed is increasing, and the importance of accuracy in the determination of coordinates, and the effectiveness of passing intelligence information, etc., are growing. In the defensive area of a contemporary motorized infantry battalion, for example, there may be more than 250 targets simultaneously, according to foreign military sources, including approximately 150 armored targets. Thus, even if, for example, three quarters of them are disclosed by intelligence, and then suppressed and destroyed, more than 60 targets still remain. That means that tactical intelligence organs must be capable of rapidly and with high accuracy detecting a substantially greater number of targets.

All of this is possible only through the able coordination of organic intelligence forces and resources, with the forces and resources that are directly conducting combat operations. Consequently, the problem of improving tactical intelligence training of all personnel, especially of officer cadres, and of increasing the responsibility of commanders and other officials for the organization and conduct of intelligence efforts in all types of military actions is becoming acute.

However, unfortunately restructuring psychology in this direction is still going very slowly. This is especially true at the company and battalion level. Testing has shown that many commanders of motorized rifle and tank subunits have poor knowledge of the basics of the organization of intelligence in combat, and the organic structure, weapons and tactics of the operations of the forces of the probable enemy, and are not able to use intelligence equipment or control intelligence organs. Repeatedly I have seen how in exercises some officers could not independently understand the stream of intelligence information or correctly assess the intentions and capabilities of the opposing side.

Needless to say, these are not simple things. But I am sure that many officers would not end up in such a difficult position in exercises if they did not disdain the ABCs of intelligence training in the units where they serve.

I recall this episode. In one of the training centers of the Belorussian Military District a motorized rifle subunit of the regiment then commanded by Lt Col V. Mikheyev had to wage a meeting engagement with superior "enemy" forces. Later, when we were analyzing the actions of the two sides, one of the umpires, I remember, was surprised. He asked how Mikheyev was able to so restructure his combat formation on the march that the "enemy" was essentially unable to deploy and ended up in a trap. Did not Mikheyev know ahead of time the concept of the opposing side?

It turned out that he did know. The intelligence organs continuously provided the regiment headquarters accurate information about the "enemy." They operated actively, boldly and resourcefully. For example, Capt V. Shcheglakov, commander of a tactical reconnaissance patrol, so camouflaged one of his vehicles along the route of movement of "an enemy" column, that the motorized riflemen in the patrol were able to remain unseen and visually observe the column. Radio interception of the operational instructions of the "enemy" headquarters was also ably accomplished. Possessing reliable information about his intentions, Lt Col Mikheyev appropriately regrouped his forces, which predetermined the outcome of the battle.

This "easy" success was, of course, no accident. The actions of the motorized riflemen on the training range became a continuation of the search for ways to improve the level of field training, including that of intelligence training, of the personnel, which has been actively carried out in this regiment for several years already.

In interpreting the experience and lessons of work associated with the improvement of intelligence training of combined arms subunits, it is impossible to avoid paying attention of the figure of the commander. It is saying little that he is the individual who is directly interested in improving this training, for the commander evaluates the enemy and makes his decision from intelligence information. The combat effectiveness of his subunit or unit depends largely on his position and personal attitude toward the questions of intelligence training. Nevertheless, frequently in exercises one sees commanders who, having received from higher headquarters a generally phrased mission to, for example, establish the nature of the "enemy" defense on some line, transmit it for execution without providing any more precise specifications. Naturally, in such a case the intelligence organs, as a rule, also submit unclear and vague reports.

It also happens that, after having organized intelligence in a generally correct manner during the preparatory period, the commander and staff do not control it in the dynamic of combat. What this can lead to may be seen from this example.

At first intelligence personnel commanded by Lt G. Radchenkov operated very actively in the tactical exercise led by Lt Col V. Chichko. They disclosed a

large number of targets on the forward edge and in the immediate depth of the "enemy" defense. But from the start of the combat firing all the attention of the battalion commander, the chief of staff and the other officers, was concentrated on the targets. The intelligence troops now no longer received any missions. Their inaction led to a situation in which a concentration of units of "enemy" forces on one of the advantageous lines went unnoticed. As a result, the counterattack by the opposing side turned out to be entirely unexpected by the battalion commander.

What can be said in connection with this? I think that one of the reasons for such an attitude toward intelligence in exercises on the part of some commanders is because the exercise itself, as the highest form of field training, still rarely contains elements that encourage the two sides to active opposition in the field of intelligence. Exercise leaders rarely create situations in which the commander, let us say, lacks necessary information about the "enemy" and is forced to obtain it through his own forces. As a result, the students work out an oversimplified approach to questions associated with the organization and conduct of intelligence.

During preparations for the summer training period, specialists from the directorates and departments of the Ground Forces Main Headquarters working in the troop units directed that commanders and staffs pay the most serious attention to this question. Practical assistance was rendered to those who so required, taking into account the lessons from the previous training period. I must say that work by representatives of other higher headquarters in the troop units will also be of benefit. Here we are speaking about not overlooking these questions in the future.

Many ways of improving the organization of the training process were proposed at meetings conducted at various levels held just prior to the start of summer training. At these meetings ways to improve the quality of intelligence training of the troops were among the questions discussed. In particular, one of these ways is to increase the attention paid to questions of intelligence training during the professional training of officers. Most importantly, it is necessary to introduce more actively into commander's training questions associated with the organization of combat support, including intelligence. It is also necessary to think about how to stimulate the interest of officers towards these questions through fresh and innovative material, and diverse and unusual individual tasks. Apropos of this, when speaking in discussions with officers about the problems of intelligence training, many refer to the fact that not very much time is devoted to working out questions associated with its organization and conduct in the commander's training program. This is true, there is not very much. Questions of intensification of lessons, seeking reserves and using leading experience must be posed all the more sharply.

For example, the system of improving the intelligence training of officers in the motorized rifle regiment where Lt Col V. Lukyanenko is chief of staff (Central Asian Military District) warrants attention. For these purposes group exercises on the ground, headquarters exercises employing means of communication, and short exercises, in particular, are used actively for these purposes. Officers are taught to process intelligence information during the course of commander's classes.

There is also another way. In the motorized rifle regiment where Maj V. Sklyarov is chief of intelligence (Leningrad Military District) officers successfully master the topic of intelligence within the framework of a, so-called, unified tactical task. The essence of this method is that the students work out comprehensively in exercises questions of tactics, protection from weapons of mass destruction, engineer training, intelligence, etc. I must note that here as well priority is given to field exercises with the use of command and control equipment and training base facilities designed to work out questions associated with the organization and conduct of intelligence.

In looking after the quality of intelligence training exercises, it seems to me that it is necessary also to raise the importance and prestige of the specialty of the tactical intelligence soldier, and attract people to this specialty. Besides planned exercises, cultural and educational, mass sports and other measures can do a great deal here. Unfortunately, in talking with the secretaries of party and komsomol organizations in those subunits which do not shine with successes in intelligence training, I notice almost everywhere a general lack of such measures in their activity. And, you see, to underestimate them means to miss a real opportunity to improve this work.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written about the competitions among intelligence troops and intelligence subunits, which have become traditional in the majority of military districts and groups of forces. Carried out along with firing, physical and engineer training, according to more difficult tasks and norms, they enable officers, warrant officers and mandatory service soldiers to test their capability for great physical and psychological burdens, and to display the knowledge and skills in intelligence that they have acquired in fraternal competition. Such competitions, in our view, would bring great benefit also to motorized riflemen, tankers, artillerymen, and soldiers of other branches of arms and special troops.

Summer military training is in progress. We have much to do in order to accomplish the assigned tasks. And, it is very important not to repeat past errors, and to make maximum use of experience that has been acquired in order to move forward, and gain in our work. In so doing each of us must remember that combat begins with intelligence.

9069

CSO: 1801/202

GROUND FORCES

TACTICAL COOPERATION WITH ARTILLERY IN COMBINED ARMS BATTLE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 87 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Mikhalkin, commander of Ground Forces Rocket Troops and Artillery: "The Commander and Modern Combat -- Lessons of Coordination"]

[Text] Among the shortcomings we noticed in our inspection was weak coordination of combined arms subunits with artillery. And, in modern combat with the employment of different branches of forces and resources the coordination of their actions, as is known, is of decisive importance. Can KRASNAYA ZVEZDA discuss some of the lessons of tactical coordination.

Gds Lt Col V. Mezenin,
Gds Lt Col V. Ponomarev,
Red Banner Carpathian Military District.

Col Gen V. Mikhalkin, commander of Ground Forces Rocket Troops and Artillery, shares his thoughts on this problem.

The shortcoming which this letter brings to our attention is characteristic not only for officers in the unit where guards lieutenant colonels Mezenin and Ponomarev are serving. This omission was also discussed at the session of the Ground Forces Military Soviet where the results of the winter training were given.

Yes, modern combat is characterized by the use of different kinds of forces and resources. Naturally, the question of the ability of the combined arms commander to control them and organize and maintain their close coordination is a keen one. And if one considers that the rocket forces and artillery are allotted the main firepower role, then commanders and staffs must coordinate their actions with combined arms subunits, as we say, down to details.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War also teaches this. In its lead article of 19 May 1944 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, for example, wrote: "The military practice of the Red Army contains many examples of exemplary, exceptionally painstaking and precise organization of such coordination. It is sufficient to recall the recent battles at Sivash, Perekop and Sevastopol, where the efforts of large masses of artillery in the full sense of the word merged with

those of the infantry, which ensured an unparalleled high offensive tempo under the existing conditions." As a former front line soldier I can confirm that, as a rule, success was achieved with fewer losses where artillery was effectively used.

Why is it that today some commanders of motorized rifle and tank subunits are not able to employ their organic and attached artillery? One cannot give an unambiguous answer to this question. But, one of the reasons, as the saying goes, lies on the surface -- it is their poor knowledge of the capabilities of rocket and artillery subunits.

Here is a characteristic example from a tactical exercise that took place in one of the units of the Carpathian Military District. Lt Col N. Arkhipov, a tank battalion commander, received an exercise input during the course of an attack about an "enemy" counterattack. Having assessed the situation, he decided to repulse the counterattack from an advantageous line. Until the arrival of the tanks on this line it was intended that the "enemy" advance would be held back by defensive fire from the attached artillery battalion. In the situation that existed this decision was in general acceptable. But, the battalion commander assigned the mission to the artillerymen in a very approximate way. The artillery battalion commander was forced to operate by guesswork. As a result, the artillerymen were ready to fire when the counterattackers had already passed the line indicated by Lt Col Arkhipov.

This episode is also instructive in that psychological costs were also manifested in the actions of the battalion commander. Tank and motorized subunits, as is known, are equipped with powerful weapons. Some commanders even view attached artillery merely as a secondary means.

Is it necessary to say that such carelessness -- and that is all that can be said about the attitude of the battalion commander toward the use of artillery -- would be extremely dangerous in a real battle. It is no accident that officers who have served in Afghanistan take a different approach to the organization of combat operations with the employment of artillery. I recall, in connection with this, a statement in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by Hero of the Soviet Union Col V. Neverov. In particular, it was an episode that told about how one of our companies was surrounded by superior dushman [rebel] forces in a shallow ravine, and had virtually no capability to extricate themselves independently. In this frankly critical situation the senior commander in the area of combat operations decided to cut off and pin down the enemy by fire from his attached artillery. The artillerymen had to work more than intricately. Nevertheless, they succeeded in implementing the planned operation.

The name of this commander is not given in the article, but I am sure that he knows well the particularities of combat employment of artillery.

Here is another example, which took place not in a real battle, but in an exercise in one of the units of the Central Asian Military District.

In anticipation of a tank attack the "enemy" deployed his anti-tank reserve on a previously prepared line. Maj V. Finkin, who commanded the tankers, knew

about this. He had powerful artillery weapons at his disposal. But he counted on solely the strength of the guns on the combat vehicles. As one might have expected the frontal attack bogged down.

In recalling this I would also like to direct attention to this detail. Neither the exercise leader, nor the assistant leader for artillery corrected Maj Finkin. Nothing was said either about his omission at the exercise critique, which indicates an underevaluation of the capabilities of artillery at higher command levels as well. Doesn't this also lead to a situation in which the target environment on ranges is at times created without considering artillery tasks? Frequently the objectives of the artillerymen are defined last, somewhere aside from the main thrust of operations by the combined arms subunits.

If you start to inquire into such kinds of discrepancies you hear in response: They wanted to observe safety measures and avoid damages to range lines of communication. Of course, in organizing exercises it is also necessary to take these aspects into account; but, not to the detriment of combat readiness and training. An experienced commander, before he creates a target environment for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other fire weapons, always thinks about where the artillery will fire, and tries to see that the targets assigned to artillery are included in the overall tactical backdrop, and that fire from guns and mortars is not dangerous to the range lines of communication.

However, we will not attribute all the omissions in the organization of coordination that we see in exercises solely to the combined arms commanders. Much here also depends on the artillerymen themselves, including the assistant exercise leaders for artillery.

Analysis shows that the prerequisites for various types of shortcomings in the use of subunits of rocket troops and artillery are frequently laid back during the development of the exercise plans, in which the actions of artillery and combined arms subunits are not linked by a single tactical concept. As a result, the artillery ends up somehow outside the field of vision of the combined arms commanders. This was the case, for example, in an exercise in one of the units of the Baltic Military District. No exercise inputs were given to the artillerymen during the dynamic of battle, and the combined arms commanders did not call for fire from the battery. There was nothing Lt Col V. Podgurskiy, assistant exercise leader for artillery, could do but to dream up as he went along tasks for the artillerymen, who ended up as uninvolved observers. Nevertheless, he did not raise an alarm, and did not insist that the artillery be used according to its purpose.

To reconcile oneself to such an attitude toward training also means to continue to form in the men an oversimplified impression about the nature of modern combat. Here it is necessary to make a decisive break in interdepartmental barriers and to seek new approaches.

At the same time it is necessary to note that success is not determined by the assistant exercise leader alone. Much depends directly on the battery and artillery battalion commanders, on their ability to link the fire of their

subunits with the actions of the companies and battalions and to react quickly to changes in the tactical situation. And this, as we know, is not simple. I have repeatedly seen how some artillery commanders, having received a mission of suppressing personnel and fire weapons, let us say, in "enemy" platoon strong points, immediately give the firing command to the firing areas, not taking into account the actual disposition of the defenders' position. As a result, artillery fire frequently struck only some of the forces concentrated in the strong points, or hit empty areas, and the motorized riflemen and tankers who attacked immediately thereafter found themselves in a difficult position.

From the experience of the Great Patriotic War it is known that the artillery commander must continuously see the battlefield with the eyes of that combined arms commander with whom he coordinates. It is important that he always have several variants for the use of artillery within the framework of accomplishing the overall mission.

Unfortunately, far from all artillery commanders are able to work so precisely. Reasons for this are inadequately thorough understanding on the part of some of the nature of combined arms combat, poor knowledge of the methods of accomplishing missions employing all involved forces and resources, and a lack of the skills of commander's foresight. It is necessary to acknowledge that we are also not teaching our officers this purposefully enough in tactical exercises conducted solely with artillery subunits. There are those who even feel relief, saying that it is easier to conduct such exercises: less time is spent for preparation, coordination with combined arms subunits is notional, and the number of safety measures employed is not so great, etc. Naturally, in such exercises the missions are frequently solved outside of the tactical situation, and formalism is permitted in the organization of coordination. At the same time, the guidance documents on artillery training clearly define that the procedure for carrying out the combat firing stage and fulfilling fire missions in independent exercises of artillerymen must be the same as in combined arms tactical exercises.

It is obvious to all that it is not easy to organize coordination in combat among units and subunits of different branches of arms, and that it is necessary to learn it in the modern way. How is this done? There are many ways, prompted by combat experience, that have been worked out by leading commanders during the training process. In particular, the practice of carrying out joint exercises by officers in combined arms and artillery subunits in the system of commander's training has become widespread in troop units. In these exercises they learn to understand the nature of modern combat more thoroughly, to expand their professional field of vision, and to enrich one another with knowledge about the combat employment of different kinds of forces and resources.

Combined group exercises, short tactical exercises, drills and other active forms of commander's training are used widely. This is the case, for example, in the "N" Motorized Rifle Regt where Lt Col A. Makarov is chief of artillery. Battle drill exercises, tests and drills on firing and artillery fire control are combined here with battle drill exercises in combined arms subunits. Combined arms battalion commanders are involved in a battery exercise with

combat firing as leaders, and artillery commanders participate actively in the development of plans and the conduct of company tactical exercises. Naturally, during the inspection the regiment's subunits, including the artillery subunits, demonstrated the ability to operate in coordination in a unified tactical situation.

I had a purpose in naming the chief of artillery of this unit. It was largely through his efforts that the joint training of the commanders and personnel of combined arms and artillery subunits was set up. In general I must say that outstanding qualities distinguish Communist Makarov. When he is confronted with some problem he does not attempt to push it off on others, but undertakes the work primarily himself. I believe that this is the modern approach.

There are many units in the Ground Forces where ways of improving combat coordination of different types of forces and resources are actively sought in exercises in the commander's training system and in daily practice. I can name many combined arms commanders who are capable of employing organic, attached and supporting artillery with high effectiveness in combat. I also know artillery officers who are no less knowledgeable of questions of tactics than combined arms commanders. But, as was already noted above, we have many officers who do not possess these qualities. Moreover, not everywhere is this being worked on as the times demand.

There is also something for the specialists in our directorate to think about here, as was fairly stated to us at a recent session of the Ground Forces Military Soviet. A principled discussion about this took place in meetings of the party organizations of the directorate, and at service conferences. As should be expected, particular attention was paid to the analysis of commander's training. It was emphasized that the directorate had still not done nearly everything to implement fully the recommendations about this matter made by the Ground Forces Military Soviet. We have not yet achieved a situation in which questions of the combat employment of artillery are mandatorily examined in all military districts at assemblies with commanders at the regimental and battalion level.

Now it is necessary to make up for what has slipped by. And a great deal will naturally depend on what lessons have been drawn locally from omissions and errors committed during the winter, and how quickly the conclusions from the inspection are reflected in practical work during the summer training period.

9069

CSO: 1801/202

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MAINTENANCE TEAMS TRAIN AS MISSILE LAUNCH CREWS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 87 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Amirov, Air Defense Troops: "Strength Reserve: In the Interests of Combat Duty"]

[Text] "Load!" Captain A. Shurchilov ordered.

Hovering for a second in the air, the missile dropped smoothly to the transporting and loading vehicle. And within just a few more moments the missile was set up on the launcher and raised to its launching angle. Shurchilov looked at his stopwatch and happily made his entry into the log: The standard had been surpassed. Nonetheless some inaccuracies in the actions of his subordinates had not evaded his keen eye. After explaining to them what they could do to make their work better, he gave the command to load once again.

The training exercise would not have been unusual in any way, had it not been for one fact: The crews consisted of soldiers from a technical subunit. In their main specialties their responsibilities are limited to servicing missiles until the point where they are secured to transporting and loading vehicles. But it was no accident that these soldiers found themselves at a launch position. This was the result of creative efforts by the unit's officers to find ways to maneuver crews in real combat. In this way they are creating a dependable strength reserve in relation to all elements of combat readiness, and ensuring that combat duty would be served well.

The idea of training such crews did not come about right away. It all began with a certain tactical exercise. By his scenario inputs the senior chief created a situation for the missilemen where members of the launch crews were being incapacitated one after the other. "If things keep going this way, there'll be no one left to do the work," the commander of the launch subunit fretted. "But couldn't something like this happen in real combat?" the inspecting officer asked.

During a conference of officers following this exercise, Major A. Chursin and Captain N. Kirillov proposed a procedure they had thought up for training soldiers of the technical subunit to perform in launch crews. It must be said right away that their proposal was not supported unanimously. But the final decision had to be made by Officer A. Khilov, and he gave the green light.

To start with, the technical subunit decided to train with written-off launchers and with missile mock-ups they made themselves. The very first weeks confirmed the preliminary calculations: Soldiers in relation to whom servicing the launchers was only an associated specialty began satisfying the standards. And in a number of cases they surpassed them. Moreover the quality of the work satisfied the corresponding requirements. But the proficiency of the crews still had to be raised to the training level of the full-time launch crews, so that if they had to be replaced by their associates, the even rhythm of combat work would not suffer. It became necessary to create special classrooms and trainers. This problem was solved quite successfully by the subunit's efficiency experts headed by Major B. Kharlanov and Senior Lieutenant A. Sakalauskas.

At a recent final inspection the inspecting officer rendered the TOE launch crew out of commission. The crew of the technical subunit immediately took over and completed the task with an excellent score.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

NAVAL FORCES

BRIEFS

PORT CALL AT TRIPOLI--In accordance with an agreement that has been achieved a group of Soviet warships, consisting of the large anti-submarine warfare ship Admiral Isachenkov, and the destroyer Bezuprechnyy, commanded by Rear Adm V. G. Yegorov, will make an official friendly visit to the Libyan port of Tripoli during the period 2-5 June. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 87 p 3] 9069

CSO: 1801/202

SPECIAL TROOPS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA RAID: LABOR SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 87 p 1

[Article by Col Yu. Yegorov, department chief, Fleet Construction Directorate; D. Kalugin, chairman, Commission on Labor Protection, Construction Directorate, Combined Trade Union Committee; and Capt 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "What Indifference Leads To"]

[Text] The construction site at which the subordinates of Lt Col S. Laptev were working was not distinguished by exemplary order. Construction materials were thrown everywhere in disarray, and piles of debris were heaped up. Nevertheless, motor vehicles rushed passed us feverishly in every direction. Thus, from the very beginning we felt as though we had entered an area of increased danger.

Both the violation of the rules for storage of materials and the disorganized movement of transport at the site indicates disdain for the rules of safety techniques.

A group of military construction personnel who were working in the area of a high tension cable attracted our attention. In such cases an observer should be present. However, no one worried about this; neither Sr Lt I. Kashtelyan, chief mechanic of the UNR [office of the work supervisor], nor Sr Lt O. Borovkov, nor mechanic V. Zhuravskiy. This is a gross violation of power safety measures.

We enter one of the doorways of a house under construction together with Sr Lt I. Makhat, chief of the construction and assembly section. Many of the flights of stairs did not have railings. Neither did the elevator well. People were working literally two steps from disaster. As recently as last year a fatal mistake occurred in a similar situation when a man was killed during assembly of an elevator well.

And here is yet another typical violation of the rules of safety techniques. Pvt A. Leynerst, a tinsmith, was working without a helmet, and hanging far out of a window. Meanwhile, work was underway on the upper floors and roof of the house. Can disaster be far away?

Such lack of care and irresponsibility cannot have any justification. Working nearby at a construction site were military construction personnel from the UNR where Lt Col Yu. Yevlashenkov is in charge. Last year the state of safety techniques in this collective noticeably improved. The result of the first quarter of this year confirmed that this was no accident.

A visual comparison also was clearly in favor of the subordinates of Lt Col Yevlashenkov. Thus, the comprehensive brigade led by V. Strikun is actively introducing the initiative of the Moscow construction workers here: "Work with high productivity, without occupational injuries and accidents." We examined the facility and public and domestic sanitation accommodations together with V. Tarasov, senior work superintendent, and M. Goncharov, labor protection and safety techniques engineer. We saw that much attention was being paid to the maintenance of the worksites in the brigade, to teaching military construction personnel safe methods of work and to using individual protective equipment.

Unfortunately, there are not all that many such examples in the Baltic Fleet Construction Directorate. In the past two years there has been a steady increase in the level of occupational injuries at construction sites.

The results of the first quarter indicate that there are thus far very few changes for the better. During these months the occupational security service of the construction directorate has prohibited work at five projects. The fleet commander and his deputy for construction have brought a number of officials to strict disciplinary accountability. The situation has been discussed at party meetings and at sessions of party committees and trade union committees.

In March and April a "Labor Protection Month" was held. Unfortunately, not all leaders and party and trade union activists had the necessary businesslike attitude toward its organization. For example, in the collectives where officers P. Reshetnikov and R. Tonka are serving everything sank to a level of formalism, since it did not reach the primary labor collective -- the brigades. In these units the month was extended with appropriate conclusions drawn.

Recent meetings of officials, during which exams on the rules and norms of safety techniques were taken, disclosed one of the causes of such incidents. How can we talk about an improvement of work to prevent accidents in collectives whose representatives received unsatisfactory marks?

Life confirms that the most direct link exists between this knowledge and practice. Take, for example, V. Kalashnikov, a labor protection and safety techniques engineer from the UNR led by Col V. Karatayev. Behind his thorough answers it was not difficult to sense and feel the responsibility with which he regards his work, and the active position he takes with respect to violations. In the first quarter of this year his collective did not have a single occupational injury.

The members of the raiding brigade left the construction site with the unanimous opinion that much still needs to be done in the military construction organizations so that labor protection becomes a concern of each leader, engineer, technician, worker and military construction soldier.

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

ACCELERATION: AUTOMATION AT TANK REPAIR ENTERPRISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 87 p 2

[Article by Maj B. Zotov, Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District:
"Restructuring: Reserves for Acceleration in Military Enterprises"]

[Text] Restructuring of production was started in the tank repair enterprise led by Colonel V. Bulava with more than just eliminating the bottlenecks. A decision was made to fundamentally modernize the equipment, automate control of production processes and sharply reduce the volume of manual labor.

The statements made in that memorable meeting of the enterprise's party committee were biting and principled. It was said that many jobs were being done by hand while modern equipment was doing nothing more than taking up space. Even the equipment that had been placed into operation was being used inefficiently. The opinion of members of the party committee, which discussed the issue of restructuring the plant, was unanimous--they had to act decisively and resourcefully, and rely on the best experience.

Soon after, a group of specialists left for Moscow by decision of the enterprise director to acquaint themselves with robot complexes and study progressive production procedures at the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni V. I. Lenin. The conclusions they returned with were crystal clear--a fundamental turning point could not be achieved unless an automated control system was introduced.

They requested two computers from their higher-ups. They were not rejected. They applied all effort to install them quickly on their own. Colonel Bulava proudly recalls his subordinates in those first days and weeks. Many difficult problems did arise at first, after all. First of all they did not have the knowledge and skills of working with computers. Dozens of engineers and technicians hit the books. Experienced instructors from the polytechnical institute were called in to lecture and conduct lessons. Great credit for the fact that no one was overwhelmed by the difficulties belongs to the enterprise's party committee and its secretary, S. Shestov.

After they managed to train people to service the computers, they created a special production control group, of which A. Isayev took charge. This group included programmer V. Shakhnazaryan, engineer L. Mazurenko, operator V. Zinchenko and others. And then they had to modernize the production equipment itself.

When the enterprise executives submitted an order for numerically-controlled machine tools and even robot-manipulators, their superiors simply could not believe that they could get them to work. And so they had to demonstrate to them and assure them that they were capable of working with the most sophisticated equipment. Major General V. Krivulin was among those who provided full support to the collective.

To the amazement of many, the machine tools began working in just a month. In the evenings, specialists gathered together in the chief engineer's office to study the documents. With time some of them became experts in the new technology, to include process engineer-programmer P. Krivoshapko, fitters M. Pashkevich and V. Yermakov, electricians F. Lavrentyev and Yu. Dorokhin and others.

Today 25 robot-manipulators, 4 numerically-controlled machine tools, 7 automatic lathes, 8 robot complexes and 20 semi-automatic welders are installed and operating at the tank repair plant. This freed many people from heavy manual labor and eliminated the constant shortage of manpower. After all, one numerically-controlled machine tool replaces three conventional ones, and just a single operator can handle four such machine tools. If we consider that the new equipment is also operating in two shifts, it is not difficult to estimate the enormous benefit that the enterprise's reconstruction has already produced.

Not only have production indicators increased: The creativity of the people have risen noticeably as well. Evidence of this can be found in the significant growth of the number of efficiency proposals. Labor and executive discipline has risen.

Enterprise chief engineer Lieutenant Colonel V. Tishchenko's work day begins at the computer console as a rule. Wide use of computer technology makes it possible to operate over a dozen production control programs simultaneously. Take for example one of the principal programs--an automated monitoring and execution system that contains over 800 positions. It includes all current assignments of every executor. The computer itself reminds the management when the deadline for carrying out a certain order is reached, and it indicates who is at fault for any delay. Each person whose name winds up in the report knows that every day beyond the deadline means automatic forfeiture of a tenth of the bonus. Consequently there are no complaints about executive discipline. Incidentally not only production problems but also decisions of the party committee and the trade union committee are kept under control.

Another program--"Energy"--keeps track of the consumption of all forms of fuel, it makes savings or excessive expenditures known, and it monitors the relationship of energy users to the established consumption limits. Programs such as "Warehouse," "Trip Tickets," "Personnel" and a large number of others are operating successfully.

There still are of course many unsolved problems as well. Thus the new manning table for the numerically-controlled machine tool section supervised by P. Krivoschapko has not yet been approved, and new estimates are not yet available. There are still many difficulties with tools and spare parts. But the people are full of enthusiasm.

"There are many young people at the plant who learned some things in the army," said party committee secretary S. Shestov. "These are aggressive, diligent people."

It must be said that social problems are the most acute of all which young specialists encounter. Construction of a youth dormitory has been dragging on for 3 years, and still the end is not in sight. Personnel turnover understandably remains high under these conditions. This is one other aspect of restructuring--facing the needs and concerns of the people head-on. Unless this is done, not a single major problem could be solved.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

CHANGE TO CONTRACT METHOD DETAILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 87 p 4

[Text] The procedure for converting the labor collectives of industrial cost accounting enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense to work in the brigade cost accounting, brigade order and collective order systems has been determined. The purpose of this conversion is so that collectives would attain high end results of labor at the lowest labor and material outlays by intensifying the material interest of workers in raising production effectiveness, and by achieving all-out development of creative initiative, economic accountability and socialist resourcefulness.

A brigade can be converted to the cost accounting system by an order (directive) signed by the enterprise director, or on the latter's instructions by an order (directive) signed by the director of the given production unit, as coordinated with the corresponding trade union committee. Introduction of the brigade order based on cost accounting culminates with the signing of a corresponding agreement by the enterprise (shop) administration and the brigade (the council of a contracting brigade), following its examination and approval at a general brigade meeting.

11004

CSO: 1801/191

OVERCOMING BUREAUCRATISM IN R&D WORK

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 87 p 2

[Article by Col Ye. Zhuravlev, chief of the scientific research department of the Military Academy of Chemical Defense imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, doctor of military sciences: "Managing Enquiry: The Opinion of a Scientist on Ways to Raise the Effectiveness of Scientific Research"]

[Text] Speaking in the name of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee to scientists and scientific workers on 27 January 1987, M. S. Gorbachev said: "If it is to become an active participant of restructuring, science must itself undergo restructuring in many things. Life is urging us to move on. He who does not anticipate scientific ideas risks falling behind in everything. Such is the situation created by our time--a time of the most profound changes in science and technology...."

People ready to perceive the requirements of restructuring not formally but in their principal essence are playing the decisive role in accelerating scientific-technical progress. And this pertains in equal measure to our military science. The efficiency of research and development can be increased noticeably in my opinion by taking a constructive approach to solving problems such as expanding the rights and raising the activity of scientist collectives, to creating more-flexible organizational structures in scientific research institutions and VUZes, and to strengthening the ties military scientific research institutions maintain with the troops and defense industry. And all of this work should begin with improving the system for managing research and development. What does this mean?

First of all we need a decisive transition from a directive, bureaucratic style or, as it was referred to at the January Plenum, a management style of "administrative pressure," to economic methods of leadership. I am referring to raising the moral and material interest of scientific workers and instructors in the high quality and timeliness of the research, and in the fastest possible implementation of its results. And this depends in many ways on the professionalism of the research and on strengthening the material and technical base of the military academies, institutes, schools and scientific research subdivisions.

There may be different opinions on this problem, as well as on the ways of solving it. Some see the solution as fulfilling the principal integrated research and development projects on the basis of business contracts, and as reorganizing the numerous science, research and development control organs into a single system, and creating a situation where the main clients for scientific research work and experimental design would also be the distributors of the material, technical and financial resources allocated from the defense ministry's budget for planned research and development. These clients should also be given the right to select the main executors (the scientific research institutions, VUZes and design offices) on a competitive basis. In this case either the weak scientific collectives would be compelled to upgrade their qualifications, or they would be reduced as being unpromising.

If military training and scientific institutions wish to obtain orders and sign business contracts for a given period of time, they would have to reorganize their laboratories, groups and divisions to meet the needs of their "order portfolio"--the particular plan, problems and the necessary scientific research base, within the limits of the planned material, technical and financial resources. In my opinion a flexible structure would allow scientific subdivisions to react (this should be emphasized) to the continually arising new directions of research, and to abandon directions that are discovered to be dead ends.

What can our military science gain from a transition to the new economic methods of control? First of all it makes it possible to place control of research and development in correspondence with the national system of science management and sharply increase the effectiveness with which the scientific potential of military VUZes and scientific research institutions is utilized. Moreover the possibility will appear for significantly reducing the swollen administrative apparatus, which is presently so preoccupied with paperwork, and to return the freed specialists to scientific subdivisions or to the troops.

We are all interested both in raising the efficiency of our specialists and in raising the contribution made by science to practice. How can this be done? I do not intend to answer this question completely. I think that the starting point of the search should be the premise that an excessive hierarchy has always been detrimental to science (including military science). It suffocates it. Paperwork and red tape have attained such large proportions that it is getting hard for science to carry this cross. On the other hand only professional researchers can solve the most complex scientific-technical problems at the level of today's requirements. Creation of special faculties in military academies and institutes to train professional scientists and science instructors would help to raise the level of research and development.

In my opinion improved stimulation measures may play a large role in restructuring control over military science. I feel that promotions should also be made dependent on the extent to which specialists participate in military scientific research, and on the results. Ranking scientists in five grades and engineers and laboratory assistants in three or four grades could become one form of such stimulation. In scientific subdivisions it would be

suitable to introduce the positions foreseen by decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers in relation to academy scientific research institutions: junior, senior, directing and chief scientific associates. The grades of engineers and technicians may include engineer, senior, directing and chief engineers, junior laboratory assistant, laboratory assistant and senior laboratory assistant.

We would naturally have to solve other organizational problems as well. Take for example the dependence of monetary reward on the quantity and quality of research. And on the other hand, waste and negligence should be punished in financial ways. This also is a requirement of the times. The result of such restructuring will be that persons without the interest, capabilities and sufficient qualifications for research and development will leave the VUZes and scientific research institutes. And to avoid abuses and violations of social justice when distributing bonuses, all members of the collective and the party and trade union organizations must participate in this process.

There is another point of view that has recently been discussed actively: a highly effective, stable system for protecting the rights of authors of new original ideas, developments, discoveries, inventions and efficiency proposals on the basis of existing national legislation. This system would make it possible to exclude cases where persons of senior rank appropriate the results of the scientific labor of junior executors and developers.

There is one other aspect of the problem. Experience shows that any scientific-technical idea can become reality only if the author of the idea is able to test its effectiveness in collaboration with defense industry workers. In this case if the results are positive, industry (this also is confirmed by practical experience) would never reject their implementation.

Now a few words about the anticipated end result. In my opinion introduction of improved economic methods for managing science would make it possible to raise the effectiveness of research by two or three times. Look at the situation now, after all: Around 15-20 percent of the specialists of some scientific subdivisions are involved in creative work, 30-35 percent are technical executors, while the remaining 40-50 percent of the workers collect, record and process the raw data and research results. Is such a ratio justified? I think not. By improving the work of the last two categories we can sharply increase the effectiveness of scientific research.

The ideas I have presented here may be debatable in some ways. But as long as the problem exists, it needs to be solved. Science cannot go on as before. By improving management of our military science we will improve the activities of the scientific and scientific educational institutions and intensify integration of science with troop combat training and effective staff training, of science with enterprises of defense industry in the interests of strengthening the country's defense capabilities.

11004

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PLANNING FOR RELIABILITY, SAFETY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 87 p 2

[Article by Professor I. Ryabinin, doctor of engineering, bearer of the USSR State Prize: "Equipment Reliability, Survivability and Safety -- or Some Problems of Theory Which are Important for the Practitioner to Know"]

[Text] Emergency situations... how suddenly they happen, why they take place, can they be forecast, and how accurate are these forecasts? How does science approach the resolution of these problems?

The times dictate the tempos of acceleration of scientific and technological progress. Today they place at the forefront the problem of reliability, survivability and safety of equipment in general, including military equipment, and of control systems in particular. Let us look back. In the 1950s, and even later, automatic regulation theory required most of all algorithms for control of individual aggregates (engines, aircraft, ships, rolling mills, etc.). With this, essentially, the work of the theoretician was finished. Now the situation has changed fundamentally. The center of effort has switched to the control of complex systems, including the "man - machine" system. A contemporary monitored object, for example an AES [atomic electric power plant], has up to a hundred thousand check points. The control system itself is becoming extremely complex, as they say, "multi-machine." The most varied demands are made upon it, and one of the main ones is improved safety. All this is so. However, the phenomenon of complexity of modern technical systems (atomic electric power plants, spacecraft, nuclear powered submarines, orbital scientific complexes, etc.), and of automated control systems, in our view, is not yet fully understood in its scientific plane, and is not resolved to the necessary degree in the applied sense.

I am not speaking about a lack of works devoted to the problem of system complexities, but of inadequate efforts directed at ensuring their survivability and safety. In this connection I wish to recall the words of Academician V. Legasov: "The tragedy at Chernobyl is a warning. And not only about nuclear power. Today we are dealing with the most complex technical systems. Powerful hydroelectric stations, gas storage, chemical combines, aviation, mines and so forth -- all of these are industrial systems. The probability of an accident at them is lower than at simple systems, but if something happens the consequences are greater and more difficult to

eliminate. And at times the state of such large systems depends on a few operators, on their qualifications and skill."

At times safety is identified with reliability. This is incorrect. A technical system may be very reliable, but also potentially dangerous. This assertion does not downgrade the need for efforts to ensure reliability, but at the same time it emphasizes their clear inadequacy for ensuring safety.

Let us refer to the literature on this topic. In it fundamental questions of safety are often set aside and computers are given solely the entirely secondary role of assisting the operator in the processing of streams of information.

The skeptical attitude toward the role of computers in questions of safety of those same nuclear power plants is due to a number of reasons: Inadequate knowledge of modern control computers; distrust of the results they provide; and the impossibility of obtaining certain experimental results required for safety conditions.

Meanwhile, safety is the ability of a system not to get to a state that threatens human life or brings other large scale harm. By increasing the reliability of elements, introducing so called structural and temporal redundancy, employing interchangeability and restorability, etc., we guarantee the breakdown resistance of the system. That is, its ability to function properly when several of its elements fail.

However, it is precisely for complex systems -- and this I would like to stress in particular -- that the possibility of highly complex combinations of events is characteristic, the probability of each of which is small, and in the aggregate rather many such "improbable" combinations accumulate. The operators must understand this.

As a rule, the efforts of developers and designers are aimed at improving the breakdown resistance of a system. This is necessary. But it is clearly inadequate for ensuring its survivability and safety. Even specially created monitoring and protection systems, oriented on a simple exhaustive search for possible dangerous situations, cannot guarantee protection against arbitrary combinations of breakdowns, violations of rules of operation and other unfavorable effects. They are, of course, extremely rare, but with respect to them the system at times remains entirely defenseless.

In order to ensure the safety of an automated complex the task arises for the development of an algorithm for monitoring a complex system which "strives," under any external influences, to control the system in such a way as to maintain it at the maximum "distance" from the boundaries of danger. In other words, to lead the system to one or another efficient or shutdown state.

Without going into the theory of the question, let us note that there are entirely down to earth reasons for every accident or emergency situation: human error; equipment breakdowns; unpredictable but entirely possible incidents. That is why today, as never before, correct diagnosis of events and understanding of the logic of their development in time are of great

importance. In other words, those working on the equipment must know precisely how a fire, an explosion, radiation, depressurization, etc. may arise. Precise knowledge of the conditions under which these dangers arise makes it possible, on the one hand, to take appropriate protective measures in a timely fashion, and on the other hand, to develop the algorithm for safe control.

Let us recall the Vega Project. The designers of the unmanned stations, who had to carry out a most difficult complex of experiments of the planet Venus and Halley's Comet, had a difficult task. They had to model the unfavorable conditions on the flight and approach path; develop an engineering method of protection; and determine its basic planning and design characteristics. In other words, they had to improve the survivability of the station. And this task was solved brilliantly.

Again I wish to emphasize the thought that we must not confuse and mix up two different problems -- reliability and survivability -- despite their many similar traits. In the Vega Project their difference was also manifested most distinctly. In the flight of many months the high reliability of the stations and their control was demonstrated, and in the one-day fly past near the core of the comet, their enviable survivability. These qualities were provided in different ways.

I repeat. In theory and practice survivability and safety at times are viewed as additional components of reliability, analogous to dependability, durability, maintainability and keeping qualities. All of this is not so harmless, for accidents and disasters are often the result of precisely the low survivability and safety of "man - machine" systems, and not only operational breakdowns of equipment. Let us recall what happened with the ships Mikhail Lermontov and Admiral Nakhimov, and the British ferry boat Herald of Free Enterprise. Everything took place with clear weather, calm seas and operable equipment. However...

Viewing safety as one of the attributes of reliability leads to a situation in which this problem is not given the necessary attention, and mandatory requirements for the analysis of the safety of complex designs are not formulated.

Modern quantitative theories of reliability and survivability are mainly based on probability models, for which a mandatory condition is the stability of the frequency of such mass events as breakdown or vulnerability. The appearance of "exotic" combinations, by their very essence, cannot be massive in nature, is not subject to experimental checks and is the result of their essential uncertainty.

The theory of safety (risk) -- and today everyone should know its fundamentals -- is to be relied upon for such models which have the goal, not so much of defining a mathematical measure of safety, as finding specific practical steps to protect against the system getting into a dangerous state. By analogy to known logic-probability methods, here it is useful to introduce such concepts as "the function of system danger," "the shortest path of dangerous functioning," "the minimum limits for averting danger," etc.

Careful thinking through all the shortest paths of dangerous functioning is useful for many reasons. It forces one to define precisely in each specific instance the concept of "a dangerous state;" it makes it possible to establish a unified interpretation among specialists of what should be most feared; it guarantees to a greater degree that all the circumstances and methods in which a system may shift to a dangerous state will be fully considered; and it encourages including in the examination of the causes of accidents and disasters not only the components of the environment, but also people who violate the rules of equipment operation.

Possibly these views will seem too theoretical. But, we are employing terminology and concepts which have already come into use. Moreover, the world of most complex equipment that surrounds us demands thorough knowledge. In particular, it demands knowledge of the organization of systems made up of multi-functional elements and the principles of their interchangeability, for the purpose of improving reliability, survivability and safety. Competent actions are impossible without improving the qualifications and professional knowledge of specialists. In this connection I wish to recall the words of Academician B. Paton: "Knowledge is expensive, but ignorance is much more expensive!"

The principle of interchangeability of elements can be employed, both in technical systems (in complexes, individual computer devices and flexible automated production), and in "man - machine" systems of various types (computer centers, crews of spacecraft and ships, comprehensive brigades, etc.). And with the help of appropriate models the "sources" of malfunctions can be counted -- from a burnt out microcircuit to the violence of the elements.

And here is one more thought. In complex (large) systems an accident, as a rule, only concludes a long chain of preceding events, which ensue one from another. The designer must know this for engineering analysis of the solution, and the operator must know it for his specific, almost automatic actions at each moment.

A reliable system may be both unsurvivable and dangerous. That is why it is necessary to develop practical measures to protect against the system getting into dangerous states, and not doubtful attempts at quantitative (mathematical) determination of safety measures (analogous with reliability). In developing new equipment it is also advisable to anticipate protection of the system against the "dangerous" intervention of operators, and in the initial stage to analyze its survivability and safety, just as we now do with respect to reliability. The times, and the need for a scientific approach to the technical (and economic) justification of designs, require this.

9069

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REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

BRIEFS

MILITARY-SCIENTIFIC AGENCIES' CONFERENCE--A methodological conference of the chiefs of army and navy military scientific organs has been held. Its participants were familiarized with the organization and work of the military scientific library of the Central Asian Military District Headquarters. It was noted at the conference that such libraries should become strongpoints of scientific work in the military districts, groups of forces and fleets. Other important topical questions of the organization of scientific work in the armed forces were also discussed, and ways of restructuring scientific work in the light of contemporary demands upon military cadres were outlined in the report by Lt Gen Ye. Kuznetsov, chief of the Military-Scientific Directorate, USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and in the statements by the conference participants. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 87 p 1] 9069

DEFENSE ENTERPRISES SHIFT WORK INCREASE--In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of production and industrial and motor transport enterprises, and in construction and certain other organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in 1987-1988 equipment will be shifted to two, three and four-shift operations. To provide the workers in these enterprises and organizations normal working and living conditions, the appropriate organs of the military directorate, along with local authorities, must restructure the operating regime of transportation, communications, public dining, trade and personal services enterprises and organizations, and other enterprises and organizations in the social sphere. Workers on the evening and night shifts must be provided hot food. It is anticipated that shops with extended business hours will be opened after the end of the shifts. Around the clock groups are being organized in kindergartens and nurseries, and the number of extended day groups in schools is being increased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 87 p 6] 9069

CSO: 1801/202

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA DEFINES U. S., NATO DOCTRINES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jun 87 p 3

[Unsigned article: "The Military Doctrines of Imperialism"]

[Text] Military doctrine is the system of views accepted in a state (group of states) at given time on the goals and nature of possible war, on the preparation of the country and armed forces for it, as well as on the methods by which it will be waged. Military doctrine usually defines with what enemy it will be necessary to wage combat in a possible war; the nature and goals of the war in which the state and its armed forces shall participate, and their missions; what armed forces are required for the successful conduct of the war, and the direction of their organizational development; the procedure for preparing the country for war; and the methods of waging war. The main postulates of military doctrine are stipulated by the socio-political and economic system, the level of production, the state of the means of waging war, and the geographic position of the country and that of the probable enemy, and stem from the domestic and foreign policy of the state.

THE DOCTRINE (STRATEGY) OF "DIRECT CONFRONTATION"

The strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR on the global and regional levels constitutes the foundation of U. S. military doctrine for the 1980s. According to a statement by U. S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, the strategy of "direct confrontation" is aimed at achieving "the complete and indisputable military superiority of the U. S.," "restoring the leading role of America in the world," "the active opposition to the USSR in everything and in all areas of the world."

The specific directions of U. S. military doctrine and of the strategy of "direct confrontation" are formulated in the document, "Directives on the Organizational Development of the U. S. Armed Forces." The directives found in this document indicate that American military doctrine is offensive and relies on nuclear weapons.

THE DOCTRINE (STRATEGY) OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The strategy of "flexible response" was developed in the U. S. and is today official NATO doctrine. It provides for the capability of waging both total

nuclear war, and "limited" wars with the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons. According to this strategy nuclear missile forces need not necessarily be employed as soon as a military conflict arises, and not in all situations. At the same time, NATO doctrine does not exclude, but has in mind, the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons.

THE DOCTRINE OF NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION (DETERRENCE)

The doctrine of nuclear intimidation (deterrence) is one of the basic strategic military policies of the U. S., as well as of a number of other NATO countries. Formally it proclaims that a most important prerequisite for security must be maintaining the effect of "deterrence" of a potential aggressor by "intimidation" -- most of all by means of American nuclear might -- in order to prevent certain of his actions, including an attack on the U. S. and its allies. The Soviet Union is proclaimed to be the chief object of "deterrence." Essentially this is a policy of threats aimed at the employment of military force. U. S. attempts to undermine the strategic balance by sharply increasing strategic offensive weapons, as well as Washington's plans for the militarization of space are included in the doctrine of nuclear intimidation (deterrence).

9069

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REVIEW OF NATO LASER TRAINING SIMULATORS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 87 p 3

[Article by Col G. Gladkov: "Laser Duels: People and Trainers"]

[Text] The "direct confrontation" doctrine adopted by the NATO leadership and implying the possibility for conducting a protracted war using only conventional weapons is encouraging the development of more and more new design concepts. In this case the efforts of foreign specialists are also directed at creating effective resources for the technical training of NATO servicemen. Emphasis is being laid on computers and lasers, which are widely used in modern trainers. As was noted in the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, electronic laser trainers simulating destruction of targets by fire are of special interest to the ground troops.

Since the early 1980s the USA has been actively using a trainer of this type-- the MAYLS [transliteration] ("multipurpose integral laser combat system"), a similar electronic laser trainer called the Simfire has become widespread in Great Britain, and the Talissi [transliteration] laser target destruction simulator was created in the FRG. A laser trainer developed in France was given the code name DX-175. There are reports in the foreign press that similar systems have been created in other Western countries.

The journal ARMY spares no praise in its advertisement of the MAYLS electronic trainer, declaring that it provides "unique possibilities not only for personnel training in conditions maximally similar to those of combat but also for extensive testing of the correctness of tactical and even operational conceptions." The trainer is supposed to make it possible to evaluate the outcome of two-sided tactical exercises accurately and objectively, and to reveal the preparedness of soldiers on the battlefield and the viability of combat equipment.

The possibility for conducting two-sided exercises with the participation of various subunits and to simulate mutual fire destruction of the opposing sides is believed to be one of the merits of trainers of this type. This can be done by equipping all weapon systems participating in a combined-arms exercise without exception with an outfit of apparatus that includes small laser generators and photodetectors.

The foreign press notes that a number of technical problems arose during the development of electronic laser trainers--ones for example such as simulating the real possibilities of a given weapon (a laser attached to an automatic rifle should not be able to knock an enemy tank out of action), creating the visual and noise background of combat (the laser "fires" silently), accounting for the fact that the laser ray strikes the target practically instantaneously, ensuring vision safety for the personnel and so on. Not all of these problems have been solved.

The USA and Great Britain have now created laser devices and detectors for many types of armament and combat equipment: automatic rifles, machineguns, the armament of infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, various types of antitank guided missile launchers, antiaircraft missile complexes, and the main types of tanks and combat helicopters. While only weapons capable of aimed fire were supplied with laser trainers initially, systems that simulate laser destruction of troops by artillery fire from covered positions, the effects of minefields and air strikes were developed later on. Special attention is turned to making weapon-mounted lasers lightweight, to keeping the sighting conditions constant, to allowing for installation of night vision instruments, and to avoiding significant changes in the center of gravity of infantry weapons.

Control units capable of simulating various characteristics of armament are being created for laser devices--characteristics such as minimum and maximum range of fire, the time of travel of a bullet or shell to the target, the kill probability and so on. After the standard issue of ammunition is expended, the unit shuts down the laser generator.

According to an American combat training pamphlet a "discharge" of a laser generator should be accompanied by discharge of a dummy round. Instead of dummy rounds, the English Simfire trainer uses a pyrotechnic cartridge that simulates the sound of gunfire and muzzle flash. The series of pulses emitted by a given laser is coded, making it possible to transmit, to detectors, information on the probability of target kill by the given weapon depending on the type of target and the range to it. The width of the laser ray corresponds to the destructive power of the ammunition (for example fragmentation ammunition is simulated by a ray of greater diameter).

Laser radiation detectors are mounted on clothing, armament and combat equipment. A special waist-belt bearing sensors is foreseen for soldiers, and several sensors are mounted on the helmet. English designers have developed an additional general-purpose detector outfit to be installed on prime movers, bridgelayers, engineering vehicles, trucks and permanent fortifications.

The detectors register three forms of laser ray action--destruction, partial destruction ("wounding" of a soldier) and a near miss, which is an indication that the enemy is firing on the given target. When the photodetector registers a certain number of "destruction" code groups, the control unit transmits a "target destroyed" command, and immediately a signal (a buzzer or siren) sounds, and smoke generators simulating the burning of the combat equipment ignite. The training ground's central computer keeps track of the "losses" of both sides.

England's Weston Simfire proposes using return reflection of the laser ray by means of an optical reflector as a confirming signal. In addition a flashing beacon is activated on the equipment. Signal smokes of four colors make it possible to keep track of the type of weapon credited with target destruction.

To shut off the buzzer, a soldier outfitted with MAYLS detectors must extract a key out of the laser transmitter and insert it into the control unit, which is worn on a special belt. The instructions require him to remove his helmet. In the English Simfire system, when a soldier is hit he must lie down on his back--only in this way will the siren stop. To make the subsequent exercise critique more objective, the computer records the times of all hits or near misses.

The foreign press published statements by soldiers who participated in laser "combat": "It is almost like real combat, if you don't learn fast, you don't live." "It taught me more than any other training." "All exercise participants have started attaching greater significance to utilizing terrain in combat."

Besides the didactic advantages, Western experts point out the economy of resources provided by electronic laser trainers. American commentators emphasize that while it costs over \$4,000 to launch one Tow antitank guided missile for training purposes, the cost of a laser "discharge" is incomparably lower. English specialists calculated that a laser simulator for a Milan antitank guided missile costs as much as two missiles.

But the delight over the merits of laser trainers has lessened somewhat in recent times. Critical remarks from users of the equipment have started appearing in the foreign military press. Laser exercises require special preparation. American specialists note that if the exercise leader does not conduct a careful preliminary briefing for the exercise participants, the exercise transforms into an "Indian hunt." It takes a long time to mount the lasers and detectors. For example it takes not less than 12 hours to check out previously installed MAYLS apparatus. This includes "ranging" the laser equipment. Doubts are also being expressed in relation to the adequacy of laser simulation of fire, inasmuch as a laser ray follows an absolutely straight trajectory. The sighting procedure is altered as well: Even at maximum range the gunner must aim at the center of the target.

According to the experience of recent exercises laser trainers are not distinguished by adequate reliability, and the successfulness of the trainer depends in many ways on something as prosaic as the condition of its storage batteries. Every MAYLS trainer outfit costs tens of thousands of dollars, it requires expenditure of dummy ammunition, and it incurs operating expenses.

Comparing different points of view, we find that foreign experts agree that electronic laser trainers require design improvements and further refinement in the course of exercises. How quickly and successfully both of these tasks will be completed, time will show.

11004

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EXAMINES WESTERN MINESWEEPERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Kolpakov, candidate of military sciences:
"Minehunters: Readers Want to Know"]

[Text] "As we know, a special type of minesweepers--minehunters--are being developed abroad to surmount minefields at sea. Please tell us about them."

I. Batyrov, V. Petrov

What kind of ship should a minehunter be? Foreign designers do not have a simple answer to this question. All that is clear to everyone is that they must be highly maneuverable when searching for and destroying mines, their magnetic and acoustic field must be low, and all mechanisms and systems must be highly shock resistant. Such a ship, naval specialists of the USA offer as an opinion, can no longer be looked at as second-string watercraft: They must be given some priority in shipbuilding programs.

Judging from articles in foreign publications besides the USA, the military departments of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, the FRG, Sweden and Italy display the greatest interest in building minehunters. Thus the journal NAVY INTERNATIONAL reports that French, Dutch and Belgian specialists signed an agreement two years ago for joint development of the "Tripartite" minehunter with a 500 ton displacement. The French Navy plans to acquire 10 such ships for itself, and the two other countries intend to obtain 15 each.

What is this minesweeper like? According to "Jane's Fighting Ships" its main dimensions are 47x8.9x2.5 meters, its minesweeping speed is 7 knots, and its maximum speed is 15 knots. It carries a crew of 49. It can sail independently for 15 days. The ship is equipped with a 1,360 kW diesel main propulsion unit in a low magnetic attraction design, and an auxiliary electric propulsion unit for silent running at a speed of up to 7 knots. Besides the traditional mine search and destroy system the minesweeper will be equipped with a PAP-104 remote-controlled submersible capable of descending to 300 m, a lightened contact sweep and resources to support six divers with an underwater weapons rating.

"Brekon" [transliteration] class and "Sundown" class minehunters are presently under construction on the basis of an order from the naval forces of Great Britain (respectively 13 and 12 units will be built). The full load displacement of the "Brekon" (Photo 1 [photographs not included]) is 725 tons, and its maximum speed is 16 knots (its minehunting speed is 8 knots).

The ship is outfitted with an integrated minesweeping system--a sonar station, acoustic and contact sweeps and an electromagnetic mine detector. The outfit also includes two remote-controlled PAP-104 submersibles and resources to support divers with an underwater weapons rating.

While the "Brekon" has a full load displacement of 725 tons and the American "Avenger" class minesweeper has a displacement of 1,040 tons, the Swedish "Landsort" has a displacement of only 360 tons (Photo 2). Its principal dimensions are 47.5x9.6x2.2 meters. Its maximum speed is 15 knots, and its minehunting speed is 4 knots. The ship has a sonar station, a contact and an electromagnetic sweep, two acoustic sweeps and a catamaran-type self-propelled radio-controlled integrated sweep. A Sea Eagle unmanned submersible is foreseen for investigation of underwater objects at depths to 60 meters. In extreme cases it can descend to 150 meters.

Minehunters of similar displacement are being built in the USA as well. An example is the "Cardinal" class minehunter (334 tons), the principal dimensions of which are 57.6x11.9x0.7 m (Photo 3). In the opinion of foreign specialists this ship is highly effective. Its velocity of 20 knots (12 when searching for mines) is relatively good, and it is equipped with a sonar station, all kinds of sweeps and a remote-controlled submersible.

If we look at the silhouettes of minehunters, we find that in principle they are all similar, as was noted in an issue of the journal COMBAT CRAFT. They have a long raised forecastle that extends far to the stern, and a developed superstructure with an adjacent funnel. Australian ships of the "MH CAT" class (Photo 4) have an original design--two interconnected hulls and a common upper deck bearing a central superstructure. A breakwater on the bow section of the upper deck covers both hulls to half their width. It serves as an obstacle to waves.

Sweep and crane booms intended to lower and raise remote-controlled submersibles, and winches and rope drums for contact, magnetic and acoustic sweeps are installed at the stern of all minesweepers. The entire length of the hull of these ships is divided into 6-10 compartments by watertight bulkheads.

The attention showed by minesweeper designers to ways to reduce their physical fields is emphasized in the foreign press. This is done chiefly by using nonmagnetic and low magnetic attraction materials, reports the journal NAVY INTERNATIONAL, by employing modern demagnetizing systems, and by developing and introducing methods of decreasing underwater and aerial noise. In most cases minesweeper hulls are made from fiber glass and, more rarely, wood and nonmagnetic steel.

The hull of the English "Brekon" has a single-layer fiber glass plating. It is molded as a single unit, and it is reinforced by a combination box framing (framing down to the level of the bilge keels and stringers beneath them). Metal fasteners are additionally installed below the water line. The minesweeper "Tripartite" has a similar hull as well. The hull of the Italian "Lerliche" [transliteration] has a frameless design with a thickened plating (80-100 mm) molded as a single unit (unitized plating). The hull of the Swedish minesweeper "Landsort" has a frameless design with a three-layer sandwich plating consisting of a foam plastic core and fiber glass shells molded on either side of the core. This technology is also to be used by American shipbuilders working on "Cardinal" class minesweepers.

The hull of the minesweeper "Avenger" is made entirely from wood. American designers proposed a laminated plating with an all-glued framing for it (with fir plywood stringers and oak plywood framing). Single- and multilayered wooden structures lined with glued plywood are used in the wheelhouse as well. As with all outside surfaces of the ship, they are also covered with fiber glass to protect against precipitation. Synthetic linings are applied to the hull beneath the water line.

It is noted in the foreign press that all minesweepers are equipped with special permanent demagnetizing devices. The intensity of the magnetic field is measured by sensors that transmit information to a central microprocessor or to independent microprocessors (one for each winding) that control the flex density.

One other problem typical of minesweepers is that of raising the shock resistance of the main engines and auxiliary machinery. This problem is solved in relation to propulsion units both by raising the shock resistance of their machine units and mechanisms in general, and by locating the most important components away from the hull. Italian specialists, NAVY INTERNATIONAL reports, were the first in the practice of minesweeper construction to permanently install counters on the hull of the "Lerliche" that measure the pressure of shock waves created by underwater explosions with the purpose of recording this information and predicting breakdown of machinery and systems.

In the opinion of reviewers minesweepers are protected against passive acoustic proximity fuses by employing machinery characterized by lower vibration and aerial noise: low-noise propellers and structures that smooth out the flow striking the propeller; vibration-damping materials and coatings; pneumatic and hydraulic film shock absorbers. To reduce structural noise transmitted into the water, an effort is made to locate machinery above the water line, on the upper deck, in special compartments. The main engines and other equipment are installed on vibration-proof foundations.

Evaluating the possibilities of modern minehunters, reviewers note that they can now work at sea states of up to 5 points: They can detect mines at depths on the order of 80 meters and at a range of around 500 meters, they can destroy bottom mines at a depth of 80 m in the presence of a 3 knot current, and they can sweep for anchored mines with a contact sweep at a speed of 8 knots.

Foreign military reviewers feel that we can expect even wider use of remote-controlled submersible and surface mine-clearing apparatus by minesweepers in the next few years. Owing to use of fiber-optic cables such apparatus could be positioned several kilometers away from their controlling ships. We can also expect an increase in the depth at which mines are hunted and destroyed--300 meters and more.

Such are the prospects; for the moment NATO specialists are intensively working on the tactics of mine warfare with existing resources. In particular these problems were addressed in the course of recent naval exercises code-named "Context-87," the major international "Rimpac" naval maneuvers of last year, and other exercises.

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REVIEW OF 3 BOOKS ON JAPANESE 'MILITARISM'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 86 pp 90-92

[Article by Colonel Ye. Aleksandrov under the "Criticism and Bibliography" rubric: "The Militaristic Course of the 'Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier'"]

[Text] "The Land of the Rising Sun" is familiar to us all as the exotic name for Japan. Interest in that state is increasing every year and there are a number of reasons for this. A multitude of tourists are drawn to the Japanese Islands by the beauty and uniqueness of its landscape. The national color of Japanese traditions, customs and ceremonies is becoming a target for photographic and cinematic cameras. The major achievements that Japanese scholars have made in science and technology and especially in electronics are of justifiable interest to those who advocate scientific and technological progress in other countries of the world.

Yet at the same time Japan has recently won itself another kind of fame. The dark haze of militaristic carbon monoxide is with increasing frequency flowing across the solar disk that is depicted on its state flag. Japan's constantly increasing military might and its involvement in America's strategy in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean represent a real threat to the peoples of that region. Three books published by the Central Soviet Press are devoted to precisely this problem. (1) ("Under the Flag of the 'Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier'" by V. A. Solovyev, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1986, 112 pages, price -- 35 kopecks; "The Armed Forces of Japan, Past and Present," Moscow, Nauka, 1985, 326 pages, price -- 1 ruble 90 kopecks; and "Japan: Again On the Path of Militarism" by Ye. B. Zaytsev and I. I. Tamginskiy, Moscow, Mysl, 1985, 181 pages, price -- 70 kopecks).

The book "Under the Flag of the Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier" contains extensive disclosures about the military aspects of contemporary Japan's foreign policy and indicates the role that the Japanese Armed Forces have in carrying out both the various types doctrines of Japan's military-political leadership and the strategic concepts of world imperialism. The author thoroughly examines the process of the so-called "Americanization" of the "Land of the Rising Sun's" foreign policy.

Based on convincing and factual material, the book shows how for the last decade Japan has firmly followed the path of America's strategy in the Pacific

Ocean area and in South-East Asia. More than 100 American military installations of various types and approximately 50,000 American soldiers are located in Japanese territory.

Washington's views on Japan's place and role in American politics has changed significantly in recent years. Statements by White House and Pentagon representatives unanimously stress that whereas this country was previously "the United States' junior partner," the situation has now changed radically, for the U.S. and Japan are the two largest industrial powers in the capitalist world.

The Washington Administration's new approach to the Land of the Rising Sun had an immediate affect on stimulating bilateral defense department activities. As is obvious from the book, this expansion of joint functions between Japanese and American defense departments is combined with the acceleration of already-existing bilateral obligations. And the events of the recent past are an eloquent commentary on this. According to foreign press, the Pentagon decided to position 52 F-16 fighter-bombers on Misawa Air Base (on the Japanese Island of Honshu) not by the summer of 1987 as the two sides had agreed, but a full six months earlier.

The book vividly shows the basic trends in American-Japanese military cooperation, its evolution in the area of military expenditures, expanded military production, qualitative and quantitative increases in the armed forces, and ideologically training the population and army personnel. The author stresses that anti-Sovietism is the primary rallying point for the forces of Japanese and American armed imperialism. The chapter "Ideology In The Service Of Reaction" is devoted to this problem. The documents that are examined in this chapter disclose a unique type of ideological training to get Japanese soldiers ready for the "coming imperialist robberies." And this inculcation of revanchist and anti-Soviet spirit is started at childhood.

The section of the book that is dedicated to Tokyo's block policy looks very interesting. One of its trends is NATO-ization. Published excerpts from Japanese and American documents directly show that "Japan has the same military alliance relationship with the United States as do the NATO countries." The author uses specific facts to show the process of gradually linking Japanese Armed Forces to the military machinery of the North Atlantic Bloc. The book specifically discloses that in 1979 Japanese-NATO intimacy received a powerful impetus. Under pressure from White House sponsors, a joint American-Japanese Working Group was created to study the future of Japanese-American military cooperation.

Other trends in the Washington's bloc-policy vis-a-vis Tokyo include Japan's involvement in already-existing (ANZUS) and planned (NEATO, NATO and others) military alliances. And the Pentagon is keeping up its attempts to infuse a militaristic spirit into economic and political alliances in the Pacific Ocean area and especially in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which Japan has various treaty obligations.

One would think that at the current stage materials on the Land of the Rising Sun's block politics as presented in the book would not have enough

information of a purely reference nature on the aforementioned political, economic and military associations in the area. Such information would undoubtedly make the book's conclusions much more persuasive and believable. The author should have gone into a little more detail on the 1951 signing of the Japanese-American "Security Treaty" which was in point of fact the starting point for the birth of militarism in Japan and the active participation of Pentagon "Hawks." This would have established the reasons for the White House's "touching concern" for the people on whom two American atomic bombs were dropped in 1945. In turn, a recounting of the events in Europe in the late 1940's and early 1950's would have helped the reader decide how converting its former enemies (Fascist Germany and militaristic Japan) into strong points became the beginning of American Imperialism's global strategy in its simultaneous battle against socialism, and especially the USSR, in the West and in the East.

The world's population, and especially people in countries of the Pacific Ocean Basin who still remember the horrors of the Japanese Occupation during the Second World War, is attentively following the development of events in Japan. And people in the Soviet Union who have more than once been the target of aggressive actions by Japanese militarists also cannot ignore the expansion of militaristic tendencies in contemporary Japan and the fact that it is getting more and more involved in the adventuristic global policies of American Imperialism. Proceeding from these trends, the collective of the monograph entitled "The Armed Forces of Japan: Past and Present" follows the process of the birth and development of Imperialist Japan's Armed Forces using rich historical and factual material, some of which is being published for the first time.

This book chronologically examines the Japanese Imperialist Army and Navy's place and role in the aggressive policies of its country's ruling circles at various stages of history, to include on the eve of and during the two World Wars, and also the primary trends in the post-war construction of the Armed Forces. The authors go into detail in analyzing a number of major military operations and therefore several of the book's chapters are filled with numerous graphs, dates and names of population centers. However it is easy to read this book because it does have the required maps, schematics and tables.

The examination into the present state of Japan's Armed Forces is a unique, quintessent publication. In it the reader will find answers to practically all questions relative to contemporary Japanese "self-defense forces," to include their structure, command and control agencies, how Navy, Ground and Air Force major units, units and subunits are organized, their technical equipment levels, mobility capabilities, combat readiness, the ideological training of their personnel and the Japanese Command's military-doctrinal views.

The monopolistic bourgeois and Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party realize that if the Army loses its popular support it will not be able to fulfill its assigned tasks either within the country or abroad. The military-political leadership is putting forth a lot of effort to transfer the Army's samurai

spirit to the civilian population and especially to the young people. The book goes into detail in describing the methods and means for initially preparing the Japanese people to be used by reactionary military circles.

Japanese policies and strategies carefully camouflage its military doctrine, anti-popular and reactionary character. Speeches by Japanese politicians that appear in periodicals are looking in vain for an integrated expression of the views that they have adopted on the specific questions of war, its goals and its possible nature, on preparing the country and the Armed Forces for war and also on the methods for waging this war. Despite this, on the basis of an analysis of the primary documents and facts, researchers have been able to show the basic trends and stages in the development of contemporary Japanese military doctrine.

The book "Japan: Again On the Path of Militarism" is a good vehicle for studying Japan's military policy at the present stage. It answers the natural question of our time: how does one explain that Japan, which suffered a shattering defeat in the Second World War and endured the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is again on the path of militarism? Why do Japanese leaders dream of revenge without thinking about what a future large-scale nuclear war will do to the country?

To answer this question, the authors take a short trip into history to show how the face of the present samurai has developed over several centuries. They then examine the rebirth of Japanese militarism. In 40 years it has gone from a 75,000-man "reserve police corps" to a full-blooded Armed Force numbering almost 250,000 men, an organization that is hypocritically called "self-defense forces."

The military policy of the Japanese leadership in recent years, beginning when Ya. Nakasone, the current head of the Cabinet of Ministers and a champion of the rebirth of militarism, entered the political arena, has been subjected to a detailed analysis. By analyzing statistical data and official statements by Japan's present leadership, the authors convincingly show not only the growth of Japan's military power, but also the process of implanting and strengthening the neo-samurai spirit both in the Army and in the civilian environment.

Materials in the book unmask various tricks that Japanese strategists and politicians have used to side-step the basic provisions of the 1947 Constitution and specifically Article 9 which states that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and also renounce the threat or use of the Armed Forces to resolve international controversies. And also that in the future the Japanese people will not develop ground, naval or air forces or other means for war.

And what is in fact taking place? Today the "Self-Defense Forces" have three arms of service equipped with very modern weapons. Their qualitative and quantitative levels (70 percent are officers and the remaining 30 percent are candidates in the various command positions) allow them to deploy an army of more than a million men in a very short time.

The book also unmasks the mechanism for overcoming the one-percent barrier in material allocations for the needs of the army. Facts show that the veil of several paragraphs in the military budget makes it possible for the country's military-political leadership to hide the Japanese militarists' growing appetite from the public. But even if one takes the official data of Japanese statistics (i.e., those which show that the one-percent has been adhered to), one can see the rate of growth for the National Defense Management's budget from year to year. For example, from 1960 to 1981 U.S. military expenditures increased by a factor of 3.9, the FRG's by a factor of 10.1, France's by 6.1, England's by 5.2 and Japan's by a factor of 24.8. This means that from 1960 to 1981 Japan made a sharp cut in the gap separating it from the major capitalist countries in Western Europe, the NATO members, in terms of the total volume of expenditures on militarizing the country. According to foreign press information, Japanese naval forces are now ranked 8th among Western sea powers. It is expected that by 1987 it will be in second place in certain types of weapons and military technology, and specifically in patrol aircraft.

The sections of the book that relate to the realization of military programs present data on the production of weapons for both today and for the future. And the authors show Japan's potential for producing nuclear weapons, its participation in the American program to militarize space and the use of Japanese technology to create the latest weapons systems for both its own army and the army of the U.S. The book contains information about American-Japanese cooperation and about the White House' attempts to knock together a three-way alliance that includes the U.S., Japan and South Korea.

In the concluding chapters the authors discuss the Soviet Union's position relative to its Far Eastern neighbors and the initiatives that the Soviet Government is making to normalize the situation in this area. All of this is again reflected in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev's 28 June 1986 address to the festive gathering dedicated to presenting the Order of Lenin to Vladivostok. He specifically stressed, "The Soviet Union is also an Asiatic and Pacific country. We are close to and directly involved in the difficult problems of this extensive region. This also defines our weighted and important view of this gigantic part of the world, a part that has concentrated such a great mass of diverse states and peoples. And our approach to them is based on our recognition and understanding of the realities that exist there."

There is no doubt that the book "Japan: Again On the Path of Militarism" holds its own among the other publications on the military problems of this country. On the whole, the monographs that are being reviewed will be a real help in explaining to soldiers the difficult international situation, the increased danger of a Japanese-American rapprochement and the necessity of increasing vigilance and combat readiness.

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12511

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CHERNAVIN, YAZOV AT RECEPTION--On 23 April Major General Kim Khak San, army, naval and air attache of the North Korean embassy in the Soviet Union, held a reception on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Korean Peoples Army. The reception was attended by USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Army General D. T. Yazov, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Colonel General V. S. Nechayev, and other generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces. The guests also included the army, naval and air attaches from a number of foreign embassies in the Soviet Union. Li Du Rel, acting charge d'affairs of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic, presided. [Text] [Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 87 p 2] 11004

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